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Abstract
This thesis consists of an introductory chapter, three main chapters, and a con-
cluding chapter. In Chapter 2, my co-author and I provide new empirical evidence
that the distribution of liquidity has a strong in-sample and out-of-sample predictive
power on intraday market volatility. To this end, we introduce a novel way of sum-
marizing the relative depth provision in the whole limit order book. Our measure,
global depth, considers the entire quoted depth and assigns weights decreasing with
distance from the best quotes. We document that global depth outperforms alterna-
tive predictors of volatility, such as the bid-ask spread, standard depth variables, and
measures of trading activity, in explaining the variations in market volatility.
The third chapter, forthcoming in the Journal of Banking and Finance, inves-
tigates the effects of competition and signaling in a pure order driven market and
examines the trading patterns of agents when walking through the book is not al-
lowed. We show that the variables capturing the cost of a large market order are not
informative for an impatient trader under this market mechanism. We also document
that the competition effect is not present only at the top of the book but persis-
tent beyond the best quotes. Moreover, we show that institutional investors’ order
submission strategies are characterized by only a few pieces of the limit order book
information.
The fourth chapter provides evidence that implied correlation is a significant in-
dicator of market-wide risk. From an aggregate perspective, I document that implied
correlation explains an important fraction of the variation in market excess returns,
with high implied correlation followed by an increase in subsequent market returns.
The predictive power is stronger at a forecast of bimonthly, quarterly and semi-
annually return horizons and robust to the inclusion of standard predictors. More-
over, I show that the information content of the correlation risk premium on market
returns is fully driven by the implied correlation. My findings indicate that periods of
high market-wide correlation produce a deterioration of the investment opportunity
set and, as a consequence, an increase in the equilibrium expected return.
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1.1 The Information Content of a Limit Order Book
The information content of the limit order book has been addressed extensively
in the theoretical literature of market microstructure. Being one of the first dynamic
equilibrium models on limit order markets, Parlour (1998) analyses the “competition
effect” on order choice. She suggests that an increase in the same–side thickness of
the LOB “crowds out” limit orders on that side, since higher competition decreases
the execution probability. Similarly, an increase in the opposite-side thickness is an-
ticipated as a decreasing execution risk, hence encouraging more aggressive behavior.
This crowding-out effect is symmetric for both sides of the book. In a dynamic equi-
librium model, Foucault (1999) proposes that the order choice depends mainly on the
asset volatility. When volatility increases, a limit order trader demands larger com-
pensation for the risk of being picked off by posting higher ask and lower bid prices.
This makes market orders more costly, which in turn increases the proportion of limit
orders on the total order flow. Foucault, Kadan and Kandel (2005) consider the ac-
tual spread as a determinant of the order choice of the strategic liquidity traders that
differ in their waiting costs. They conclude that for certain levels, high cost traders
(impatient investors) will submit market orders, whereas others submit limit orders.
However if spread increases over a cutoff level, all traders will supply liquidity to
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the market. Goettler, Parlour and Rajan (2005) solve numerically for the stationary
Markov perfect equilibrium in a model in which traders endogenously choose whether
to submit a market or a limit order and the order size. On the other hand, Rosu
(2009), similar to Foucault et al. (2005), models a continuous-time market, but with
a dynamic investor decision problem, i.e., an agent can modify her strategy decision
continuously. Two of the very recent theoretical works allow asymmetric information
for pure order driven markets; Goettler, Parlour and Rajan (2009) and Rosu (2012).
In Goettler et al. (2009), informed traders are liquidity providers, i.e., they submit
limit orders. However, in high volatility states, they switch their order choice to
market orders to take advantage of the mispriced orders waiting in the queue. Rosu
(2012), on the other hand, proposes that the informed traders can be patient or im-
patient based on how far the fundamental value is from the public price. That is;
if the fundamental value of an informed trader is well above the public price plus a
cutoff value, which is proportional to the volatility, then the agent will be aggressive
and submit a market order to take advantage of her information instead of waiting
to be compensated by a limit order.
Based on the aforementioned theoretical literature, Chapters 2 and 3 of this dis-
sertation aim at understanding the effects of the information content of a limit order
book in a pure order driven market. In “Global Depth and Future Volatility” we
propose a new way of summarizing the distribution of liquidity in a limit order book
and we examine whether this is informative about future volatility. On the other
hand, “Competition, Signaling and Non-Walking Through the Book: Effects on Or-
der Choice” investigates whether the state of a limit order book shapes investors’
choice of order submission.
We use high frequency data of the Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE). Our dataset
consists of order and trade books of the biggest 30 stocks (ISE-30 index). By matching
these two books, we reconstruct the complete limit order book dynamically. Hence,
17
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at any given time, we have a list of all orders waiting to be executed, whether they are
buy or sell orders, their limit prices, and the volume accumulated at each quote. There
are particular characteristics of our market that make it convenient for the analysis.
Similar to other markets (Australian Stock Exchange and the Spanish Stock Exchange
for instance), the ISE is an open limit order book market. Investors are able to observe
outstanding and traded orders in real time. Moreover, ISE is a fully transparent
market. The information is not limited to a certain quote, but investors can observe
the information of the whole book. Another particular characteristic of ISE, similar
to the Australian Stock Exchange, the Sao Paulo Stock Exchange (Bovespa), and
the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong for instance, is that walking through the book is
not allowed. When an investor submits a large market order, the unexecuted part is
converted to a limit order at the quoted price instead of walking up or down the limit
order book to be fully executed.
In Chapter 2, we focus on how the distribution of market liquidity is related to
market realized volatility, as well as how the distribution of individual-stock liquid-
ity is related to individual-stock volatility. To this end, we develop a new measure
that summarizes the distribution of orders waiting at different price levels, i.e., it
summarizes the limit order book distribution. Our measure, global depth, considers
the entire quoted depth and assigns weights decreasing with distance from the best
quotes. The construction of global depth is motivated from the current literature on
order choice. We conclude from this literature that not only the volume of orders at
the best quotes, but also the depth beyond the best quotes matters for developing a
trading strategy. Hence, our proposed measure has two ingredients: it summarizes
the volume distribution in the whole limit order book and weighs information based
on the price distance from the best quotes.
In order to construct global depth we first sample a limit order book for every 15-
minute trading intervals to obtain best bid and ask prices, submitted volume and the
18
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limit price of each order. We then calculate the (tick-adjusted) price distance of each
limit order relative to the best limit price and the proportion of volume waiting up
to each price level (cumulative volume distribution). Finally, we assign exponentially
decaying weights with price distance, and thus we give the highest importance to
the information at the best quotes, second highest to the second best quotes, and so
forth.
The economic link between liquidity and future volatility follows the predictions of
Goettler et al. (2005) and Goettler et al. (2009); if the volume of orders accumulated
away from the best quotes increases, this may signal to the market that the current
quotes are mispriced (“signaling effect”). In this case, large jumps are more likely, and
thus we expect higher future volatility.
We employ a standard predictive regression model of the market volatility on ag-
gregate global depth. We estimate the volatility of the value-weighted ISE-30 index
employing the two-scales realized volatility estimator proposed by Ait-Sahalia, Myk-
land and Zhang (2011). The aggregate global depth for both sides of the market
is obtained from the cross-sectional averages of individual stock’s global depth. We
document that global depth significantly and negatively predicts the intraday market
volatility up to 150 minutes ahead. In a simple setting, global depth variables explain
almost 25% of the variation in market volatility. Our measure is both economically
and statistically the strongest in explaining future market volatility among other
liquidity measures (e.g. bid-ask spread, Amihud illiquidity measure), standard pre-
dictors of volatility (e.g. trading activity variables), standard depth variables, and lag
volatility. We also provide evidence of out-of-sample forecasting performance; global
depth predicts market volatility up to 75 minutes ahead, and it explains over 14%
of the out-of-sample variation in the 15-minutes-ahead market volatility. Finally, we
document that the individual liquidity distribution–individual volatility relationship
is negative and significant for 83% of the stocks in our sample.
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Chapter 3 also explores the information content of a limit order book. This
chapter directly examines the effects of the book information on the order choice
of an agent. We specifically answer the following questions: (1) Does “competition
effect” dominate “signaling effect” at every level of the depth? (2) How does the non-
walking through the book market mechanism affect order decision of an impatient
trader? (3) What is the difference in trading behavior between institutional traders
and individual investors?
To this end, we model the order choice of an agent as a two-stage process. In the
first stage, an investor decides whether to be impatient and submit a market order,
or to be patient and submit a limit order. In the second stage, given that the agent
is impatient, she decides whether to submit a large market order or a small market
order based on the quantity to trade. On the other hand, if she is patient, she decides
her limit price, i.e., whether to place an order at the best quotes, within the best
quotes or beyond the best quotes. Hence, our empirical analysis relies on a two-stage
sequential ordered probit (SOP) model.
To analyze competition and signaling effects beyond the best quotes, we mainly
focus on the actions of patient traders. We document that for a patient trader, the
competition effect overcomes the signaling effect for the depth variables closer to the
best quotes whereas the signaling effect is stronger for the depth away from the best
quotes. Particularly, we find that the volume up to the second best quotes has the
strongest competition effect.
To examine the effects of non-walking through the book, we focus on the trading
strategies of impatient traders. When walking through the book is allowed, price
related variables such as spread, and price distances variables capture the cost of
a large market order. As expected, we find that none of these variables affect the
order choice of an impatient trader. On the other hand, a market order investor
considers volatility, previous price trend, and volume accumulated beyond the best
20
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quotes on the opposite side of the book while deciding the quantity to trade. This
result is also consistent with the non-walking through the book mechanism, since
these variables affect the execution probability of the limit order-converted part of
large market orders.
Finally, to study the trading patterns of institutional and individual investors, we
focus on the first state of the SOP model. Institutional traders only take into account
competition effect variables to decide whether to submit a market or a limit order. If
they are informed traders (Chakravarty (2001)), our results suggest that institutions
base their decisions more on their own private valuations than on the state of the
limit order book.
1.2 Implied Correlation and Expected Returns
Chapter 4 examines the predictive power of aggregate implied correlation over
market returns. The question of whether asset returns are predictable has a long
history in finance. Since Kendall (1953) indicated that stock prices could follow a
random walk, the literature has extended to provide evidence that stock returns are
predictable. Campbell (1987) and Fama and French (1989), among others, document
the predictive power of business cycle variables such as the term structure of inter-
est rates and the default spread. When economic conditions are bad, returns are
expected to be higher. As income is low, investors decrease their consumption to
invest more only if returns are expected to be high in the future. Lettau and Lud-
vigson (2001) show that the short-term deviation between aggregate consumption,
asset holdings, and labor (CAY) also predicts stock market returns. They argue that
transitory movements induced by time variation in expected returns are intended
to be “smoothed out”. Hence, investors will increase their consumption over wealth
(CAY increases) if subsequent excess returns are expected to be higher. On the other
hand, financial ratios have also been found to contain information on future returns.
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As Lewellen (2004) suggests, the negative relationship between the price-to-dividend
ratio and subsequent returns can be given by a mispricing view. When the price-
to-dividend ratio is high, prices are higher than fundamentals. In this case, returns
should be lower in the future, since prices revert back to fundamentals.
I extend this literature and explore the predictive power of a new variable, the
implied correlation, over future market returns. One of the first papers documenting
that correlation changes over time is by Goetzmann, Li and Rouwenhorst (2001). In
their study, they examine the correlation structure of the main world equity markets
and find that correlation varies over time, which makes the diversification benefits
also time-varying. Longin and Solnik (2001) present evidence that international cor-
relation increases in bear markets, but not in bull markets. In the same line, Ang and
Chen (2002) and Hong, Tu and Zhou (2007) study the stock correlations condition-
ing on extreme movements and find that the correlation is much higher for downside
than upside moves. Hence, the diversification benefits decrease in times when they
are most demanded. The time-varying nature of correlation and the reducing diver-
sification benefits in bad times motivate the question of whether correlation is a risk
factor, i.e., whether investors are willing to pay a premium for securities that pay off
well in states of high correlation.
Krishnan, Petkova and Ritchken (2009) investigate this question by using a physi-
cal measure of correlation and document a negative price of correlation risk. Taking a
different approach, Driessen, Maenhout and Vilkov (2009) decompose the market vari-
ance risk premium into correlation risk premium and individual variance risk premia
using index options and individual stock options. They illustrate that the negative
risk premium for the market variance is only consistent with a negative price of corre-
lation risk. Mueller, Stathopoulos and Vedolin (2012), on the other hand, analyze the




This chapter takes an aggregate perspective and investigates whether changes in
implied correlation affect the expected market risk premium in the time-series. To
this end, I use option data of the S&P100 index and its individual components to
construct the aggregate implied correlation. I estimate risk-neutral expectations of
variances from the strike of a simple variance swap introduced by Martin (2011). I rely
on a regression model of the market excess return on the lagged implied correlation.
The market risk premium is obtained as the CRSP NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ value-
weighted portfolio returns in excess of the one-month treasury bill rate.
My findings reveal that aggregate implied correlation is highly and positively re-
lated to subsequent market excess returns. I document that the predictive power
is stronger for intermediate prediction horizons, and robust to the inclusion of dif-
ferent control variables such as the price-to-dividend and price-to-earnings ratios,
consumption over wealth, default spread, term spread, relative risk-free rate, realized
variance, implied variance, realized correlation, market variance risk premium, and
the cross-sectional average of individual variance risk premia. The economic impor-
tance of implied correlation is the strongest compared to the rest of the variables; a
one standard deviation increase in implied correlation translates into 1.31% increase
in three-months-ahead monthly market returns.
The results presented in this chapter provide evidence that periods of high correla-
tion indicate an increase in aggregate risk; when business conditions deteriorate, risk
averse investors demand a higher risk premium to hold aggregate wealth, inducing an
increase in the market risk premium.
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Global Depth and Future Volatility
Co-authored with Ilknur Zer (London School of Economics)
2.1 Introduction
This paper examines the link between two central concepts in financial markets:
liquidity and volatility. Liquidity is essential for well-functioning financial markets.
It is generally ample but occasionally evaporates very rapidly, signaling the start of
a crisis. Therefore, it is crucial to understand the effects of liquidity provision on
market dynamics. This has gained an increased attention from regulators, market
participants, and academics alike. Nevertheless, we are still in the early stages of
accurately defining and measuring liquidity, due to its unobservable and multidimen-
sional nature. On the other hand, information on future volatility is one of the main
ingredients in assessing risk-return trade-off for portfolio valuation, derivatives pric-
ing models, and it affects the execution probability of a limit order. In this paper,
we propose a novel way of summarizing the distribution of liquidity in a limit order
book and examine whether liquidity dry-ups in equity markets anticipate spikes in
volatility.
Our focus is to evaluate the role of the relative depth provision in future market
volatility. Predicting market volatility, rather than an individual stock volatility, is
important because it approximates the aggregate uncertainty. It is an indicator for
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policy makers of the vulnerability of financial markets, as changes in market volatility
have systemic repercussions on the whole economy (see Schwert (1989) and Poon and
Granger (2003) for further discussions). An individual stock volatility, on the other
hand, may increase due to stock-specific news or announcements, and not necessarily
due to systemic events, such as a sudden withdrawal of liquidity. We examine the
volatility–liquidity relationship at an intraday level. Trading in financial markets
nowadays mostly takes the form of electronic markets, where trading occurs fast.
Hence, during stressed market conditions, liquidity may disappear very quickly. For
example, the withdrawal of the high-frequency liquidity providers has contributed
to the volatility present within the flash crash of 2010 within minutes. This makes
it desirable to study the market dynamics at an intraday level. Nevertheless, little
research has been undertaken to study the predictive power of market liquidity on
market volatility at an intraday frequency.1
The high-frequency relationship between liquidity and subsequent volatility has
important implications on traders’ order choice strategies. There is extensive evi-
dence, both theoretically and empirically that investors submit limit orders in high
volatility states (see Foucault (1999) and Ranaldo (2004) for instance). When volatil-
ity is high, the risk of being picked off by an informed agent increases, inducing in-
vestors to submit less aggressive orders. Another explanation is given by the option-
like feature of limit orders. Placing a buy (sell) limit order is equivalent to writing
a free put (call) option to the market (Handa and Schwartz (1996)). The higher the
volatility, the higher the option value of the limit order, as in this case the proba-
bility that the spot price hits the limit price increases. Hence, this paper presents
a statistical model to predict volatility using available limit order book information,
which can be employed by market participants to submit less aggressive orders when
1Relevant exceptions are Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2001) and Pastor and Stambaugh
(2003). However, both studies focus on a contemporaneous relationship at a daily frequency.
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volatility is expected to be high.
We provide new empirical evidence that the distribution of orders waiting to be
traded strongly predicts market volatility. We measure the liquidity distribution by
developing a short-run market measure, global depth. A stock’s global depth is a
weighted average of the volume of orders waiting at the entire limit order book, with
weights decreasing with distance from the best bid/ask price. The aggregate level
is the average of global depth of individual stocks. One natural motivation behind
the weighting scheme comes from the execution probabilities. Limit orders submitted
farther away from the best quotes have lower execution probabilities compared to the
ones submitted closer to the best quotes. Hence, a trader gives higher weights to the
information around the best quotes compared to the rest of the book.
There are several practical routes that one could take to construct a liquidity
measure. With our approach, we aim to fill a gap that is left by the existing literature.
Many studies focus on the volume of orders at the highest bid and the lowest ask
prices (depth at the best quotes). Some others include the volume of orders waiting
beyond the best quotes up to a specific price level. The main conclusion we extract
from these studies is that, although both matter, depth at the best quotes is more
informative.2 Hence, a relevant proxy to capture the available liquidity needs two
ingredients: it should consider the whole book and weigh the information in the book
based on price distances.3 In order to construct our measure, global depth, we first
sample the limit order book in discrete trading intervals. Second, we consider the
(tick-adjusted) price distance of each order relative to the best limit price. Then,
by calculating the percentage of total volume supplied or demanded up to a given
price distance, we obtain the empirical cumulative distribution function of the limit
2See Parlour (1998), Ahn, Bae and Chan (2001), Handa, Schwartz and Tiwari (2003), Ranaldo
(2004), Bloomfield, O’Hara and Saar (2005), Foucault et al. (2005), Ellul, Holden, Jain and Jennings
(2007), Cao, Hansch and Wang (2008), Cao, Hansch and Wang (2009), Pascual and Veredas (2009),
Goettler et al. (2009) and Valenzuela and Zer (2013), among others.
3Price distance refers to the position of a given bid (ask) with respect to the best bid (ask) price.
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order book. Finally, a stock’s global depth is the weighted average of the distribution
function, where weights are decreasing with price distances.
Compared to standard liquidity measures like spread, depth, and ratios based on
both spread and depth, global depth provides a more complete picture of the liquidity
provision by considering the whole book. Instead of focusing on the size of the orders
waiting, our measure is based on the distribution of volume at a given time. That
is, it measures the relative concentration of depth provision at each quote, which
reveals information of the disagreement on the true price. As models of Goettler
et al. (2005) and Goettler et al. (2009) predict, if orders waiting in a given book are
accumulated at a quote farther away from the best prices, then this signals to the
market that current quotes are mispriced. In this case, jumps are plausible, creating
higher future volatility. On the other hand, higher liquidity provision around the best
quotes relative to the rest of the book is associated with a consensus on the current
price; therefore, we expect lower future volatility.
While conceptually this study could be conducted in any limit order market,
there are certain market characteristics that are of particular benefit to address the
liquidity–volatility relationship. It is definitely helpful if the data contains the entire
order book. This is not the case for most data from the European and the US markets
because of the multiple trading platforms and hybrid market structures. That makes
the information flow fragmented. Furthermore, it is important for our analysis that
the market provides high pre-trade transparency, i.e., the market participants can
observe the whole book rather than being limited to the best five or ten quotes.
One exchange that meets these criteria and is relatively large is the Istanbul Stock
Exchange (ISE).4 The order and trade books from ISE form the dataset that we use
in this study. By matching these two books and removing the executed orders, we
4As of December 2011, ISE is the 20th (8th) biggest stock exchange in the world (Europe–Africa–
Middle East region) in terms of value of share trading in electronic order book trades with a trading
value of $405,136 million. See, the World Federation of Exchanges for details.
27
Chapter 2
reconstruct the limit order book. That is, for a given time we have the best bid and
ask prices, all of the orders waiting to be executed, their submitted prices and their
corresponding volumes.
Our empirical results contribute to our understanding of the relationship between
liquidity and future volatility of the efficient price. It is challenging to estimate
intraday volatility of the true price because of the microstructure noise arising from
several sources inherent in the trading process or high-frequency data, such as the
informational effects, bid–ask bounces, or data recording errors. Ait-Sahalia et al.
(2011) address this specific problem and provide the volatility proxy that we use in
our study.
We provide new empirical evidence on both in-sample and out-of-sample informa-
tiveness of the liquidity distribution on market volatility of the efficient price at an
intraday level. We show that global depth is both economically and statistically the
strongest among standard liquidity and trading activity measures, on explaining the
variations in market volatility. Out-of-sample forecasting tests provide formal evi-
dence for substantial forecasting power of global depth. It predicts one-period-ahead
market volatility with an out-of-sample R2 of over 14%, where the forecasting power
lasts up to 75 minutes ahead. Finally, we show that the time-series relation between
global depth and market volatility is not driven by variations in a particular stock
or industry, but rather that the relation is shared by the majority of the stocks. We
find a negative and significant relationship between the individual stock level global
depth and future volatility for 83% of the stocks in our sample.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the next section frames our work
within the context of the existing literature. Section 2.3 describes data and the
trading structure in our market. Section 2.4 explains the estimation of our measure
in detail. Section 2.5 introduces the econometric methodology and variables included
in the analysis. Estimation results, the out-of-sample forecasting evaluations, and
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robustness checks are presented in Section 2.6. Finally, Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Related Literature
This paper relates to recent literature that attempts to measure the liquidity
provision considering the whole book. Domowitz, Hansch and Wang (2005) propose
an illiquidity measure based on the supply and demand step functions for a given
security. By using data from the Australian Stock Exchange, they conclude that not
only the liquidity risk, but also the liquidity commonality, is priced in stock returns.
In another related study, Naes and Skjeltorp (2006) examine the informativeness of
the order book from the Oslo Stock Exchange. They introduce a new variable–the
slope of the book–that describes the average elasticity across all price levels with the
corresponding volumes, and show that it is negatively related to both trading volume
and price volatility. Our contribution to this literature is twofold: first, we propose a
new way of summarizing the state of the whole book, which considers the distribution
of depth at different price levels. In addition, our proposed measure, global depth,
weighs information provided by different quotes by assigning the highest weights to
the best quotes and lower weights for the quotes that are farther away from the
best prices. Second, by including several liquidity measures in our analysis, we run a
horserace among them and evaluate their performances in explaining future volatility.
Our work also builds on the literature illustrating that limit orders are information
driven. Foucault et al. (2005), Kaniel and Liu (2006), Rindi (2008), Goettler et al.
(2009), and Rosu (2012) provide theoretical background explaining that informed
traders may reveal their private information via limit order submissions. Foucault
et al. (2005) show that if spread increases over a cutoff level, all traders submit limit
orders. In the setting of Goettler et al. (2009), although informed traders are liquidity
providers, they switch to market orders in order to benefit from the mispricing in high
volatility states. In Rosu (2012)’s model, informed traders can submit limit or market
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orders based on how far the fundamental value is from the publicly available price.
Kaniel and Liu (2006) show that informed traders are more likely to submit limit
orders than market orders if the information is long lived. In the model of Rindi
(2008), liquidity suppliers can be either uninformed or informed. She shows that the
disclosure of traders’ identity decreases the adverse selection, motivating informed
traders to provide more liquidity. Bloomfield et al. (2005), Anand, Chakravarty and
Martell (2005), and Menkhoff, Osler and Schmeling (2010) complement this literature
by providing empirical evidence that informed traders submit limit orders. In this
paper, we document evidence from an emerging country stock exchange that the
limit order book contains information shaping agents’ trading decisions. We show
that several summary measures extracted from the limit order book have explanatory
power on future volatility.
Finally, our paper is closely related to the literature that examines the predictive
power of liquidity on volatility. In an early empirical work, Ahn et al. (2001) analyze
the interactions between transitory volatility and order flow composition by using data
from the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong. They show that an increase in transitory
volatility is followed by an increase in the market depth, where the latter is measured
by the total number of limit orders posted at the best quotes. Moreover, they show
that although the depth at the best quotes explains future individual volatility, the
depth beyond the best quotes does not have any explanatory power. Hence, they
conclude that the transitory volatility arises mainly from the scarcity of limit orders
at the best quotes. By employing cointegration analysis for the bid and ask quotes,
Pascual and Veredas (2010) separate transitory volatility from informational volatil-
ity (volatility arising by the actions of informed agents) and show that trade size and
quoted depth both at the best and away from the quotes have predictive power on
individual volatility. Duong and Kalev (2008) investigate the forecasting power of the
Naes and Skjeltorp (2006)’s definition of order book slope. They document a negative
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relation between future volatility and order book slope. Finally, by using data from
the automated futures market, Coppejans, Domowitz and Madhavan (2001) study
the dynamic relation between liquidity, return and volatility in a vector autoregres-
sive framework. Consistent with the aforementioned studies, they find a negative
relationship between liquidity and future volatility. We contribute to this literature
in two ways: first, we extract a new measure from the limit order book, and second,
we study the relationship between market liquidity and future market volatility.
2.3 The Market and Data
Our dataset comprises order and trade books of the individual constituents of the
Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE)–30 index for the period of June and July 2008.5 The
index corresponds to almost 75% of the total trading volume of the ISE for the sample
period.
The ISE is a fully computerized as well as a fully centralized stock exchange, i.e.,
the trading of the listed stocks has to be executed in the ISE via electronic order
submissions. Hence, our data fully captures the order flow. The information of a new
order arrival or execution is updated instantaneously on traders’ screens. All brokers
are directly connected to the ISE system and have access to the full book. Prior to
the submission of an order, they can see the quantity available at different prices, not
limited to the best five or ten quotes.
The trading occurs between 09:30am to 5:00pm, with a lunch break. There are
two opening call auctions: one for the morning session and one for the afternoon
session. In contrast to the opening sessions, during the continuous double auction
all of the orders submitted are either matched instantaneously, or booked until the
corresponding match order arrives to the system based on the usual price and time
5We sincerely thank Recep Bildik, Ozkan Cevik, Ulkem Basdas, and Huseyin Eskici from Istanbul




All of the orders include the price and the quantity. Trade occurs if a matching
order is submitted on the opposite side of the book. If an order is not fully executed,
then the excess is converted into a limit order at the corresponding price instead of
walking through the book.6 Moreover, there are no hidden orders; the price and the
quantity of all orders are fully displayed.
Order book data consists of information regarding the orders submitted for a given
stock and date, whereas trade data records the executed orders. The order and trade
ID numbers generated by the exchange system allow us to match orders in these two
books and track any order through submission to (possible) execution or modification.
Samples of the order and transaction data sets are presented in Tables A.1 and A.2 in
Appendix A. By using the order and trade books, we first reconstruct the limit order
book dynamically for each stock and obtain relevant information, such as the bid
and ask prices and corresponding volumes at a given time. Hence, the reconstruction
methodology enables us to obtain snapshots of a limit order book at any given time.
In particular, we have the same information that a trader observes: the volume of
orders waiting to be executed for the entire price range. We use this information to
calculate the relative frequency of orders waiting in every price level. Sample of a
constructed limit order book data is presented in Appendix A, Table A.3. To conserve
space, only the information up to the 10 best prices is presented.
Table 2.1 presents the descriptive statistics for 30 stocks in our sample. We report
the time-series averages of all the figures, except the market capitalization, for which
the value at the beginning of the sample is presented.
The results reveal that one of the biggest stocks in our sample, GARAN, is 40 times
more actively traded than the smallest stock, MIGRS. On average, the maximum
6This is similar to the Australian Stock Exchange, the Sao Paulo Stock Exchange (Bovespa), and
the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong, for example.
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics for Each Stock
The table reports the summary statistics of ISE–30 stocks for June-July 2008. The first column
presents the ticker of the securities in our sample. The market capitalization is the value at beginning
of the sample period in million Turkish Liras (M TRY). Number of Orders (Trades) is the average
of the total number of orders (trades) in a day. Ave. Trade Size is the daily average size of trades
in number of shares. Spread is the tick-adjusted difference between the best ask and the best bid.
Finally the last two columns report the average of the daily percentage of buy orders and limit
orders, respectively.
Mcap Number of Number of Ave. spread %Buy %LO
Orders Trades Trade (tick adj.)
Size
AKBNK 16650 2,609 1,643 5,376 1.04 46.79 68.56
AKGRT 1463 1,044 714 2,007 1.15 52.13 62.16
ARCLK 1664 1,003 576 1,234 1.25 45.50 71.04
ASYAB 1980 1,392 954 2,168 1.14 49.20 62.10
DOHOL 2160 2,438 1,546 7,676 1.06 44.11 68.74
DYHOL 1082 2,991 1,949 4,706 1.06 48.77 65.93
EREGL 9995 2,286 1,455 1,495 1.08 48.71 67.76
GARAN 14448 9,259 6,186 13,015 1.02 47.46 69.78
GSDHO 277 2,074 1,400 7,336 1.05 47.48 64.22
HALKB 7750 1,656 972 2,506 1.10 46.46 71.57
HURGZ 745 2,281 1,455 5,695 1.10 47.05 67.16
IHLAS 202 1,975 942 7,596 1.01 47.64 70.75
ISCTR 13165 7,332 4,732 6,777 1.03 49.48 69.81
ISGYO 459 700 367 3,448 1.11 44.94 71.81
KCHOL 7629 1,399 855 4,542 1.11 45.17 68.76
KRDMD 670 2,016 1,150 8,376 1.05 45.80 70.28
MIGRS 3614 346 152 3,040 1.03 38.90 70.28
PETKM 1024 1,156 688 1,537 1.14 46.81 70.54
PTOFS 2778 507 295 1,541 1.38 45.80 69.47
SAHOL 8676 1,103 713 3,076 1.15 48.54 66.25
SISE 1439 1,572 975 3,189 1.08 51.39 67.02
SKBNK 876 1,872 1,216 2,579 1.15 44.15 64.36
TCELL 17050 1,847 1,095 4,569 1.10 46.47 71.25
THYAO 919 1,252 787 2,040 1.10 50.52 68.10
TKFNK 2166 1,172 747 1,227 1.13 48.63 64.70
TSKB 490 707 448 3,840 1.06 48.98 63.23
TTKOM 14350 4,447 2,343 3,527 1.05 39.22 73.20
TUPRS 7387 1,413 761 1,036 1.07 48.45 73.68
VAKBN 4400 4,813 3,169 9,533 1.04 47.42 68.53
YKBNK 9999 2,939 1,911 7,562 1.04 48.33 67.08
Average 5184 2253 1406 4408 1.10 47.01 68.27
Median 2163 1752 973 3487 1.08 47.44 68.65
Min 202 346 152 1036 1.01 38.90 62.10
Max 17050 9259 6186 13015 1.38 52.13 73.68
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trade size is over 13,000 units, with a median of 3,500 units. In terms of the number
of orders submitted, GARAN is 5 times larger than the median, whereas MIGRS is
5 times smaller. The bid-ask spread is presented in column V. The results show that
the inside spread of the ISE–30 constituents is narrow, with a tick-adjusted maximum
of 1.38. Finally, about 68% of the submitted orders are limit orders and on average,
the number of buy and sell orders are almost balanced.
2.4 Global Depth and the Limit Order Book Distri-
bution
To evaluate the role of liquidity on future volatility, we first need a measure that
summarizes the state of a given limit order book. We want our measure to capture the
relative depth provision in the whole book to account for the liquidity supply beyond
the inside quotes. Intuitively, one needs to consider the whole book, not only the
information contained in the best quotes, because both price impact and execution
probability of an order could depend on the depth beyond the best quotes.7
Latza and Payne (2013) investigate the forecasting power of market and limit order
flows on high-frequency stock returns on a sample of traded stocks from the London
Stock Exchange SETS system. They define the limit order flow as the difference
between the weighted sums of the buy and sell limit order shares. The declining
weights associated with each limit order capture the price positioning, hence the
aggressiveness of a new limit order entry. Moreover, the extant literature documents
that the information provided farther away from the best quotes is less informative
compared to that from quotes closer to the best prices. One possible reason is that
the execution probability of an order is a decreasing function of the price distance.
Hence, while considering the execution probability–price trade-off, it is natural
for a trader to give higher importance to the information around the best quotes.
7For example, the execution probability of a limit order submitted, say at the second best quotes,
depends on the accumulated volume of orders waiting at the best and the second best quotes.
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These arguments bring the second ingredient of our measure: assigning weights to
the information provided in different quotes based on price distances.
To construct our summary measure, global depth, we first consider the distribution
of orders within different tick sizes along with their quoted volumes and calculate the
limit order book probability density function (LOB–PDF). Second, we obtain the
limit order book cumulative distribution function (LOB–CDF) by integrating the
LOB–PDF over the different ranges of price distances. A stock’s global depth is the
weighted average of the cumulative distribution function of the limit order book.8
Finally, the aggregate level of depth is approximated as the cross-sectional average of
global depth measures of individual stocks.
2.4.1 Construction of global depth
We obtain the limit order book distribution and global depth by employing the
following steps:9
1. For each security and each day, we sample the limit order books every 15 min-
utes, excluding the lunch break and the opening sessions.10 The first snapshot
of the book contains the unexecuted orders submitted until 10:00am, whereas
the last one contains all of the unexecuted orders submitted until 17:00pm.
Hereafter, the time subscript τ indexes these trading intervals.
2. We calculate the (tick-adjusted) price distance of each limit order relative to
the best extant limit price at the end of each snapshot. In other words, for each
8One could easily find good arguments in favor of constructing global depth from the probability
distribution function (LOB–PDF) instead of the the LOB–CDF. We repeat the analysis by using the
LOB–PDF and obtain qualitatively similar but less strong results. Hence, the rest of our analysis
depends on the measure calculated from the LOB–CDF.
9Appendix A, Section A.2, illustrates the steps with an example.




order i in the limit order book at τ , we define the price distance ∆ as:
∆buyi,τ = (p
B
τ − pbuyi )/tick,
∆selli,τ = (p
sell
i − pAτ )/tick,
where pBτ (pAτ ) is the best bid (ask) price in interval τ and p
buy
i (pselli ) is the limit
price of the ith order.
3. For each side of the book, day, and snapshot, we get the LOB–PDF by cal-
culating the percentage of total volume supplied/demanded at a given ∆ for
∆ = 0, 1, 2, ..,∆c.11 Therefore, LOB–PDF summarizes both the relative magni-
tude of the depth provision and its price location.
4. By integrating the LOB–PDF of the buy (sell) side over the ranges of ∆, i.e.,
by calculating the cumulative frequencies, we obtain the LOB–CDF of the buy
side (sell).
5. We define a stock’s global depth as the weighted average of the LOB–CDF.




F buys,τ (∆)g(λ,∆), (2.1)






for a constant decay parameter λ. A stock’s global depth of the sell side is
constructed analogously. Throughout the paper, we assume the following expo-
11To capture the whole book without missing any orders submitted farther away from the best
quotes, we set ∆c = 30.
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6. g(λ,∆) is a non-linear function of the decay parameter λ, which can be exoge-
nously given or estimated within a regression model. We obtain the “optimal”
decay parameter by employing a non-linear panel regression of the form:
σs,τ+1 = b0 + b1σs,τ + b2
∆c∑
∆=0
F buys,τ (∆)g(λ,∆) + b3
∆c∑
∆=0







csDs + εs,τ ,
where, for a given stock s in a trading interval τ , σs,τ is the mid-quote volatility,
F buys,τ (F sells,τ ) is the cumulative limit order book distribution function for the buy
(sell) side of the market, g(λ,∆) is the weight function previously defined in
equation (2.2), Tk,τ is the intraday dummy that equals to 1 if k = τ , and finally,
Ds are stock-specific dummy variables allowing for stock fixed effects.
7. For each stock s and interval τ , we evaluate global depth at the optimal decay
parameter λ̂ and calculate GDs,τ (λ̂), as introduced in (2.1). Finally, the ag-
gregated global depth measure is the cross-sectional average of individual stock
global depth measures.
Global depth is the convolution of two functions: the LOB–CDF and the weight
function. It is size-related and goes beyond the inside quotes. It aggregates all of
the orders waiting on a given side of the market, and focuses on how the available
liquidity is distributed across price levels. Thus, it provides a more complete picture
of liquidity. It gives the flexibility of assigning different weights to different quotes
based on price distances.13
12As a robustness, we use different weight functions. The discussion is presented in Section 2.6.5.
13Note that by setting λ = 0 one can assume equal weights for each of the quotes.
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By definition, global depth is related to the standard “local” depth measures, i.e.,
the quoted depth up to a given threshold. An investigation of their relationship is pre-
sented in Appendix A, Section A.3. From this analysis, we conclude that although
they are positively and significantly correlated, there is a non-trivial proportion of
the variation of global depth that cannot be explained by the standard depth mea-
sures. Hence, global depth captures different information than that of standard depth
measures.
2.4.2 Descriptive analysis
Figure 2.1, Panel A plots the limit order book probability density function (LOB–
PDF) averaged across intervals, days, and stocks (average LOB–PDF), whereas Panel
B plots the corresponding cumulative distribution (LOB–CDF). Panel A reveals that
for both sides of the market, the frequency of the orders waiting at the second best
quotes is the highest and the limit order book distribution is positively skewed. Simi-
lar to the findings of Bouchaud, Mezard and Potters (2002) for the analysis conducted
on three stocks traded in Paris Bourse, the empirical densities of price distance ∆
have a gamma-like shape.
Table 2.2 presents the descriptive statistics of the limit order book distribution.
The first column reports the summary statistics of the average LOB–PDF. The last
four columns report the statistics for four limit order book distributions at 10:00am
(beginning of the day), 12:00pm (end of the morning session), 14:15pm (beginning of
the afternoon session) and 17:00pm (end of the trading day).
The results reveal that the liquidity provision is concentrated closer to the best
quotes for the buy side compared to the sell side, which can be observed by comparing
either the mean or the skewness of the distribution. The mean of the distribution,
for all of the time intervals, is higher for the sell side than the buy side, whereas
































(b) Panel B: LOB–CDF
Figure 2.1: Panel A plots the limit order book probability density function (LOB–
PDF), averaged across stocks and trading intervals. Panel B plots the corresponding
cumulative distribution functions.
can also be concluded from the cumulative frequencies of volumes for different price
distances ∆. Around 40% and 30% of the depth is concentrated at the best or second
best quotes (∆ = 0 or ∆ = 1) for buy and sell sides, respectively. The frequency of
orders waiting 5 or more ticks away from the quotes is 35% for the sell side, whereas
it is only 23% for the buy side. Finally, the average variance of the sell side is 36%




Table 2.2: Summary Statistics: The Limit Order Book Distribution
For both sides of the market, this table presents the descriptive statistics for the empirical limit order
book distributions. The mean, variance, skewness, and the fractions of number of shares accumulated
up to a given price distance ∆ are reported. The first column shows the summary statistics of the
limit order book distribution which is obtained by averaging across intervals, days, and stocks. The
last four columns report the statistics for four limit order book distributions (averaged across stocks)
at 10:00am (beginning of the day), 12:00pm (end of the morning session), 14:15pm (beginning of
the afternoon session) and 17:00pm (end of the trading day).
uncond. 10:00am 12:00pm 14:15pm 17:00pm
Buy side mean 3.43 3.64 3.32 3.41 3.42
variance 18.42 20.06 17.67 17.83 17.52
skewness 2.41 2.34 2.60 2.33 2.35
up to 1 ∆ 0.40 0.38 0.40 0.41 0.41
up to 3 ∆ 0.68 0.66 0.69 0.68 0.68
up to 5 ∆ 0.82 0.81 0.84 0.82 0.82
up to 10 ∆ 0.93 0.92 0.94 0.93 0.93
up to 20 ∆ 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
up to 30 ∆ 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Sell side mean 4.63 4.68 4.64 4.56 4.73
variance 25.16 27.51 25.77 23.73 24.20
skewness 1.84 1.83 1.89 1.77 1.74
up to 1 ∆ 0.30 0.31 0.29 0.30 0.28
up to 3 ∆ 0.55 0.56 0.55 0.55 0.53
up to 5 ∆ 0.72 0.73 0.72 0.72 0.70
up to 10 ∆ 0.88 0.87 0.88 0.89 0.88
up to 20 ∆ 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98
up to 30 ∆ 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
2.5 Predicting Market Volatility
Examining the relationship between future market volatility and aggregate liquid-
ity at an intraday level is the aim of this section. To this end, after sampling each
trading day into twenty-one 15-minute intervals, we first calculate our proposed mea-
sure, global depth, for each stock and each interval. We then use the cross-sectional
average of individual stock global depths for buy and sell sides of the market as main
explanatory variables. The market volatility is defined as the volatility of the Istanbul
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Stock Exchange–30 index. We employ the following predictive regression model:










+ controls + ετ ,
where for a given interval τ , σMτ is the mid-quote-volatility of the value-weighted
index, and GDbuyτ and GD
sell
τ are global depth for buy and sell sides of the market,
respectively. Tk,τ is the intraday dummy that equals to 1 if k = τ .
We include the lagged volatility, σMτ , and interval dummies in the set of explana-
tory variables to control the well-known systematic intraday patterns and clustering
in volatility. Furthermore, we employ both the standard predictors of volatility and
other liquidity measures as control variables. Similar to the construction of GD, the
control variables are calculated as the equal-weighted cross-sectional average of the
individual stock measures.14
The coefficients of interest, a2 and a3, are expected to be negative; the higher
liquidity provision around the best quotes, the lower the future volatility. The first
possible link follows from the price impact of an order. If the liquidity provision
is concentrated near the best quotes, i.e., when global depth is high, then the price
impact of an order is lower, leading to smaller future short-term volatility. The second
link arises from the dispersed beliefs, based on the theoretical predictions of Goettler
et al. (2005) and Goettler et al. (2009). They show that an increase in the frequency of
orders waiting away from the best prices signals that the current quotes are mispriced.
Hence, an increase in the dispersed beliefs about the true price of an asset may make
large price jumps plausible, which in turn creates higher future volatility.
14As a robustness check, we repeat the analysis by calculating the value-weighted average of the
explanatory variables to proxy the aggregated measures. The results are presented in Section 2.6.5.
Our main results are also confirmed in these regressions.
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2.5.1 Measuring volatility: the two scales realized volatility
estimator (TSRV)
To explore the role of relative depth provision in explaining the volatility of the
true price process rather than the noise component, we calculate the return volatility
by employing the two scales realized volatility (TSRV) estimator proposed by Ait-
Sahalia et al. (2011).
Let X denote the fundamental log-stock price process. In financial data, instead,
we can only observe log-price Y , either in a form of transaction or quoted price, which
is a linear combination of X and some noise :
Yt = Xt + t,
where  is assumed to be independent of the X process for identification purposes
and X follows a geometric Brownian motion. The noise may be a result of many
microstructure effects: frictions inherent in the trading process, temporary liquidity
withdrawals, and measurement or data recording errors. In this paper, the market
microstructure noise is assumed to be i.i.d., however no additional distributional
assumption is imposed. In other words, we adopt the nonparametric case and let the
diffusion term be an unrestricted stochastic process (see Ait-Sahalia et al. (2011) for
further details).
Without the noise, the realized variance estimator, [Y, Y ](all)T =
∑n
i=1 (Yti+1 − Yti)2
is a consistent and asymptotically unbiased estimator of the quadratic variation of
the process X, 〈X,X〉T =
∫ T
0
σ2t dt, where T is any fixed time interval. However,
in the presence of the microstructure noise, Ait-Sahalia, Mykland and Zhang (2005)
and Zhang, Mykland and Ait-Sahalia (2005) show that the realized volatility (RV)
is no longer a consistent and unbiased estimator of the volatility of the true value
of an asset. It leads to an estimate of the volatility of the noise, instead of the true
price of the underlying asset. As a solution, Ait-Sahalia et al. (2011) propose the two
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scales realized volatility estimator (TSRV), which enables the use of the full available
sample data, and gives an unbiased and consistent estimate of the quadratic variation
of the true price process.
The TSRV is defined as:
〈X,X〉TSRVT =
√






where [Y, Y ](all)T is the realized variance calculated using the whole sample with size
T and





[Y, Y ]sparse,kT .
To obtain [Y, Y ]sparse,k, we first divide the whole sample into K number of moving
window subsamples (K = 5 minutes) with a fixed length of N , where N = T −
K. For example, the first subsample starts with the first and ends with the N th
observation, whereas, the second subsample starts with the second and ends with
(N+1)th observation. Then, we sparse each subsample with one-minute frequency. So,
[Y, Y ]sparse,k is the realized variance estimator of the kth one-minute-sparsed subsample
of returns.
Figure 2.2, Panel A plots the RV and TSRV estimates of a stock in a day calculated
for different sparse periods. Consistent with Ait-Sahalia et al. (2011), the TSRV
is almost invariant to the choice of the sparse period, whereas the RV estimator
changes dramatically, mainly due to noise embedded in the data. Panel B plots our
dependent variable, the TSRV estimate of the mid-quotes for the value-weighted index
calculated for each interval and day based on one-minute sparse periods (scaled by
100). There is substantial variability in the return volatility, with a standard deviation
of 11%. Finally, the augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron tests suggest the



































(b) Panel B: TSRV time-series
Figure 2.2: Panel A plots the realized volatility (RV) and the two scales realized volatility
(TSRV) estimates calculated at different sparse periods. Panel B plots our dependent vari-
able; the TSRV estimate of the mid-quotes for the value-weighted index calculated for each
interval and day based on one-minute sparse periods (scaled by 100).
2.5.2 Estimation of the decay parameter
A stock’s global depth is obtained by multiplying the cumulative limit order book
distribution with a normalised weight function and then taking the area below the
resulting curve. The weight function is a non-linear function of the decay parameter
λ, which is estimated by using the first 3 days of data as a training period and running
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the non-linear regression model introduced in equation (2.3). The estimated decay
parameter λ̂ is equal to 0.366, with a standard error of 0.173, suggesting a “moderate”
decay on the information provided in each quotes.15 Then, for the rest of the sample
period, for each stock s and interval τ , we evaluate global depth at the optimal decay
parameter λ̂, as introduced in equation (2.1), and calculate the cross-sectional average
of GDs,τ (λ̂).
Figure 2.3 presents the time-series plot of the aggregated optimal-decayed global
depth measure for both sides of the market. We see that the depth provision around
the best quotes on the buy side is higher compared to the sell side for most of the
trading intervals, in line with the findings discussed in Section 2.4.2. These two
variables are negatively correlated with a correlation coefficient of −25%. The average
of global depth is 49% (40%), whereas it ranges from 30% (24%) to 62% (52%) for
the buy (sell) side of the market. The augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron
tests reject the unit-root in global depth variable for both sides of the market.
2.5.3 Control variables
Trade-related variables
Since both trading activity and volatility depend on the news arrival process,
several studies have used trade-related variables to forecast price volatility. Consistent
with Bollerslev and Domowitz (1993), Jones, Kaul and Lipson (1994), and Foucault,
Moinas and Theissen (2007), the number of trades occurring in the interval τ , NT,
and the average trade size, AQ, are included to capture the trading activity.
15Our empirical findings are robust to the different training periods chosen. We use 5 and 10 days
of data as training period to estimate the decay parameter λ. The estimated parameter is equal to
0.304 and 0.335 when 5 and 10 days of data are used as training period, respectively. Hence, the
















Figure 2.3: This figure plots the intraday estimates of global depth evaluated at the optimal
decay parameter for buy and sell sides of the market. The estimation is based on the sampling
of a trading day in 15-minute intervals.
Relative spread
In a related study, Foucault et al. (2007) show that the bid-ask spread is infor-
mative about future individual stock volatility. Hence, we also include the relative
spread, relSPRτ , which is calculated as the ratio of the bid-ask spread to the mid-
quote prices for each interval.
Slope of the limit order book
Another measure extracted from the limit order book is “the slope of the order
book” proposed by Naes and Skjeltorp (2006). The slope measures the sensitivity
of the quantity supplied in the order book with respect to the prices. Furthermore,
Duong and Kalev (2008) document evidence for the predictive power of the order
book slope over price volatility. Following these studies, we consider the SLOPE as







where DEs,τ and SEs,τ denote the slope for bid and ask sides, respectively, for stock































where NB (NA) denotes the total number of bid (ask) prices. pk is the quote at the
tick level k. p0 corresponds to the mid-quote at the end of interval τ . Finally, νBt
(νAk ) is the natural logarithm of the accumulated total volume up to the price level
pBk (pAk ).
In harmony with the findings of Duong and Kalev (2008), we expect the slope
to be negatively related to the future volatility. The steeper the slope, the more
concentrated the volumes in the order book are in a given time interval.
Standard depth measures
The “local” depth, defined as the total volume available to be traded at the best bid
or ask prices, is one of the traditional measures of liquidity. We calculate DEPTH0buy
and DEPTH0sell for the buy and sell sides of the market respectively.
Recent theoretical and empirical studies document that the volume at and farther
away from the best quotes have a different impact on the order choice of a trader
(see Goettler et al. (2005), Goettler et al. (2009), Cao et al. (2008), and Valenzuela
and Zer (2013), among others). Moreover, Pascual and Veredas (2010) document
that both at and away from the best quotes are informative about future individual
stock volatilities. Hence, to capture the volume available beyond the best quotes, we
include the cumulative depth from the second up to the five best quotes for the buy




We employ the Amihud (2002)’s illiquidity measure, AMR, which is the ratio of
absolute stock return to the turnover. For stock s and interval τ , it is calculated as
AMRs,τ =
|rτ |∑NTτ
i=1 pi · qi
, (2.7)
where NT is the number of trades in interval τ , rτ is the return on mid-quotes between
intervals τ and τ − 1, qi is the number of shares traded and pi is the corresponding
trade price for trade i.
Quote-slope
We include the log quote slope, logQS, introduced by Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001).
The logQS aggregates the tightness and depth dimensions of liquidity. For each time






ln (qAτ · qBτ )
, (2.8)
where qA and qB are the volume of orders waiting at the best ask price pA and the
best bid prices pB, respectively. A decrease in the logQS means that the slope of the
best quotes is flatter and the market is more liquid.
Domowitz-Hansch-Wang illiquidity measure
Finally, we consider the illiquidity measure proposed by Domowitz et al. (2005),
DHW. This variable measures the cost of buying and selling Q shares of the stock,
simultaneously. The higher the cost, the more illiquid the stock. For each time



































where qAk and qBk are the volume of orders waiting at the kth best ask price pAk and
the kth best bid price pBk , respectively. m and m′ denote the position in which the
last sell and buy orders are executed. Finally, for each stock s, Qs is the median of
the accumulated volume of orders waiting in the book.
2.6 Empirical Findings
As a natural first step in our empirical analysis, we compare the explanatory
power of the optimal-decay-weighted global depth (GD evaluated at λ = λ̂), equal-
weighted global depth (GD evaluated at λ = 0) and the standard “local” depth
measures that take into account the depth provision up to a given threshold. We
further investigate the in-sample predictive power of global depth on volatility by
adding standard predictors of volatility and other liquidity measures in our analysis.
Section 2.6.1 reports the results. Section 2.6.2 asks whether the global depth-volatility
relationship holds for further horizons.
Our findings are based on regressions of the market volatility on lagged global
depth measures and different sets of control variables. Market volatility is calculated
as the two scales realized volatility of the mid-quote return of the value-weighted
index. All of the specifications use 21 trading intervals on 36 days and include intraday
dummies. To conserve space, we do not report the estimated coefficients of the dummy
variables. t-statistics are calculated using Newey-West standard errors to capture
possible autocorrelation in the residuals.
Finally, in Section 2.6.3, we examine whether the documented time-series relation
between global depth and future market volatility is driven by a variation in a par-
ticular stock or industry. To this end, we shift our focus to the relation between the
individual stock volatility and liquidity. We first run the regression model in a pooled
data with stock fixed effects. t-statistics are based on cluster robust standard errors
on stock level. The interval and stock dummies are jointly significant, but for the
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sake of brevity they are not reported. To take into account possible cross-sectional
variations that cannot be captured by the stock fixed effects, we also run the predic-
tive regressions for each of the stocks in our sample and report the summary of the
individual regression results.
The discussion of the results is based on the estimated coefficients, their statistical
significance, and the adjusted R2s. To improve the ease of interpretation of the
estimated coefficients, all of the explanatory variables are standardized to have a unit
variance, and the dependent variable is presented in percentage terms.
2.6.1 One-period-ahead predictability regressions
Our first focus is to examine the predictive power of the optimal-decay-weighted
and equal-weighted global depth measures. GDτ (λ̂) is global depth evaluated at
the optimal decay factor λ̂ and assigns exponential weights to the quotes based on
price distances, as introduced in Section 2.4.1, whereas GDτ (λ = 0) is global depth
evaluated at a decay factor 0, i.e., it assigns equal weights to each quotes. The
dependent variable is the 15-minute-ahead market volatility, σMτ+1. Table 2.3 reports
the results.
The results show a strong predictive power of global depth for both sides of the
market over the one-period-ahead market volatility. Irrespective of the chosen decay
factor λ, an increase in the average liquidity around the best quotes is followed by a
lower level of volatility in the next period. The explanatory power of global depth
evaluated at the optimal decay factor is higher compared to the one that assigns equal
weights to each quote. This confirms that depth closer to the best quotes is more
informative.
For all of the specifications, the economic importance of the buy side is higher than
the sell side. This asymmetry is consistent with the extant literature, documenting
that buy orders are more informative than sell orders (see, for instance, Burdett and
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Table 2.3: Predictive Regressions–Global vs. Local Depth
This table reports the estimated coefficients of the regression model defined in equation (2.4). The
dependent variable is the 15-minute-ahead market volatility, σMτ+1, calculated as the TSRV mid-
quote volatility of the value-weighted index (multiplied by 100). GD
buy
τ (λ̂) and GD
buy
τ (λ = 0) are
the cross-sectional averages of global depth of individual stocks, GDbuys,τ , evaluated at the optimal










τ are the accumulated volume of orders from the second to the
5th best quotes for the buy and sell sides of the market, respectively. All of the explanatory variables
are standardized. t-statistics are calculated using Newey-West standard errors to capture possible
autocorrelation in the residuals and reported in parenthesis. For the sake of brevity, the estimated
coefficients of the intraday dummies are omitted.
dep. var.: σMτ+15min I II III IV V VI
GD
buy






























σMτ 0.038 0.027 0.023 0.032 0.023 0.023
(6.82) (5.35) (4.96) (6.70) (4.97) (4.67)
constant 0.179 1.707 0.749 0.292 0.734 0.741
(7.94) (5.35) (8.07) (7.46) (7.56) (7.40)
adj. R2(%) 16.94 22.87 24.62 19.65 24.44 24.79
O’Hara (1987), Griffiths, Smith, Turnbull and White (2000), and Duong and Kalev
(2008), among others).
Second, the correlation between global depth and local depth measures reported
in Appendix A may indicate that these variables share common information on future
volatility. Hence, it is important to examine whether global depth is still significant
in explaining subsequent volatility under the presence of standard depth variables.
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To this end, we include both the volume of orders at the best quotes and total volume
of orders from the second to the fifth best prices in our analysis. Table 2.3 columns
IV-VI present the estimated coefficients and the corresponding t-statistics.
DEPTH0buy and DEPTH0sell, the total volume of orders waiting at the best bid
and ask prices, respectively, significantly explain the future market volatility. As
expected, a decrease in the volume of orders at the best quotes creates higher future
volatility. However, when global depth variables are included in the analysis, they
are no longer significant. Finally, we see that including global depth to the regression
significantly increases the adjusted R2 from 16.9% to 24.6%, whereas including all of
the local depth variables together with GD does not add any explanatory power. The
adjusted R2 increases slightly to 24.8%.
Overall, we conclude that the exponentially-weighted global depth has a superior
in-sample predictive power compared to the standard depth measures and compared
to global depth that assigns equal weights.
To confirm the robustness of the explanatory power of global depth on one-period-
ahead market volatility, which is documented in “simple” regressions, we include sev-
eral other control variables. Table 2.4 presents the estimated coefficients and the
corresponding t-statistics.
The results reveal that global depth for the buy side strongly predicts market
volatility. This result is remarkably robust to the inclusion of alternative liquidity
measures and standard predictors of volatility. Besides global depth variables, the rel-
ative spread and the slope of the book are both positively and significantly correlated
with the future volatility.
This result further extends the findings of Foucault et al. (2007), who document
that the relative spread has explanatory power over future individual stock volatili-
ties. We show that the aggregated measure has an explanatory power on the market
volatility as well. Yet, the estimated (standardized) coefficients show that our ag-
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Table 2.4: Predictive Regressions–Control Variables
This table reports the estimated coefficients of the regression model defined in equation (2.4). The
dependent variable is the 15-minute-ahead market volatility, σMτ+1, calculated as the TSRV mid-quote
volatility of the value-weighted index (multiplied by 100). GD
buy
τ (λ̂) is the cross-sectional average
of global depth of individual stocks, GDbuys,τ , evaluated at the optimal decay factor λ̂, as outlined
in Section 2.5.2. All of the control variables are constructed analogously. SLOPE is the slope of
the limit order book defined in equation (2.6), relSPR is the relative spread, NT is the number of
trades and AQ is the average trade size. AMR is the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure. The logQS
is the log quote slope, introduced by Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001) and defined in equation (2.8).
Finally, DHW is the Domowitz et al. (2005) illiquidity measure described in equation (2.9). All of
the explanatory variables are standardized. t-statistics are calculated using Newey-West standard
errors to capture possible autocorrelation in the residuals and reported in parenthesis. For the sake
of brevity, the estimated coefficients of the intraday dummies are omitted.
dep. var.: σMτ+15min I II III IV V
GD
buy
τ (λ̂) -0.034 -0.030 -0.030 -0.028
(-6.82) (-6.83) (-5.44) (-5.23)
GD
sell
τ (λ̂) -0.021 -0.017 -0.011 -0.011
(-3.51) (-3.14) (-1.50) (-1.56)
SLOPEτ 0.013 0.017 0.015
(1.87) (2.79) (2.26)












σMτ 0.038 0.023 0.013 0.015 0.011
(6.82) (4.96) (2.51) (3.30) (2.19)
constant 0.179 0.749 -0.796 -0.947 -0.889
(7.94) (8.07) (-2.54) (-3.14) (-2.87)
adj. R2(%) 16.94 24.62 28.81 28.88 28.95
gregated global depth measure is both economically and statistically the strongest in
explaining the variations in the market volatility.
The estimated coefficient of the slope has an unexpected sign. Naes and Skjeltorp
(2006) and Duong and Kalev (2008) document that the slope is negatively related to
the volatility. If the volume of orders is more concentrated in a given price, then the
book has a higher slope, signaling the consensus about the true price. Therefore, a
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higher slope should be followed by lower future volatility. To investigate this further,
we run the slope in a simple regression and see that it is negatively and significantly
correlated with the future volatility at a 5% level as expected (not reported). Thus,
we conclude that controling other liquidity measures changes the sign of the slope.
This indicates that the relationship between the slope and volatility is not robust
to the inclusion of other liquidity measures. Finally, we note that the adjusted R2
increases significantly from 17% to 25% with the inclusion of GD variables, whereas
we see a slight increase with the inclusion of further controls.
2.6.2 Predicting further horizons
In this section, we examine the informativeness of the limit order book distribution
at time τ on multiple-period-ahead volatilities. Specifically, we run the same baseline
regression model specified in equation (2.4), while we calculate the dependent variable
as the mid-quote volatility of the index at time τ + h, with h = 1, 2, ..., 10, where
for example, τ + 2 refers to the 30-minute-ahead volatility. The regression results are
presented in Table 2.5.
In Panel A we report the “simple” regressions, whereas Panel B reports the results
when all of the control variables are included in the regression equation. We see that
the significance of the estimated coefficients as well as the predictive power of global
depth is (almost) monotonically decreasing with the prediction horizon. Global depth
is significant for all of the horizons, suggesting that the limit order book distribution
is informative over the 150-minute-ahead volatility. When we add the other control
variables, we see that the relative spread and the slope of the book significantly
predicts longer term volatility as well.
Finally, although the illiquidity measure proposed by Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001),
the quote-slope, does not significantly explain the 15-minute-ahead volatility, the





Table 2.5: Predictive Regressions–Further Horizons
This table reports the estimated coefficients of the regression model defined in equation (2.4). The dependent variable is the market volatility, σMτ+h calculated
as the TSRV mid-quote volatility of the value-weighted index (multiplied by 100) in period τ + h for h = 1, 2, ..., 6. GD
buy
τ is the cross-sectional average of
global depth of individual stocks, GDbuys,τ , evaluated at the optimal decay factor λ̂, as outlined in Section 2.5.2. All of the control variables are constructed
analogously. SLOPE is the slope of the limit order book defined in equation (2.6), relSPR is the relative spread, NT is the number of trades and AQ is the
average trade size. AMR is the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure. The logQS is the log quote slope, introduced by Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001) and defined
in equation (2.8). Finally, DHW is the Domowitz et al. (2005) illiquidity measure described in equation (2.9). In Panel A for every time horizon, we report
the “simple” regressions, whereas Panel B reports the results when all of the control variables are included in the regression equation. All of the explanatory
variables are standardized. t-statistics are calculated using Newey-West standard errors to capture possible autocorrelation in the residuals and reported in
parenthesis. For the sake of brevity, the estimated coefficients of the intraday dummies are omitted.
dep. var.: σMτ+h Panel A: “simple” regressions Panel B: multiple regressions
0–15 15–30 30–45 . 105–120 120–135 135–150 0–15 15–30 30–45 . 105–120 120–135 135–150
GD
buy
τ (λ̂) -0.034 -0.029 -0.027 . -0.028 -0.027 -0.025 -0.028 -0.023 -0.023 . -0.024 -0.025 -0.025
(-6.82) (-5.55) (-4.60) . (-3.29) (-3.30) (-2.63) (-5.23) (-5.17) (-4.29) . (-3.01) (-2.93) (-2.91)
GD
sell
τ (λ̂) -0.021 -0.023 -0.022 . -0.020 -0.017 -0.016 -0.011 -0.011 -0.009 . -0.002 0.002 -0.006
(-3.51) (-3.46) (-3.07) . (-2.24) (-1.93) (-1.85) (-1.56) (-1.94) (-1.34) . (-0.23) (0.17) (-0.60)
SLOPEτ 0.015 0.023 0.020 . 0.017 0.011 0.010
(2.26) (2.69) (2.33) . (1.82) (1.31) (1.01)
relSPRτ 0.021 0.019 0.021 . 0.023 0.033 0.049
(2.12) (2.86) (2.89) . (2.47) (2.98) (3.43)
NTτ 0.008 0.013 0.006 . 0.010 0.005 0.009
(1.24) (1.86) (1.01) . (1.09) (0.45) (0.94)
AQτ 0.001 0.003 0.003 . 0.006 -0.002 -0.013
(0.28) (0.68) (0.75) . (1.15) (-0.35) (-2.13)
AMRτ 0.002 0.009 -0.001 . 0.002 0.001 0.000
(0.58) (7.56) (-1.12) . (0.36) (0.27) (-0.04)
logQSτ 0.014 0.027 0.022 . 0.018 0.001 -0.023
(0.96) (2.80) (2.40) . (1.62) (0.09) (-1.43)
DHWτ 0.003 0.002 0.005 . 0.015 0.018 0.013
(0.60) (0.52) (1.00) . (1.49) (1.86) (1.51)
σMτ 0.023 0.016 0.012 . 0.000 0.004 0.010 0.011 -0.001 -0.002 . -0.017 -0.006 0.004
(4.96) (3.40) (2.03) . (-0.07) (0.75) (1.62) (2.19) (-0.16) (-0.36) . (-2.29) (-1.06) (0.54)
constant 0.749 0.754 0.733 . 0.751 0.692 0.655 -0.889 -1.314 -1.200 . -1.124 -1.038 -0.996
(8.07) (8.50) (6.81) . (5.39) (5.24) (4.15) (-2.87) (-3.05) (-2.98) . (-2.70) (-2.43) (-1.81)
. .
adj. R2(%) 24.62 20.53 17.69 . 13.58 12.26 13.10 28.95 28.40 23.66 . 20.66 18.42 19.7755
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depth has a leading role in explaining longer horizon future volatility.
2.6.3 Predicting individual stock volatilities
This section examines the relationship between the limit order book distribution
and the future volatility, if any, on an individual stock level. To this end, we run the
following predictive regression:









csDs + controls + εs,τ ,
where, for stock s and interval τ , σs,τ is the mid-quote two scales realized volatility,
GDbuys,τ and GDsells,τ are global depth estimates for the buy and sell sides of the market,
respectively. Tk,τ is the intraday dummy that equals to 1 if k = τ , and Ds are stock-
specific dummy variables allowing for stock fixed effects. We employ the same control
variables introduced in Section 2.5.3.
We first run the regression model in a pooled data with stock fixed effects. Ta-
ble 2.6 columns I to IV report the estimated coefficients for the pooled regression
with the corresponding t−statistics. Second, we estimate individual regressions for
all of the stocks in our sample to take into account the possible cross-sectional vari-
ations that cannot be captured by the stock fixed effects. The summary of these
results are presented in columns V to VIII. We report the cross-sectional median of
the estimated significant coefficients at a 5% level. In brackets, first, we report the
percentage of the stocks with a significant coefficient at a 5% level, and second, we
report the percentage of the positive estimates (given significant).
Our main result is confirmed in these individual volatility regressions. Global
depth is negatively related to the future volatility for 83% of the stocks for the buy
side of the market. We conclude that the time-series relation between the aggregate





Table 2.6: Predictive Regressions–Individual Stocks
This table reports the estimated coefficients of the regression model defined in equation (2.10). GDbuys,τ and GDsells,τ are the individual stock’s global depth
estimates for the buy and sell sides of the market, respectively, evaluated at the optimal decay factor, as outlined in Section 2.5.2. In a given trading interval
τ , SLOPE is the slope of the limit order book defined in equation (2.6), relSPR is the relative spread, NT is the number of trades and AQ is the average
trade size. AMR is the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure. The logQS is the log quote slope, introduced by Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001) and defined in
equation (2.8). Finally, DHW is the Domowitz et al. (2005) illiquidity measure described in equation (2.9). All of the explanatory variables are standardized.
The dependent variable is στ+1, which is the TSRV volatility calculated using the mid-quotes of the orders originated in interval τ + 1 (multiplied by 100).
Columns I to IV show the results for the pooled regression. t-statistics based on cluster robust standard errors on stock level are reported. Columns V to VIII
summarize the results when the model is estimated for each stock separately. The cross-sectional median of the estimated significant coefficients at a 5% level
is reported. In brackets, first, the percentage of the stocks with a significant coefficient at a 5% level and second, the percentage of the positive estimates,
are reported. t-statistics are calculated using Newey-West standard errors to capture possible autocorrelation in the residuals. For the sake of brevity, the
estimated coefficients of the intraday dummies and stock fixed effects are omitted.
Pooled regression Summary of individual regressions
I II III IV V VI VII VIII
GDbuyτ (λ̂) -0.056 -0.059 -0.057 -0.054 -0.063 -0.059 -0.061 -0.055
(-12.40) (-12.88) (-12.71) (-12.35) [83/0] [87/0] [77/0] [77/0]
GDsellτ (λ̂) -0.020 -0.028 -0.017 -0.018 -0.040 -0.049 -0.057 -0.055
(-5.66) (-6.63) (-3.58) (-4.02) [27/0] [40/0] [13/0] [13/0]
SLOPEτ -0.006 0.035 0.028 -0.046 0.058 0.047
(-0.82) (5.56) (4.80) [33/20] [37/81] [27/75]
relSPRτ 0.051 0.014 0.009 0.083 0.056 -0.044
(5.50) (1.43) (0.91) [43/100] [43/54] [33/40]
NTτ 0.0331 0.036 0.046 0.046
(9.88) (10.93) [53/100] [63/100]
AQτ 0.000 0.004 0.029 0.030
(-0.02) (0.98) [23/71] [23/71]
AMRτ -0.002 0.001 0.001 0.015
(-0.80) (0.29) [20/50] [17/60]
logQSτ 0.077 0.080 0.115 0.108
(9.80) (10.22) [40/100] [43/100]
DHWτ 0.013 0.014 0.069 0.071
(2.67) (2.85) [30/100] [27/100]
στ 0.076 0.047 0.058 0.037 0.076 0.060 0.064 0.057
(15.17) (9.23) (13.33) (7.37) [97/100] [53/100] [70/100] [30/100]
constant 0.757 0.188 -0.192 -0.145 0.785 1.058 -0.102 0.692
(20.19) (1.25) (-1.39) (-1.09) [100/100] [60/94] [33/50] [30/67]
adj. R2(%) 13.40 15.10 15.80 16.20 10.07 13.74 13.53 14.4557
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industry, but rather the relation is shared by the majority of the stocks.
The results reveal the asymmetry between the buy and sell sides of the market at
the individual stock level as well. The sell side of the market is informative only for
27% of the stocks in the individual regressions. Although both sides of the market
are significant in the pooled regression, the economic importance of the buy side is
almost three times greater than the sell side.
Besides global depth, there are other pieces that contain information about future
individual stock volatility. In line with the main prediction of Foucault et al. (2007),
we find that a wider relative spread signals that the informed traders expect higher
volatility in the future. Moreover, the number of trades and the (log) slope of the
best quotes, logQS, are positively related to the future volatility.
In summary, we conclude that global depth on the buy side of the market has the
leading explanatory power on one-period-ahead individual stock volatility compared
to the standard predictors of volatility. This result is robust to the inclusion of the
liquidity controls. Besides the standard predictors, we provide new evidence that the
slope of the best quotes (an illiquidity measure proposed by Hasbrouck and Seppi
(2001)) predicts volatility.
2.6.4 Out-of-sample tests
The results presented in Section 2.6 document that our proposed measure, global
depth, significantly explains up to the 150-minute-ahead market volatility. Besides
global depth, the slope of the order book and the relative spread contain information
about the future market volatility. In this section, we assess the predictive ability of
these three measures through out-of-sample forecasting experiments.
We evaluate the out-of-sample forecasting ability of each variable compared to its
historical average. Specifically, for a subsample of observations up to a given time t,
we compare the h-period-ahead squared forecast errors with the squared difference
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between the realized value at t + h and the sample mean value up to time t. To do
so, we split our data into two subsamples: Tin is the estimation period and Ttest is
the testing period with Tin + Ttest = T . We then re-estimate the parameters of the
model in which we use the variable of interest as the predictor. Recursive estimators
of h-period-ahead forecasts are based on the sample starting from Tin up to T − h.






t+h − σMt ,
where σMt+h and σ̂Mt+h are the two scales realized and fitted market volatilities at time
t+ h and σMt is the mean value of the market volatility up to time t.
We evaluate the comparison by using two different metrics: the difference in mean-
squared errors (∆MSE) and the out-of-sample R2. If the proposed measure has
superior out-of-sample forecasting ability relative to the average of past data, then
both of these measures will be positive. Finally, we employ the Diebold and Mariano
(1995) predictive ability test (DM) to test the significance of ∆MSE. The difference





















Panels A and B of Table 2.7 present the statistics when the estimation windows
are 250 and 350 observations, respectively.
Our findings in Panel A reveal that the difference in mean-squared errors and
out-of-sample R2s are positive irrespective of the chosen forecasting variable. In other
words, forecasts based either on global depth variables, slope or the relative spread





Table 2.7: Out-of-Sample Forecasting Evaluation
The out-of-sample forecasting experiment results are reported in the table. The h-period-ahead forecast error is obtained as the difference between the realized
volatility at t + h and the fitted value of the predictive regression estimated up to time t, whereas the competing error is calculated from the sample mean
volatility up to time t. The dependent variable is the 15-minutes market volatility, σM , calculated as the TSRV mid-quote volatility of the value-weighted index
(multiplied by 100). GD
buy
τ (λ̂) is the cross-sectional average of global depth of individual stocks, GDbuys,τ , evaluated at the optimal decay factor λ̂. Similarly,
SLOPEτ and relSPRτ are the cross-sectional averages of the slope of the limit order book defined in equation (2.6) and the relative spread, respectively. The
out-of-sample R2(%) and the difference in mean-squared errors (∆MSEx1000) are defined in equations (2.12) and (2.11), respectively. Finally, DM denotes
the Diebold-Mariano predictive ability test. Panels A and B report the results when the estimation window is set to 250 and 350 observations, respectively.
Forecasting variable 0–15min 15–30min 30–45min 45–60min 60–75min 75–90min
Panel A: Estimation Window: 250 obs.
GD
buy
τ (λ̂) out-of-sample R2(%) 11.24 8.64 7.55 7.05 5.70 4.10
∆MSE 1.82 1.40 1.22 1.14 0.93 0.67
DM t−stat 2.76 2.54 2.49 2.33 2.05 1.52
GD
sell
τ (λ̂) out-of-sample R2(%) 2.51 3.83 3.17 3.33 3.76 3.91
∆MSE 0.41 0.62 0.51 0.54 0.61 0.64
DM t−stat 0.79 1.00 0.95 0.96 1.15 1.19
SLOPEτ Out-of-sample R2(%) 3.06 1.37 1.68 2.90 3.52 4.10
∆MSE 0.50 0.22 0.27 0.47 0.57 0.67
DM t−stat 1.63 0.79 1.38 1.75 1.55 1.26
relSPRτ out-of-sample R2(%) 15.39 13.93 13.54 13.43 13.12 13.64
∆MSE 2.49 2.25 2.19 2.18 2.13 2.23
DM t−stat 3.22 3.14 3.04 2.99 2.89 3.21
Panel B: Estimation Window: 350 obs.
GD
buy
τ (λ̂) out-of-sample R2(%) 14.48 11.96 11.33 10.00 8.12 6.15
∆MSE 2.00 1.64 1.55 1.36 1.10 0.81
DM t−stat 2.65 2.52 2.73 2.32 2.15 1.54
GD
sell
τ (λ̂) out-of-sample R2(%) 0.31 1.15 1.56 0.92 0.43 -0.67
∆MSE 0.04 0.16 0.21 0.13 0.06 -0.09
DM t−stat 0.08 0.22 0.34 0.21 0.10 -0.15
SLOPEτ Out-of-sample R2(%) 1.31 0.70 0.59 -0.07 -0.97 -0.93
∆MSE 0.18 0.10 0.08 -0.01 -0.13 -0.12
DM t−stat 0.53 0.48 0.40 -0.03 -0.37 -0.22
relSPRτ out-of-sample R2(%) 9.98 6.71 7.09 6.47 5.19 5.68
∆MSE 1.38 0.92 0.97 0.88 0.70 0.75
DM t−stat 1.77 1.44 1.45 1.35 1.04 1.21
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past volatility. The Diebold-Mariano test shows that only global depth for the buy
side of the market and the relative spread are the statistically significant predictors of
market volatility, relative spread being stronger. Moreover, we see that the predictive
power of both spread and global depth are decreasing almost monotonically with the
prediction horizon.
Panel B, on the other hand, uncovers stronger results for GDbuy. Our variable
delivers impressive out-of-sample R2’s from 14.5% when forecasting one-period-ahead
market volatility up to 6.2% when predicting 90-minutes-ahead market volatility. On
the other hand, we observe that all of the statistics are worsened when we focus on the
relative spread performance. The highest out-of-sample R2 is 9.98% and reached when
the forecast horizon is one-period-ahead. The statistical significance of the difference
in mean-squared errors is also found to be the highest for the same prediction horizon,
but only with a t-statistics of 1.77.
As a further analysis, we examine whether employing relative spread alone, or em-
ploying the buy side global depth along with the spread produces better forecasts. To
do so, the first forecast errors are calculated from the model where GDbuy and relSPR
are the explanatory variables, whereas the second forecast errors are calculated from
the model in which relative spread is the only explanatory variable. Similarly, we
repeat the analysis for two different estimation window sizes; 250 and 350 observa-
tions. The results show that, when we set the estimation window size equal to 250,
where both of the variables were found to have a good out-of-sample performance,
including global depth into the analysis increases the out-of-sample R2 by almost 7%.
The difference in mean-squared errors is significant at 5% with a t-statistics of 2.66.
When the estimation window is 350 observations, as expected, all of the statistics
improve. The out-of-sample R2 is increased to over 11% and ∆MSE is significant
with a t-statistics of 3.20. Note that by construction, global depth does not include
the bid-ask spread since the price distances are calculated as the position to the best
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quotes, rather than the mid-quotes. Thus global depth is related to the depth di-
mension of liquidity and can be thought as a complement of the tightness dimension.
Hence, we conclude that capturing both the tightness and the depth dimension of
liquidity significantly increases the out-of-sample forecasting power.
2.6.5 Robustness
We perform four sets of robustness tests. Our first set of robustness checks is on
the specification of the weights to estimate global depth. We employ the following








We re-estimate the optimal decaying factor λ via non-linear least squares as λ̂ = 1.318
following the model outlined in equation (2.3). We then evaluate global depth at λ̂.
Second, instead of sampling the trading day using the 15-minute snapshots, we
test the predictive power of the limit order book distribution on 30-minute intervals.
Similarly, we first re-estimate the decay parameter for 30-minute intervals as 0.364
and then evaluate global depth at λ̂.
Third, we perform a robustness test on the specification of the regression model.
We re-estimate the benchmark specification in equation (2.4) with the log-transformed
variables to allow the left-hand side of the equation to include potentially both positive
and negative numbers.
In our analysis, to proxy the aggregate level of liquidity, we first calculate global
depth for each stock and get the cross-sectional average. Our final robustness check
includes the re-calculation of the aggregated measures by using value-weighted cross-
sectional averages.
Our results are presented in Table 2.8. Columns I and II repeat the results for






This table reports the results for the robustness analysis. Columns I and II repeat the results reported in Table 2.4: the benchmark specification. Columns
III and IV present the results for the first robustness check, i.e., when the linear decaying weight function introduced in equation (2.13) is used instead of
the exponential decaying weights. The following two columns show the results when the sampling period is 30 minutes instead of 15 minutes. In columns
VII and VIII, we report the estimated coefficients for the log-transformed variables. Finally, the last two columns report the results when the explanatory
variables are aggregated via value-weighted cross-sectional averages instead of equal-weighted. All of the explanatory variables are standardized. In all of the
specifications t-statistics are calculated using Newey-West standard errors to capture possible autocorrelation in the residuals and for the sake of brevity, the
estimated coefficients of the intraday dummies are omitted. All of the variables are defined in Table 2.4.
benchmark linear-decaying weights 30–min. sampling log-transform. value-weighted
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X
GD
buy
τ (λ̂) -0.034 -0.028 -0.031 -0.027 -0.043 -0.041 -0.034 -0.029 -0.031 -0.028
(-6.82) (-5.23) (-6.55) (-5.07) (-5.41) (-6.03) (-6.86) (-5.29) (-6.20) (-4.40)
GD
sell
τ (λ̂) -0.021 -0.011 -0.019 -0.009 -0.028 -0.009 -0.022 -0.011 -0.022 -0.016
(-3.51) (-1.56) (-3.14) (-1.27) (-2.74) (-1.03) (-3.59) (-1.55) (-3.95) (-2.29)
SLOPEτ 0.015 0.015 0.039 0.017 0.021
(2.26) (2.21) (2.73) (2.60) (2.59)
relSPRτ 0.021 0.021 0.033 0.022 -0.001
(2.12) (2.09) (3.10) (2.24) (-0.09)
NTτ 0.008 0.008 -0.002 0.005 0.009
(1.24) (1.27) (-0.16) (0.74) (1.69)
AQτ 0.001 0.002 0.012 -0.001 -0.004
(0.28) (0.33) (1.45) (-0.29) (-0.99)
AMRτ 0.002 0.002 0.012 0.002 0.001
(0.58) (0.59) (2.24) (0.50) (0.39)
logQSτ 0.014 0.015 0.045 0.014 0.034
(0.96) (1.00) (2.93) (0.93) (2.30)
DHWτ 0.003 0.003 0.011 0.003 0.000
(0.60) (0.55) (1.66) (0.56) (0.03)
σMτ 0.023 0.011 0.024 0.012 0.047 0.02 0.023 0.01 0.025 0.01
(4.96) (2.19) (5.02) (2.23) (4.87) (2.01) (4.86) (2.60) (5.39) (2.66)
constant 0.749 -0.889 1.026 -0.704 1.016 -2.333 0.858 -3.220 0.626 -0.450
(8.07) (-2.87) (7.10) (-2.15) (7.02) (-4.05) (7.94) (-3.23) (8.79) (-1.63)
adj. R2(%) 24.62 28.95 24.31 28.68 33.23 43.02 24.84 28.83 24.26 27.2963
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robustness check, i.e., when the linear decaying optimal weights are employed instead
of exponential decaying weights. The following two columns show the results when
we use 30-minute sampling frequency instead of 15-minute sampling. In columns VII
and VIII, we report the results for the log-transformed variables.
Finally, the last two columns report the results when the explanatory variables are
aggregated via value-weighted cross-sectional averages. All of the regressions include
the intraday dummy variables. The estimated coefficients are omitted for the sake of
brevity. All of the explanatory variables are standardized.
The results for all of the robustness tests provide strong evidence for the informa-
tiveness of the buy side global depth on future volatility of the efficient price. The
sell side of the market is significant only when the aggregated sell side global depth
is approximated as the value-weighted average of the individual stocks. We observe
an increase in the informativeness of global depth, specially in a multivariate setting,
when the sampling period is 30 minutes instead of 15 minutes. All of the estimated
coefficients and the adjusted R2s are higher under the former frequency.
Overall, the results reveal that our findings for the informativeness of global depth
over future efficient return volatility is robust to the weight functions, different model
specifications, and the chosen sampling period.
2.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we evaluate the role of relative depth provision in future market
volatility. To measure the former, we propose a novel way of summarizing the dis-
tribution of liquidity in a limit order book, while taking into account the relative
magnitude and the location of the quoted depth. Our summary measure, global
depth, considers how liquidity is distributed in the whole book and assigns weights
to the information provided by different quotes.
By using high-frequency data from the Istanbul Stock Exchange, we document
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strong evidence that global depth is negatively correlated with one-period-ahead mar-
ket and individual stock volatilities. It dominates the explanatory power of standard
predictors of volatility. These results are remarkably robust to the inclusion of several
liquidity measures. Besides global depth, we find evidence that the relative spread is
informative, supporting the theoretical prediction of Foucault et al. (2007).
Out-of-sample forecasting experiments provide formal evidence of the predictive
power of both global depth and the relative spread on future volatility. We conclude
that including both measures in the analysis and thus capturing both the tightness
and the depth dimension of liquidity, significantly increases the out-of-sample R2.
We contribute to the existing empirical literature, which examines the informa-
tiveness of a limit order book on future volatility. However, this is the first study that
examines the predictive power of aggregate liquidity on intraday market volatility.
Moreover, we propose a new measure with a superior explanatory power compared
to standard liquidity measures.
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Competition, Signaling and Non-Walking
Through the Book: Effects on Order
Choice
Co-authored with Ilknur Zer (London School of Economics)
3.1 Introduction
The limit order book and the characteristics of an asset, such as volatility, provide
essential information for a trader who wants to design an appropriate order submis-
sion strategy. This in turn affects the price formation of an asset and the liquidity
dynamics in the market. Following this, there has been a growing research interest
on investors’ choice of order submission over the last decade. By undertaking an
empirical study of a pure order driven market, this paper aims to contribute to this
literature. Our contribution is twofold: first, we examine the trading patterns of
agents when walking through the book is not allowed, i.e., when orders that would
otherwise walk through the book are converted into limit orders. Second, we test
whether “competition” or “signaling” effects, two theories that have been proposed in
the existing literature, dominate each other for depth beyond the best quotes. Both
of these analyses are the first attempts in the literature.
In the Istanbul Stock Exchange, walking through the book is not allowed. That
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is, a “large” market order is first matched with the available volume at the best
corresponding quote. Then, the remaining part is converted to a limit order at the
quoted price instead of walking up or down the limit order book to be fully executed.
This market rule obviously affects the cost of a market order. When walking down/up
the book is allowed, the cost of execution of a large market order is higher since it
matches with less favorable prices (Hamao and Hasbrouck (1995)). This in turn
should affect the market order trader’s submission strategy. By focusing on the order
choice of an impatient (market order) trader, we analyze the informativeness of the
price information contained in the book.
In an early work, Parlour (1998) suggests that an increase in the same-side thick-
ness of the limit order book reveals high competition, which in turn increases the
submission of more aggressive orders in order to jump the queue (“competition ef-
fect”). On the other hand, in their recent theoretical works, Goettler et al. (2005)
and Goettler et al. (2009) argue that if the total volume of orders waiting beyond the
best bid (ask) is “too high”, then this signals to the market that the current quotes
are mispriced and should decrease (increase) (“signaling effect”). By calculating the
volume of orders waiting in the queue for the 10 best quotes, we analyze which effect
dominates at every price level.
Our analysis requires considering the reaction of patient (limit order) and impa-
tient (market order) traders separately to the changing market conditions. Hence,
similar to Pascual and Veredas (2009), we employ a two-stage sequential ordered pro-
bit (SOP) model. Although our methodology coincides with their study, our research
questions are different. In order to test whether competition effect is more persistent
than the best quotes, we focus on the actions of patient traders. On the other hand,
to analyze whether or how non-walking through the book affects the trading strategy
of a market order trader, we focus on the trading strategies of impatient traders.
Using the unprocessed order flow and trade data provided by the Istanbul Stock
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Exchange (ISE), we first reconstruct the limit order book dynamically. We use the
order flow, trade book and limit order book to analyze the effects of the informa-
tion content of the books on the order choice of a trader on a sample of 30 stocks
for the period of June and July 2008. Our data set has one major advantage com-
pared to many studies: since the ISE is a fully computerized and centralized stock
exchange (unlike NYSE, there is no specialist and unlike the London Stock Exchange
for instance, there is a single trading platform in the ISE), the data generated fully
captures the order flow and the execution process. Moreover, in our data set we can
distinguish whether an order is initiated by an institutional or individual investor.
By using this classification we examine whether the trading behavior is different for
institutional traders compared to the individual ones.
There are several papers that provide a theoretical background that the state
of the limit order book contains information that shapes agents’ trading decisions.1
Ahn et al. (2001), Ranaldo (2004), Beber and Caglio (2005), Ellul et al. (2007), Fong
and Liu (2010), Menkhoff et al. (2010), among others, investigate the state of the
book and its effects on order choice of an investor in an empirical framework. The
aforementioned studies consider the informativeness of the limit order book only at
the best quotes, as opposed to Cao et al. (2008), Cao et al. (2009), Pascual and
Veredas (2009) and Lo and Sapp (2010).
Using data from the Australian Stock Exchange, Cao et al. (2008) show that the
information contained at the best quotes affects order submissions, cancelations, and
modifications. On the other hand, the rest of the book matters for order cancellations
and modifications. Using the same data set, Cao et al. (2009) investigate whether
the prices beyond the best bid and offer and their corresponding depths matter in
price discovery. They conclude that the contribution of beyond the book to the price
1See Parlour (1998), Foucault (1999), Foucault et al. (2005), Goettler et al. (2005), Kaniel and
Liu (2006), Goettler et al. (2009), Rosu (2009), among others.
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discovery is 22%, whereas the remaining part comes from the current bid and ask
prices as well as the transaction price. Using a two-stage sequential ordered probit
model, Pascual and Veredas (2009) conclude that not only the best quotes, but the
information beyond the best quotes matters in explaining the degree of patience of
incoming orders. Moreover, they note that although the impatient traders strongly
rely on the best quotes, for limit order traders, strategic decisions are primarily based
on the state of the book beyond the best quotes. Lo and Sapp (2010) empirically
show the trade-off between order aggressiveness and quantity. Using a simultaneous
equations framework in a foreign exchange market, they conclude that order size tends
to be smaller when an order is more aggressive. That is, by submitting smaller size
market orders, traders avoid the higher execution costs. Our paper is the first study
that investigates whether the volume of orders waiting at different price distances
encourage agents to submit more aggressive orders and jump the queue, or rather
signal them to submit less aggressive orders. Moreover, an atypical feature of our
dataset enables us to examine the order choice of a trader when walking through the
book is not allowed.2
Our main findings can be summarized as follows:
• The competition effect dominates the signaling effect for both sides of the mar-
ket, in every stage.
• For a limit order agent, the competition effect is persistent beyond the best
quotes. We show that for both sides of the market, the volume up to the second
best quotes has the strongest competition effect.
• While fitting the size of her market order, for an impatient trader none of
the price information, neither spread or price distance variables, matter in our
2There are other studies that use intraday data from the ISE. For instance, Bildik (2001) and
Ekinci (2008) provide intraday descriptive analyses for the ISE. Bildik (2001) examines the intraday




market. This might be a result of the non-walking through the book, since under
this mechanism, the spread and the price distance variables do not capture the
cost of a large market order.
• We show that volatility, previous price trend and volume accumulated beyond
the best quotes on the opposite side of the book affect the aggressiveness of
market orders. This result might also be explained by the non-allowance of
walking through the book, since these variables affect the execution probability
of the unexecuted part of a large market order.
• Institutional investors consider only the competition effect variables while they
decide to submit a market or a limit order. If they are informed traders as
proposed by the existing literature, this may imply that institutions place orders
based more on their own private valuations than the information provided by
the limit order book.
The paper is organized as follows: Next section describes data and introduce the
order aggressiveness categories. Section 3.3 presents the econometric methodology;
the two-stage sequential ordered probit model. In Section 3.4, we list the explanatory
variables and discuss the empirical questions. Section 3.5 presents the empirical
findings and robustness checks. Finally section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 The Market and Data
3.2.1 Trading structure in the Istanbul Stock Exchange
The Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE) is operating as a fully computerized pure
order-driven market since November 1994. As of December 2012, the ISE index
had a $358 billion value of shares traded year-to-date and $315 billion of market
capitalization. The total value of shares trading and the market capitalization were
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3% and 2% of NYSE respectively.3 In terms of value of shares traded, it is the 20th
largest stock exchange in the world and 5th within the emerging countries.4
Similar to all other major exchanges, a trading day starts with a call market
matching mechanism to determine the opening price. For the rest of the day, a double
auction continuous order matching mechanism is used for trading. Trading occurs in
two sessions with a lunch break and every order is valid for a corresponding session or
for a day. For the period under consideration, the double-continuous auction trading
occurs between 9:45–12:00 in the morning session and 14:00–17:00 in the afternoon
session. A given order is either matched, resulting in a trade, or queued up in a limit
order book waiting to be executed based on the usual price and time priorities. The
fully computerized system ensures the strict enforcement of those priority rules. The
status of a given security is updated almost instantaneously on the traders’ screens,
whenever there is an order arrival, or execution.
Similar to the Australian Stock Exchange and the Spanish Stock Exchange for
instance, the ISE is an open limit order book market. In this market, both individual
and institutional investors are directly connected to the ISE system and they can
observe the book in real time. On the other hand, the ISE offers more pre-trade
transparency compared to many other exchanges. Upon arrival, traders can observe
all of the orders submitted/traded, with the corresponding prices and volumes. The
information is not truncated to any price step. Moreover, for the executed orders
only, they can see the name of the corresponding party who initiated the trade.5 The
open book and pre-trade transparency properties are relevant for our study since we
examine the “competition” and “signaling” effects beyond the best quotes up to the
10 best prices.
3Source: World Federation of Stock Exchanges.
4Emerging countries are classified based on the list of the International Monetary Fund July 16,
2012 report.
5The non-anonymity has changed by October 2010, but for the sample under consideration,
traders can identify the name of the trading parties.
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The other market mechanism worth to emphasize is that walking through the
book is not allowed in the ISE, similar to the Australian Stock Exchange, the Sao
Paulo Stock Exchange (Bovespa), and the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong, for example.
Hence, the unexecuted portion of a marketable limit order6 is converted to a limit
order. If an investor wishes to buy (sell) shares by walking up (down) the book, she
needs to use appropriate limit orders. This characteristic allows us to examine the
effects of this particular market mechanism on the order choice of a market order
trader.
3.2.2 Data and descriptive analysis
Our dataset contains the order and trade books for the period of June and July
2008 for the biggest 30 stocks listed on the Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE–30 index).
The 30 stocks in our sample correspond to 75% of the total trading volume of the
ISE for the period under consideration. These data sets allow us to reconstruct the
complete limit order book dynamically. The order book data consists of all submitted
orders for a given stock and date, their corresponding prices and quantities, order
submission times, an order identification number (order ID), buy/sell indicator, as
well as whether the trader is an institutional or an individual one. On the other hand,
the transaction data consists of all the executed orders, their corresponding prices and
quantities, and execution times. These two books are linked to each other with order
and trade ID numbers generated by the ISE system. Hence, our data enables us to
track an order from submission to execution or modification (if any).
To reconstruct the limit order book, we incorporate every order according to the
price and time priority rules and fill in the limit order book one by one. If the price of
a new-coming buy (sell) order is higher (lower) than or equal to the ask (bid) price,
we classify it as a market order. A market order is matched with the corresponding
6In this study, we call marketable limit orders as market orders following Payne (2003) and
Hasbrouck and Saar (2009).
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order(s) from the other side of the book and removed from the limit order book.
Moreover, if an order revision (including the split) is submitted, the original order is
removed from the limit order book. For a given limit order book snapshot, we have a
list of orders submitted but not yet executed, whether they are buy or sell orders and
originated by individual or institutional traders, price and volume information up to
the 10th best quotes. The volume available at the best, second best, and up to the 10th
best prices are calculated as the total volume of orders waiting at that price level.
Hence, by reconstructing the limit order book, we have access to the information
on both the length (price information) and the height (the corresponding volume
information) of a limit order book, which is crucial for our analysis to understand
how the information beyond the best quotes affects the order submission strategies
of agents.
Table 3.1 reports the descriptive statistics of the order flow and trade book, av-
eraged across the sample period. Besides the market capitalization, for which the
value at the beginning of the sample period in million Turkish Liras (M TRY) is
presented, all of the figures are obtained by averaging across trading days (excluding
the opening sessions). The results show that, on average 2253 orders are submitted
in a day, equivalent to 83 million TRY.7 The highest number of orders is submitted
and traded by Garanti Bankasi (GARAN) investors, whereas the smallest one is for
Migros (MIGRS). In terms of volume of orders submitted, GARAN is 8 times bigger
than the average, whereas MIGRS, is 9 times smaller than the average. Although our
sample is composed by the 30 biggest stocks traded in the ISE, these results show a
high degree of heterogeneity in the sample of study. On average around 1400 trades
occur in a day with a total daily average trade size of 9 million shares. This corre-
sponds to an average value traded of around 28 million TRY per day. The number
of buy orders is slightly less than the number of sell orders, and the number of limit
7On 25th of July 2008, the exchange rate was 1.20USD/TRY.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics for Each Stock
The table reports the summary statistics of ISE–30 stocks for June–July 2008. The first and the
second columns present the ticker and names of the securities in our sample, respectively. The
market capitalization is the value at beginning of the sample period in million Turkish Liras (M
TRY). Number of Orders (Trades) is the average of the total number of orders (trades) in a day.
Volume of Orders (Trades) is the average of the daily number of shares submitted (traded). Value of
Orders (Trades) is the average of the daily value of orders (trades) (volume x price). Spread is the
tick-adjusted difference between the best ask and the best bid. Finally the last two columns report
the average of the daily percentage of buy orders and limit orders, respectively.
Company Company Market Number of Volume of Value of
Ticker Name Capitalization Orders Orders Orders
(M TRY) (M shares) (M TRY)
AKBNK Akbank 16650 2609 26 130.63
AKGRT Aksigorta 1463 1044 4 18.35
ARCLK Arcelik 1664 1003 2 10.51
ASYAB Asya Katilim Bankasi 1980 1392 7 16.94
DOHOL Dogan Holding 2160 2438 37 54.95
DYHOL Dogan Yayin Holding 1082 2991 28 46.06
EREGL Eregli Demir Celik 9995 2286 7 61.99
GARAN Garanti Bankasi 14448 9259 221 749.10
GSDHO Gsd Holding 277 2074 33 35.77
HALKB Halk Bankasi 7750 1656 8 49.35
HURGZ Hurriyet Gazetesi 745 2281 29 45.50
IHLAS Ihlas Holding 202 1975 32 18.15
ISCTR Is Bankasi 13165 7332 89 393.63
ISGYO Is GMYO 459 700 5 4.94
KCHOL Koc Holding 7629 1399 12 41.51
KRDMD Kardemir 670 2016 34 38.73
MIGRS Migros 3614 346 3 60.88
PETKM Petkim 1024 1156 4 20.39
PTOFS Petrol Ofisi 2778 507 2 8.47
SAHOL Sabanci Holding 8676 1103 7 28.25
SISE Sise Cam 1439 1572 10 14.73
SKBNK Sekerbank 876 1872 10 21.47
TCELL Turkcell 17050 1847 15 117.95
THYAO Turk Hava Yollari 919 1252 5 26.83
TKFNK Tekfen Holding 2166 1172 3 25.96
TSKB TSKB 490 707 6 5.73
TTKOM Turk Telekom 14350 4447 29 119.25
TUPRS Tupras 7387 1413 3 75.11
VAKBN Vakiflar Bankasi 4400 4813 86 151.08
YKBNK Yapi ve Kredi Bankasi 9999 2939 42 106.19
Average 5184 2253 26.52 83.28
Median 2163 1752 10.04 40.12
Min 202 346 1.59 4.94
Max 17050 9259 221.13 749.10
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics for Each Stock (cont.)
Company Number of Volume Value Spread %Buy %LO
Ticker Trades Traded Traded (tick adj.)
(M shares) (M TRY)
AKBNK 1643 8.81 44.09 1.04 46.79 68.56
AKGRT 714 1.54 6.59 1.15 52.13 62.16
ARCLK 576 0.75 3.27 1.25 45.50 71.04
ASYAB 954 2.19 5.64 1.14 49.20 62.10
DOHOL 1546 12.37 18.45 1.06 44.11 68.74
DYHOL 1949 9.45 15.40 1.06 48.77 65.93
EREGL 1455 2.19 20.22 1.08 48.71 67.76
GARAN 6186 82.39 278.14 1.02 47.46 69.78
GSDHO 1400 10.91 11.78 1.05 47.48 64.22
HALKB 972 2.56 15.99 1.10 46.46 71.57
HURGZ 1455 9.53 15.09 1.10 47.05 67.16
IHLAS 942 7.63 4.30 1.01 47.64 70.75
ISCTR 4732 32.46 143.32 1.03 49.48 69.81
ISGYO 367 1.35 1.31 1.11 44.94 71.81
KCHOL 855 3.93 13.72 1.11 45.17 68.76
KRDMD 1150 9.91 11.39 1.05 45.80 70.28
MIGRS 152 0.48 9.84 1.03 38.90 70.28
PETKM 688 1.12 6.02 1.14 46.81 70.54
PTOFS 295 0.48 2.53 1.38 45.80 69.47
SAHOL 713 2.19 9.44 1.15 48.54 66.25
SISE 975 3.24 4.63 1.08 51.39 67.02
SKBNK 1216 3.23 7.06 1.15 44.15 64.36
TCELL 1095 5.05 40.15 1.10 46.47 71.25
THYAO 787 1.65 8.99 1.10 50.52 68.10
TKFNK 747 1.00 8.56 1.13 48.63 64.70
TSKB 448 1.72 1.62 1.06 48.98 63.23
TTKOM 2343 8.48 35.07 1.05 39.22 73.20
TUPRS 761 0.83 22.86 1.07 48.45 73.68
VAKBN 3169 31.17 54.61 1.04 47.42 68.53
YKBNK 1911 14.61 36.47 1.04 48.33 67.08
Average 1406 9.11 28.55 1.10 47.01 68.27
Median 973 3.24 11.59 1.08 47.44 68.65
Min 152 0.48 1.31 1.01 38.90 62.10
Max 6186 82.39 278.14 1.38 52.13 73.68
orders constitute about 68% of all the submitted orders. The average tick adjusted
spread is quite narrow, being less than 2 for all of the stocks in our sample. This
is similar to the findings of Griffiths et al. (2000) on the most liquid securities of
the Toronto Stock Exchange, but lower than the spreads presented in Pascual and




In order to analyze how the state of the book affects the order choice of an investor,
we define order aggressiveness categories based on the classification of Biais, Hillion
and Spatt (1995). The first two categories are related to the market order (MO)
aggressiveness, whereas the rest is defined for the limit order (LO) aggressiveness
based on the limit price position.
• Category 1 (“large MO buy”): Vorder ≥ Vask and Porder ≥ Pask.
• Category 2 (“small MO buy”): Vorder < Vask and Porder ≥ Pask.
• Category 3 (“buy LO within the quotes”): Pask > Porder > Pbid.
• Category 4 (“buy LO at the quote”): Pask > Porder = Pbid.
• Category 5 (“buy LO away from the quote”): Porder < Pbid < Pask.
where, Vorder and Porder are the volume and the price of a buy order, respectively. Vask
is the total volume of orders waiting at the best ask price, Pask. Finally, Pbid denotes
the best bid price. Sell side is constructed analogously.
Table 3.2 presents the descriptive statistics of the order aggressiveness categories
for both buy and sell sides of the market separately. The results suggest that for the
buy side, the most frequent events are small buy market orders (category 2) followed
by orders submitted at the quotes, whereas for the sell side the ones away from the
best quotes (category 5) have the most frequent arrivals, contradicting the findings
of Biais et al. (1995), Beber and Caglio (2005), and Griffiths et al. (2000) for the
Paris Bourse, the NYSE and the Toronto Stock Exchange, respectively. Table 3.2
also shows a very low frequency of orders within the quotes (for both sides of the
book), which can be explained by the small inside spread.The results regarding the
execution rate, i.e., the proportion of orders executed, suggest that only around 20%
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Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics of the Order Aggressiveness Categories
This table presents the descriptive statistics of the order aggressiveness categories for both sides
of the market. Orders are divided into five categories based on the limit price position following
Biais et al. (1995). Category 1 (“large MO buy”): Vorder ≥ Vask and Porder ≥ Pask. Category 2
(“small MO buy”): Vorder < Vask and Porder ≥ Pask. Category 3 (“buy LO within the quotes”):
Pask > Porder > Pbid. Category 4 (“buy LO at the quote”): Pask > Porder = Pbid. Category 5 (“buy
LO away from the quote”): Porder < Pbid < Pask. Vorder and Porder are the volume and the limit
price of the buy order, respectively. Vask is the accumulated volume of orders waiting at the best
ask price, Pask. Finally, Pbid denotes the best bid price. Sell side is constructed analogously. The
first two columns report the proportion of orders and order sizes for each category. Execution rate
is calculated as the proportion of orders executed in each category, whereas the last column presents
the average execution time (in minutes) of orders in each category.
Number of Volume of Execution Execution
Orders (%) orders (%) Rate (%) Time (min)
Buy Side
Category 1 3.77 14.82 98.05 3
Category 2 33.24 24.31 99.77 0
Category 3 0.98 1.90 86.88 18
Category 4 32.14 34.79 67.33 24
Category 5 29.87 24.17 21.31 88
Sell Side
Category 1 3.51 12.71 98.16 2
Category 2 24.44 22.42 99.77 0
Category 3 0.85 1.66 88.95 15
Category 4 28.79 32.32 60.72 21
Category 5 42.41 30.88 16.04 78
of orders away from the quotes are executed compared to 60% of execution rate for
the orders at the quotes. That is, going from category 4 to 5; traders are facing a
substantial non-execution risk. These figures are very similar to the study of Griffiths
et al. (2000) conducted on the Toronto Stock Exchange. A similar conclusion can be
derived from the average waiting times for execution.
3.3 Sequential Ordered Probit Regressions
We investigate how the information content of the limit order book affects the
order choice of the investor, by considering the order choice as a two-stage process.
As a first step in her order choice, observing the market dynamics and limit order book
information, the agent is patient, i.e., submits a limit order, or she is impatient, i.e.,
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submits a market order.8 In the second stage, given the agent is patient, she decides
the position of her limit price (decides to submit category 3, 4 or 5 order), whereas the
impatient trader decides whether to submit a large or small market order (category 1
or 2 order). To allow this sequential decision, following Pascual and Veredas (2009),
we employ a sequential ordered probit (SOP) model for the empirical investigation.
The attractiveness of the SOP model, compared to the ordered probit model, is that
the former enables us to compare the reaction of the patient and impatient trader to
the changing market conditions separately.
3.3.1 First stage–arrival of a market or limit order trader
Let Y ∗ denote the degree of patience of an incoming agent in the first stage of
the SOP model. Although Y ∗ is unobservable, we assume that it is a function of
K observable (limit order book) variables, Xs. We consider volatility, price trend,
volume and price distances as explanatory variables. A detailed explanation of the




βkXk,t−1 + εt, (3.1)
Yt =
{
0 if −∞ < Y ∗t ≤ δ
1 if δ < Y ∗t <∞
, (3.2)
where δ is the threshold and t refers to the transaction time, not the clock time. The
first-stage-dependent variable is equal to 1 if the trader is impatient and submits a
market order or 0 if the trader is patient and submits a limit order.
8One can argue that the degree of patience is based on a trader’s information level, preferences
or waiting costs, hence, exogenously determined. However, recent theoretical works suggest that
market conditions and the state of the book affect the degree of patience. For example Goettler
et al. (2009) claim that although a patient informed agent submits a limit order, when she observes
high volatility, she switches to a market order to take advantage of the mispriced quotes. Similarly,
in Foucault et al. (2005), if spread increases over a cutoff level, all traders, even the ones with high
waiting costs, will submit limit orders. Moreover, Ranaldo (2004), Beber and Caglio (2005), among
others, show empirically that a trader considers the state of the book while formulating her order
strategies. Hence, we allow the arrival rate of patient and impatient agents to be influenced by the
state of the book and market conditions.
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Assuming that the error terms are normally distributed, the probability of the
incoming trader being patient is:
P (Yt = 0) = P (−∞ < Y ∗t ≤ δ)
= P (−∞ <
K∑
k=1





where Φ is the normal cumulative distribution function.
3.3.2 Second stage–patient trader
In the second stage, both patient and impatient traders choose their level of ag-
gressiveness given the information content of the book. A patient trader has three











1 if −∞ < LO∗t ≤ δlo1
2 if δlo1 < LO∗t ≤ δlo2
3 if δlo2 < LO∗t <∞
, (3.5)
where δlo1 and δlo2 are the thresholds.
The dependent variable is equal to 1 if a trader submits a limit order away from
the best quotes (category 5), is equal to 2, if the order is submitted at the best quotes
(category 4) or is equal to 3 if the order is submitted within the quotes (category 3).
Hence, our dependent variable increases as aggressiveness increases.
Assuming that the error terms are normally distributed, the probability of the
incoming patient trader being type i = 1, 2, 3 is:







where δlo0 = −∞ and δlo3 =∞.
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3.3.3 Second stage–impatient trader
Finally, the impatient trader decides the quantity she wants to trade; whether she
submits an aggressive market order (category 1), or submits a small market order












0 if −∞ < MO∗t ≤ δmo1
1 if δmo1 < MO∗t <∞
, (3.8)
where, δmo1 is the threshold.
As the coefficients of the sequential ordered probit measure the change in the
latent variable with respect to a change in one of the explanatory variables, they
are difficult to interpret. A direct interpretable measure is given by the marginal
probabilities (marginal effects), which show how the probability of order choices is
affected given a marginal change in any of the explanatory variables:








































Empirically we ask the following questions: whether “competition” or “signaling”
effects dominate each other at every level of the depth, how/whether walking through
the book affects the order decision of an impatient trader, and finally, whether the
limit order book information affects the trading behavior institutional investors.
3.4.1 Covariates for the impact of depth at and beyond the
best quotes
We test whether the competition and signaling effects, proposed by Parlour (1998)
and Goettler et al. (2005), Goettler et al. (2009), respectively, dominate each other for
depths beyond the best quotes. To do so, we calculate the volume of orders waiting in
the queue for the 10 best prices. We define a proxy for the signaling and competition
effects separately for every stage of the sequential ordered probit (SOP) model. In
the first stage, when a trader decides whether to submit a market or a limit order, she
considers only the increase of the volume at the best quotes (Vsame1 and/or Vopp1)
as an increased competition. We therefore use the volume of orders waiting beyond
the best quotes as a proxy for signaling effect. Given that the trader is impatient, in
the second stage, she decides the size of her market order. In this case, since the order
has the price priority, there will be no price competition and the volume of orders
beyond the best quotes captures the signaling effect.
On the other hand, in the second stage, when a limit order trader decides her
limit price, we consider two states: first, (tick-adjusted) inside spread greater than 1
and second, spread equal to 1. If an agent observes the inside spread greater than 1,
then by submitting an order within the quotes (category 3 order) she can jump the
queue. In this case, Vsame1 and (possibly) depth beyond the best quotes captures the
competition effect. However, if the spread is 1, then “mechanically” it is not possible
to submit a category 3 order, i.e., a trader cannot gain priority over the orders already
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waiting at Vsame1. In this case, while positioning her limit price, she may consider
just the depth beyond the best quotes as an increased competition, at least up to some
cutoff level, discarding the depth at the quotes as part of the competition effect. In
order to determine the cutoff point, we run the SOP regressions with accumulated
volume of orders from the second to the third, from the second to the fourth and from
the second to the fifth best prices (Vsame2_3, Vsame2_4 and Vsame2_5). The signaling
effect will then be captured by Vsame4_10, Vsame5_10 and Vsame6_10, respectively.
Table 3.3 reports the results. For both sides of the market, the volume up to the
second best quotes has the strongest competition effect. That is, the competition
effect persists beyond the best quotes. The marginal effects as well as the significance
of the estimated coefficients are decreasing with the additional quotes added.9 More-
over, at every price level, competition effect dominates the signaling effect. Finally,
the results suggest an asymmetry between the sell and the buy side. The signaling
effect is more persistent and stronger for the sell side.
As suggested, we pick the volume at the second best quote as the cutoff level.
Hence, we define the competition effect, Vcomp and the signaling effect, Vsign as
follows:








t + ...+ Vsame
10
t .
• Step 2– order choice of patient traders:
Vcompt =
{
Vsame2t if spreadt = 1
Vsame1t + Vsame
2






t + ...+ Vsame
10
t .
9For the sake of brevity we did not report the marginal effects, but only report the median
coefficient for the statistically significant stocks. Note that the marginal effect of an order submitted
at the quotes (category 4) is positively related to the coefficient reported.
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Table 3.3: Analysis of Depth Beyond the Best Quotes
The table presents the results of the depth analysis using different cutoff values. Vcomp=Vsamej +
...+Vsamecutoff, where j = 1, if spread/tick> 1, j = 2 otherwise. Whereas, Vsign=Vsamecutoff+1 +
...+Vsame10. Vcompopp and Vsignopp are constructed analogously for the opposite side of the book.
All of the volume variables are scaled by 1e-6. Vola is the EWMA volatility (multiplied by 1000),
Trend is the previous price change of 60 observations (multiplied by 1000), SPR is the (tick adjusted)
inside spread, calculated as the difference between the best ask and bid quotes. The median, the
percentage of positive coefficients given that they are significant, and finally the percentage of stocks
with a statistically significant slope at a 5% level are reported.
BUY Vola Trend SPR Vcomp Vcompopp Vsign Vsignopp
cutoff=2 Median 0.04 0.82 0.78 0.67 0.08 -0.10 0.07
Sig. (%) 50 73 97 80 27 60 37
Pos. (%) 93 100 100 100 75 6 100
cutoff=3 Median 0.04 0.83 0.81 0.47 0.07 -0.14 0.05
Sig. (%) 47 77 97 67 47 53 27
Pos. (%) 93 100 100 95 79 0 88
cutoff=4 Median 0.04 0.82 0.84 0.39 0.09 -0.11 0.02
Sig. (%) 47 77 97 57 43 43 40
Pos. (%) 93 100 100 82 92 15 58
cutoff=5 Median 0.04 0.82 0.82 0.32 0.15 -0.09 0.06
Sig. (%) 47 80 97 53 53 47 37
Pos. (%) 93 100 100 75 100 29 64
SELL
cutoff=2 Median 0.05 -0.62 0.66 1.30 0.11 -0.19 0.05
Sig. (%) 43 60 100 83 27 83 47
Pos. (%) 85 6 100 100 63 8 79
cutoff=3 Median 0.05 -0.63 0.68 0.68 0.08 -0.24 0.06
Sig. (%) 47 57 97 77 50 77 43
Pos. (%) 79 6 100 96 60 0 69
cutoff=4 Median 0.05 -0.64 0.65 0.21 0.10 -0.34 0.04
Sig. (%) 43 57 97 67 43 67 47
Pos. (%) 77 6 100 85 92 0 64
cutoff=5 Median 0.05 -0.65 0.65 0.12 0.07 -0.44 0.01
Sig. (%) 43 57 97 57 57 60 40
Pos. (%) 77 6 100 59 94 0 58





t + ...+ Vsame
10
t . (3.14)
where Vsamei is the total volume of orders waiting at the ith best quote. Competition




3.4.2 Covariates for the impact of non-walking through the
book
In markets where walking through the book is allowed, an aggressive (category
1) market order has to walk up or down the order book to be fully executed. For
markets in which walking through the book is not allowed, any excess that cannot be
executed at the pre-specified limit price joins the queue at the quoted price instead
of walking through and executed with less favorable prices. By focusing on the order
choice of a market order trader, we test the relevance of price information while fitting
her order size when walking through the book is not allowed. In addition to the depth
variables, we define the inside spread and the price distance variables.
i) The (tick adjusted) inside spread, calculated as the difference between the best
ask and bid quotes.
ii) • The (tick adjusted) price distance between the best and the second best
quotes for the opposite and the same sides of the book.
• The (tick adjusted) price distance between the second best ask (bid) and
the highest available ask (lowest available bid) quote for the opposite and
the same sides of the book.
The spread and the price distance variables for the opposite side capture the
(weighted) average execution price of an aggressive order for markets in which walking
through is possible. Because, in that case, when a large buy (sell) market order is
submitted, it will eat up all the available volume at the best ask (bid) and then
move up (down) to the second best ask (bid), and if necessary move up to third after
consuming the second, etc. Since the cost of a market order increases with Dopp1_2
or/and Dopp2_max, this should lead to a submission of less aggressive market orders.
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3.4.3 Additional explanatory variables
Besides our key explanatory variables discussed above, the current literature posits
that the volatility and the previous price trend affect the order choice of an agent.
We include these two variables in our analysis as explanatory variables.
Following Beber and Caglio (2005), we define the volatility as the exponential
moving average of the last 60 mid-quote squared returns. The optimal decay factor
λ is obtained via maximum likelihood estimation.10
σˆt =
√
λσˆ2t−1 + (1− λ)r2t−1. (3.15)
Expected signs: While higher volatility implies a higher probability of execution,
it also increases the adverse selection costs. Existing literature identifies a negative
relationship between volatility and order aggressiveness. Foucault (1999), Wald and
Horrigan (2005) and Goettler et al. (2009), among others, claim that in high volatility
states, since the picking off risk increases, the aggressiveness of an incoming agent
decreases.
An order submission strategy may also depend on recent movements in the price
(Hall and Hautsch (2006)). We identify the previous price trend observed by the
agents (Trend) as the change of the mid-quote prices for the last 60 observations at
the time of the order arrival.
Expected signs: Given that a trader observes an increasing price trend upon arrival,
this may indicate a possible future price increase as well. Since this movement will
move the prices away from the current levels, a buy trader may interpret it as an
increased non-execution risk of her limit order; hence, she prefers to submit a more
aggressive order. This works opposite for the seller.
In all of the regressions, to control the seasonality on the arrival rate of orders,
10Riskmetric EWMA is a version of GARCH(1,1) where persistence parameters sum up to one and
the constant term is equal to zero. In other words, the optimal decay parameter λ can be obtained
by estimating the Integrated GARCH model.
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we use time of the day dummy, indicating which half-an-hour of the day the order
is submitted. Moreover, five previous lags of the dependent variables, determined by
the Akaike information criterion (AIC) is included as control variables.11
3.5 Results
As mentioned in Section 3.2, the 30 stocks in our sample present a high degree
of heterogeneity. Thus, we estimate the sequential ordered probit (SOP) regressions
for each stock separately, for buy and sell sides of the market. All of the regressions
include 5 lags of the dependent variable and the time-of-the day dummies. For the
sake of brevity, those are not reported. We report the median, minimum, maximum
and the 25th and the 75th percentile of the estimated coefficients, the percentage of
statistically significant coefficients at 5% level, and the percentage of positive coeffi-
cients given that they are significant. Table 3.4, Table 3.5 and Table 3.6 present the
results of the first stage, the second stage for a limit order trader, and the second
stage for a market order trader of the SOP model, respectively. Table B.1 provides the
description of the explanatory variables defined in Section 3.4 and Table B.2 provides
a summary of the major findings.
3.5.1 Impact of depth at and beyond the best quotes
Table 3.4 reveals that an increase in the depth at the best quotes (Vcomp) is
perceived as an increased competition and encourages traders to submit more market
orders for both sides of the market. On the other hand, when competition on the
opposite side of the book (Vcompopp) increases, agents predict that the market order
arrivals increases on the opposite side of the book, implying an increased probability
of execution for their limit orders, hence they submit more limit orders. These results
11While the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) chooses 5 as the optimal lag in the first stage
and the second stage–limit order trader, it chooses 2 as the optimal lag in the second stage–market
order trader. We perform a robustness analysis with optimal lags chosen by the BIC and conclude
that the results are similar.
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are consistent with the findings of Ranaldo (2004), Beber and Caglio (2005), and
Pascual and Veredas (2009). Our results suggest that an increase in the volume of
orders waiting beyond the best quotes (Vsign) is perceived as a disagreement on the
current price and discourages the market order submissions. This signaling effect is
more pronounced on the sell side of the book compared to the buy side. This contra-
dicts with the results of Pascual and Veredas (2009) who find a positive relationship
between the accumulated number of orders waiting from the second to the fifth best
quotes and the arrival rate of market order traders. They conclude that this finding
supports the “crowding-out” hypothesis of Parlour (1998).
Table 3.5 presents the regression results for a patient trader. It suggests that only
the same side of the book matters for both, buyer and seller. Vcomp and Vsign has
expected signs. An increase in the competition leads to a submission of aggressive
limit orders to jump the queue, whereas an increase on the same side depth away
from the quotes (Vsign) is perceived as a possible mispricing of the best quotes as
Goettler et al. (2005) and Goettler et al. (2009) predict and lead to a submission of
less aggressive limit orders.
Marginal effects regarding the depth variables reveal that the volume at the best
quotes is particularly emphasized while determining the degree of patience of the
incoming trader compared to depth beyond the best quotes. Furthermore, the com-
petition effect is stronger compared to the signaling effect for both sides of the market
in all stages of the SOP.
3.5.2 Impact of non-walking through the book
Table 3.6 shows that, while fitting the size of her market order for an impatient
trader, none of the price information, neither spread nor price distance variables,
matter. This is intuitive, since when walking through the book is not allowed, the





Table 3.4: First Stage Sequential Ordered Probit
The table presents the results of the first stage of the two-stage sequential ordered probit model. The dependent variable is equal to 1 if the incoming
trader is impatient (submits a market order, MO), and 0 otherwise. Vola is the EWMA volatility (multiplied by 1000), Trend is the price change of the
last 60 observations (multiplied by 1000), SPR is the (tick adjusted) inside spread, calculated as the difference between the best ask and bid quotes, Vcomp
(Vcompopp) is the volume accounting for the competition effect on the same (opposite) side of the book, Vsign (Vsignopp) is the volume accounting for the
signaling effect on the same (opposite) side of the book as defined in equation (3.12). All of the volume variables are scaled by 1e-6. Dsame1_2 is the price
distance between the best and the second best quotes, whereas Dsame2_max is the price distance between the second best ask (bid) and the highest available
ask (lowest available bid) quote for the same side of the book. Dopp1_2 and Dopp2_max are constructed analogously for the opposite side of the book. All
of the regressions include 5 lags of the dependent variable and the time-of-the day dummies. For the sake of brevity, those are not reported. The median,
minimum, maximum and the 25th and the 75th percentile of the estimated coefficients, the percentage of positive coefficients given that they are significant,
and finally the percentage of stocks with a statistically significant slope at a 5% level are reported. The cross sectional median of marginal effects (scaled by
1e3) is also reported.
Buy Vola Trend SPR Vcomp Vcompopp Vsign Vsignopp Dsame1_2 Dsame2_max Dopp1_2 Dopp2_max
Median -0.02 -1.08 -0.31 1.64 -1.95 -0.02 0.00 -0.14 -0.01 -0.14 -0.02
Min. -0.09 -5.67 -4.46 0.08 -8.03 -0.35 -0.56 -0.83 -0.04 -0.96 -0.75
P25 -0.04 -1.55 -0.40 0.80 -3.76 -0.06 -0.08 -0.40 -0.02 -0.36 -0.04
P75 0.01 -0.62 -0.23 3.53 -1.03 0.04 0.05 -0.09 0.00 -0.04 0.00
Max. 0.05 0.87 -0.04 7.40 -0.16 0.67 0.39 0.18 0.02 0.50 0.05
Sig. (%) 63 83 80 100 100 60 53 40 43 30 73
Pos. (%) 16 0 0 100 0 33 56 8 15 22 32
Marginal Effects–median
MO -9.28 -406.55 -121.38 650.20 -746.44 -6.21 -0.56 -54.55 -1.99 -54.80 -6.28
Sell
Median -0.03 1.02 -0.37 1.76 -1.77 -0.14 0.01 -0.15 0.00 -0.25 -0.01
Min. -0.10 -0.14 -1.26 0.14 -7.89 -0.93 -0.51 -1.02 -0.64 -0.75 -0.12
P25 -0.04 0.59 -0.41 0.73 -3.32 -0.28 -0.12 -0.41 -0.02 -0.35 -0.02
P75 -0.02 1.36 -0.24 4.15 -0.77 -0.05 0.07 -0.02 0.00 0.04 0.00
Max. 0.05 4.85 -0.05 9.97 -0.14 0.05 0.39 0.73 0.03 0.26 0.02
Sig. (%) 67 80 83 100 100 77 70 40 30 43 50
Pos. (%) 5 100 0 100 0 4 57 25 44 0 20
Marginal Effects–median




Table 3.5: Second Stage Sequential Probit–Patient Traders
The table presents the results of the second stage of the two-stage sequential ordered probit model for patient traders. Given the trader is patient, the
dependent variable is equal to 1, 2 or 3 if the trader submits a category 5, category 4 or category 3 order (limit price within, at or away from the best
quotes), respectively. Vcomp (Vcompopp) is the volume accounting for the competition effect on the same (opposite) side of the book, Vsign (Vsignopp) is
the volume accounting for the signaling effect on the same (opposite) side of the book as defined in equation (3.13). They are scaled by 1e-6. The rest of
the explanatory variables are defined in Table 3.4. All of the regressions include 5 lags of the dependent variable and the time-of-the day dummies. For the
sake of brevity, those are not reported. The median, minimum, maximum and the 25th and the 75th percentile of the estimated coefficients, the percentage
of positive coefficients given that they are significant, and finally the percentage of stocks with a statistically significant slope at a 5% level are reported. The
cross sectional median of marginal effects (scaled by 1e3) is also reported.
Buy Vola Trend SPR Vcomp Vcompopp Vsign Vsignopp Dsame1_2 Dsame2_max Dopp1_2 Dopp2_max
Median 0.02 0.67 0.78 0.52 0.08 -0.07 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.00
Min. -0.10 -0.14 0.08 -0.07 -0.52 -0.72 -0.20 -1.26 -0.04 -2.40 -0.06
P25 -0.01 0.42 0.56 0.20 -0.04 -0.24 -0.01 -0.31 0.00 -0.20 -0.01
P75 0.04 1.16 0.86 1.43 0.30 -0.01 0.11 0.47 0.02 0.22 0.02
Max. 0.14 2.10 1.79 4.17 2.23 0.54 0.56 1.91 0.04 5.39 1.59
Sig. (%) 50 73 97 80 27 60 37 60 50 27 43
Pos. (%) 93 100 100 100 75 6 100 44 53 50 54
Marginal Effects–median
LO–Above -8.13 -259.55 -303.69 -204.17 -32.90 27.73 -5.44 -11.87 -1.46 -10.25 -0.22
LO–At 7.57 250.95 287.37 194.83 32.33 -26.76 5.33 11.31 1.41 9.85 0.21
LO–Within 0.25 9.09 12.02 5.96 0.56 -0.65 0.14 0.28 0.07 0.50 0.01
Sell
Median 0.02 -0.42 0.66 0.58 0.02 -0.08 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.26 0.00
Min. -0.05 -2.49 0.20 -0.03 -1.28 -1.33 -0.59 -1.00 -0.05 -0.73 -0.06
P25 0.00 -0.94 0.53 0.19 -0.03 -0.36 -0.01 -0.41 -0.01 -0.07 -0.01
P75 0.05 -0.10 0.84 1.88 0.11 -0.03 0.11 0.54 0.02 0.41 0.00
Max. 0.22 0.50 1.18 5.56 0.96 0.65 0.53 1.39 1.67 5.00 0.04
Sig. (%) 43 60 100 83 27 83 47 40 37 40 30
Pos. (%) 85 6 100 100 63 8 79 42 55 75 56
Marginal Effects–median
LO–Above -6.45 164.39 -264.32 -229.53 -8.61 32.53 -8.54 -0.31 -0.39 -101.07 -0.38
LO–At 6.26 -158.65 256.27 221.10 8.01 -32.08 8.45 0.31 0.38 99.31 0.35
LO–Within 0.14 -4.70 8.52 5.93 0.11 -0.89 0.08 0.00 0.01 1.80 0.0289
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price of a large market order compared to a small one. To analyze this further, we
first test the joint significance of these variables and second, we use a different proxy
to capture the price and volume information contained beyond the best quotes.
For the majority of the stocks, we cannot reject the null hypothesis γSPR =
γDopp1_2 = γDopp2_max = 0 with a median χ2 = 4.63 (p-val=0.1759) and χ2 = 2.88
(p-val=0.4112) for buy and sell sides, respectively, where γ is defined in equation
(3.7). This suggests that the price information contained in the limit order book
is even jointly uninformative for a market order trader. As a different proxy, we
fit a second degree polynomial for the total volume available at each price and the
corresponding quotes. Then the coefficients of the quadratic term for both sell and
buy sides of the book are used in the SOP regressions. As expected, the fit of the
quadratic trend for the same and the opposite sides of the book are insignificant at
5% level.
Our results suggest that a market order trader only considers volatility, previous
price trend, and volume accumulated beyond the best quotes on the opposite side
of the book. In high volatility states an impatient trader submits more aggressive
market orders. This can be explained by two: first, an impatient trader may benefit
from a high volatility state since it increases the probability of fully execution of large
size orders. This is due to the fact that the excess is converted to a limit order and
the execution probability of a limit order increases with volatility.12 This result is
consistent with findings of Hall and Hautsch (2006). In their analysis conducted on
Australian Stock Exchange, another market with non-walking through the book, they
focus only on the aggressive market and limit orders. Their results suggest that high
volatility states increase the arrival rate of aggressive market orders. Second, given
that the trader submits a market order in a high volatility state, it is more likely that






Table 3.6: Second Stage Sequential Probit Regressions–Impatient Traders
The table presents the results of the second stage of the two-stage sequential ordered probit model. Given the trader is impatient, the dependent variable is
equal to 0 if she submits a small market order (MO) (category 2 order) or equal to 1 if she submits a large MO (category 1 order). Vcomp (Vcompopp) is
the volume accounting for the competition effect on the same (opposite) side of the book, Vsign (Vsignopp) is the volume accounting for the signaling effect
on the same (opposite) side of the book as defined in equation (3.14). They are scaled by 1e-6. The rest of the explanatory variables are defined in Table 3.4.
All of the regressions include 5 lags of the dependent variable and the time-of-the day dummies. For the sake of brevity, those are not reported. The median,
minimum, maximum and the 25th and the 75th percentile of the estimated coefficients, the percentage of positive coefficients given that they are significant,
and finally the percentage of stocks with a statistically significant slope at a 5% level are reported. The cross sectional median of marginal effects (scaled by
1e3) is also reported.
Buy Vola Trend SPR Vcomp Vsign Vsignopp Dsame1_2 Dsame2_max Dopp1_2 Dopp2_max
Median 0.18 -1.01 -0.12 -0.14 -0.05 -0.09 -0.04 0.01 -0.16 0.00
Min. 0.10 -5.57 -0.89 -2.54 -0.98 -1.62 -0.97 -0.05 -0.86 -0.65
P25 0.15 -1.52 -0.22 -0.31 -0.14 -0.69 -0.16 0.00 -0.35 -0.05
P75 0.22 -0.41 0.01 0.03 0.03 -0.04 0.08 0.04 0.11 0.02
Max. 0.41 0.56 0.46 2.79 0.26 0.46 0.53 0.09 0.56 0.11
Sig. (%) 100 67 3 27 33 70 10 27 23 47
Pos. (%) 100 0 0 13 50 5 0 88 29 43
Marginal Effects–median
Large MO 23.29 -134.84 -14.43 -8.13 -5.55 -12.14 -5.81 1.44 -12.59 0.60
Sell
Median 0.19 1.20 -0.01 -0.51 -0.08 -0.09 0.01 0.01 -0.10 -0.01
Min. 0.10 -0.18 -0.61 -4.22 -1.37 -1.07 -0.81 -0.17 -1.56 -0.09
P25 0.17 0.44 -0.13 -0.98 -0.27 -0.27 -0.15 -0.01 -0.41 -0.03
P75 0.24 2.10 0.12 -0.12 -0.05 0.00 0.26 0.02 0.12 0.01
Max. 0.63 5.00 0.81 0.32 0.02 0.74 0.57 0.05 0.80 0.07
Sig. (%) 100 67 7 63 53 50 13 10 37 13
Pos. (%) 100 100 50 0 0 7 0 33 18 25
Marginal Effects–median
Large MO 31.36 181.68 -2.50 -71.17 -12.70 -19.65 1.68 1.02 -8.24 -0.9391
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she is informed as Goettler et al. (2009) predict. She would like to take advantage of
the mispricing at the quotes, which makes her to submit an aggressive market order.
The accumulated volume of orders on the opposite side of the book (Vsignopp) and
the change of the mid-quote prices for the last 60 observations (Trend) are negatively
related with the buy market order aggressiveness. In other words, an impatient
buyer splits her orders into several small quantities rather than submitting a large
market order when Vsignopp or Trend increases. Because, an increase in Vsignopp
or Trend signals a possible future price increase, increasing the non-execution risk for
the limit-order-converted-part of the aggressive market order. The opposite is true
for the seller.
In comparison to the study of Pascual and Veredas (2009), which is conducted
on the Spanish Stock Exchange, we have different results. The authors show that
the spread and the price distances on the opposite side of the market matters for an
impatient trader’s decision. In addition, in his study on the Swiss Stock Exchange,
Ranaldo (2004) demonstrates that the sensitivity of a large market order with respect
to volatility is more negative compared to a small one. Thus, in high volatility states
an impatient trader prefers to submit a small market order, which contradicts our
finding. One plausible explanation of the discrepancy in the results could be the
walking through the book mechanism, which is allowed in both of the markets.13
3.5.3 Effects of the additional variables
In line with the existing literature, we find that the probability of an incoming
agent being patient increases with volatility, since the picking off risk increases in high
volatility states. On the other hand, Table 3.5 shows that, given that the agent is
patient and submits a limit order, she prefers to submit more aggressive limit orders
13Non-walking through the book is not the only difference between the ISE and the other markets




when volatility is higher since submitting orders away from the quotes decreases the
execution probability significantly.14 This result is weak for both sides of the market.
Our results suggest that, when the previous price trend increases, a buyer submits
more limit orders whereas a seller submits more market orders. This contradicts
the expected sign proposed. One possible interpretation is the expectation of mean
reversion in the prices. If a seller, for instance, believes that prices will revert back,
she would submit an aggressive market order to take advantage of this “mispricing”,
instead of waiting and to be compensated by a limit order.
Consistent with the majority of the literature, the first stage SOP regressions show
that when spread is wider the arrival rate of patient traders increases. On the other
hand, Table 3.5 shows that, the importance of the inside spread is more pronounced
for the limit order trader while positioning their limit price. We find that a wider
spread persuades patient traders to compete more heavily to jump the queue when
spreads are wide, which confirms the predictions of Foucault et al. (2005) and Goettler
et al. (2005).
3.5.4 Trading behavior of institutions
The current literature points out that individual and institutional investors may
differ in their level of information implying that institutions are informed traders
(Lo and MacKinlay (1990), Cornell and Sirri (1992), Koski and Scruggs (1998), and
Chakravarty (2001)). In our data we can distinguish whether an order is initiated
by an institutional or individual investor, with a limitation however. Due to internal
regulations, some of foreign institutional investors are classified as individual instead
of institution. Thus, whenever it is marked as an institutional investor in our data set,
it is an institutional investor for sure. However, individual traders are pooled with
14For instance, Table 3.2 suggests that submitting an order away from the quotes instead of at
the quotes decreases the execution probability from 60% to 20%.
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foreign institutions.15 This in turn reduces our sample size significantly, but does not
affect the conclusions we derived. In our sample, on average 3.7% of all orders are
initiated by institutional investors.
In order to formally test whether we can separate the sample as individual and
institutional trading, we run the following two-stage sequential ordered probit (SOP)
regression for both buy and sell sides of the market and test the null hypothesis
µ = γ1 = γ2 = ... = γK = 0.










t−1Xk,t−1 + εt, (3.16)
where Xs are the observable (limit order book) variables defined in Section 3.4, and
Y ∗s,t is the dependent variable introduced in equation (3.2). We define a dummy
variable, DINS which takes the value 1 if the order is initiated by an institutional
trader.16 The hypothesis is rejected at 5% of significance level with a median χ2 =
46.65 (p-val=0.0009) for 76% of the stocks for the sell side of the market. Similar
conclusion holds for the buy side of the market. The joint hypothesis is rejected
for the 83% of the stocks with a median χ2 = 41.49 (p-val=0.0000). These reveal
that the information contained in the limit order book affects the trading behavior
of institutions and individuals differently.
Following this, we separate the sample into two groups: orders initiated by institu-
tional investors and by individual investors and re-run the first stage SOP regressions
introduced in equation (3.2) for each of the groups separately. The results for the
sell side of the market are presented in Table 3.7. Buy side results are qualitatively
similar. The same explanatory variables, introduced in Section 3.4, are employed as
in the analysis using the whole sample. The dependent variable is equal to 1 if the
15According to the information provided on the web page of the ISE, for the June and July 2008,
on average, 10% of the trading value is originated by foreign investors. The maximum and minimum
ratios are around 30% and 2%, respectively.
16It is not possible to run this regression for one of the stocks in our sample (IHLAS) due to





Table 3.7: First Stage Sequential Ordered Probit–Institutional vs Individual Investors
The table presents the results of the first stage of the two-stage sequential ordered probit model for institutional (INS) and individual (IND) investors for the
sell side of the market. For both set of regressions, the dependent variable is equal to 1 if the incoming trader is impatient (submits a market order, MO), and
0 otherwise. All of the explanatory variables are defined in Table 3.4. All of the regressions include 5 lags of the dependent variable and the time-of-the day
dummies. For the sake of brevity, those are not reported. The median, minimum, maximum and the 25th and the 75th percentile of the estimated coefficients,
the percentage of positive coefficients given that they are significant, and finally the percentage of stocks with a statistically significant slope at a 5% level are
reported. The cross sectional median of marginal effects (scaled by 1e3) is also reported.
INS Vola Trend SPR Vcomp Vcompopp Vsign Vsignopp Dsame1_2 Dsame2_max Dopp1_2 Dopp2_max
Median -0.05 1.06 -0.41 2.51 -2.78 0.04 0.02 -0.06 -0.01 0.19 0.01
Min. -0.17 -2.02 -5.39 0.40 -13.45 -0.93 -1.24 -1.66 -2.09 -1.63 -0.20
P25 -0.09 0.04 -0.82 1.44 -4.54 -0.11 -0.18 -0.56 -0.05 -0.88 -0.03
P75 0.06 1.72 0.10 5.14 -1.63 0.17 0.10 0.17 0.03 0.57 0.05
Max. 0.12 5.59 4.08 14.84 -0.48 1.97 0.69 0.76 0.15 2.01 0.24
Sig. (%) 10 24 3 93 83 14 28 7 21 10 38
Pos. (%) 33 100 0 100 0 75 38 0 17 0 55
Marginal Effects–median
MO -17.80 403.50 -137.50 962.00 -929.50 10.36 7.70 -23.70 -2.67 72.90 4.19
IND
Median -0.03 1.05 -0.35 1.78 -1.74 -0.15 0.01 -0.12 0.00 -0.17 -0.01
Min. -0.11 -0.13 -1.22 0.14 -8.03 -0.99 -0.52 -1.03 -0.60 -0.73 -0.12
P25 -0.05 0.59 -0.42 0.70 -3.51 -0.37 -0.12 -0.34 -0.02 -0.33 -0.02
P75 -0.02 1.37 -0.26 4.09 -0.75 -0.05 0.07 -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00
Max. 0.05 4.80 -0.07 10.02 -0.14 0.04 0.40 0.73 0.03 0.26 0.02
Sig. (%) 70 87 77 100 100 83 70 37 40 43 50
Pos. (%) 5 100 0 100 0 4 57 27 42 0 20
Marginal Effects–median
MO -9.96 367.50 -125.00 632.50 -610.00 -52.00 1.93 -41.50 -0.26 -57.80 -3.1195
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incoming trader is impatient (submits a market order) and 0 if she submits a limit
order.
When we examine the results for the sample of individual investors, we see that
volatility, the previous price trend, the inside spread, the competition variables, and
the signaling variables are highly significant at a 5% level. On the other hand, the
regression results for institutions reveal that only the volume at the same and at the
opposite side of the book, (Vcomp and Vcompopp), are significant for institutional
investors. The joint hypothesis βINSVcomp = βINSVcompopp = 0 is rejected with a median
χ2 = 51.07 (p-val=0.0000) for all of the stocks except one. In other words, competition
matters in their decision to submit a limit or a market order. Other features of the
results presented in Table 3.7 are worth to underline. Volatility is not informative
for an informed agent. This may suggest that institutional traders do not face the
picking off risk that drives them to submit more limit orders rather than a market
order in high volatility states. Similarly, the signaling variables (Vsign and Vsignopp)
are not informative as expected. Informed agents do not rely on the signaling on
the current prices provided by the market. Finally, the coefficients on volatility, price
trend, spread, signaling variables, and price distance variables are jointly insignificant
for 62% of the stocks with a median χ2 = 13.42 (p-val=0.0967).
To sum up, we conclude that, similar to the individual investors, institutional
investors consider the information provided by the limit order book while designing
their trading strategies. However, their decision to submit a market or a limit order
is based on only a few pieces of the limit order book information. They take into
account other traders’ actions only for competition. This suggests that institutional
investors’ order submission strategies are based on their own private valuations rather




We provide several robustness checks to conclude that our findings are not driven
by an arbitrary choice. The first robustness check is related to the model specification.
Instead of estimating the model with ordered probit, we use ordered logit. The second
robustness checks are on the definitions of the transient volatility and the price trend.
Throughout the paper, we proxy the price fluctuations by using the exponential-
weighted moving average (EWMA) volatility and the price trend as the percentage
change in the mid-quote prices for the last 60 observations. First, we re-estimate the
optimal decay parameter λ by using 100 mid-quote returns instead of 60. Similarly,
as a robustness check for the price trend, we employ different window sizes of 100 and
120. Moreover, we re-estimate the two-stage sequential ordered probit model with
different transient volatility measures, namely the standard deviation and absolute
value of the mid-quote changes of the previous 60, 100 and 120 orders prior to the
order submission.
Table 3.8 presents the robustness test results for the first stage and second stage
patient trader, whereas Table 3.9 reports the results for the second stage impatient
trader for the sell side of the market. For the sake of brevity, buy side is not re-
ported since the results are qualitatively similar. All of the results are qualitatively
robust, except for the volatility in the second stage–limit order trader. To sum up,
we conclude that all of our main findings are remarkably robust to different proxies.
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Table 3.8: Robustness: First Stage and the Second Stage–Limit Order Trader
This table reports the results for the robustness analysis for the sell side of the market for the first
stage and the second stage–limit order (LO) trader. The first three rows repeat the results for the
benchmark model, whereas the following three rows present the results for the logistic regression
(Logit). The robustness analyses on the definition of volatility (Vola_std60, Vola_abs60) and on
the previous trend (Trend100) are provided. Vola_std60 is the standard deviation of the last 60
mid-quote returns. Vola_abs60 is the absolute change in the last 60 mid-quote prices and Trend100
is the previous price change of the last 100 observations. All of the regressions include 5 lags of the
dependent variable and the time-of-the day dummies. For the sake of brevity, those are not reported.
The median, the percentage of positive coefficients given that they are significant, and finally the
percentage of stocks with a statistically significant slope at a 5% level are reported.
1st stage Vola Trend SPR Vcomp Vcompopp Vsign Vsignopp
Benchmark Median -0.03 1.02 -0.37 1.76 -1.77 -0.14 0.01
Sig. (%) 67 80 83 100 100 77 70
Pos. (%) 5 100 0 100 0 4 57
Logit Median -0.05 1.67 -0.65 3.08 -3.08 -0.24 0.02
Sig. (%) 67 80 83 100 100 77 67
Pos. (%) 5 100 0 100 0 4 60
Vola_std60 Median -0.06 1.02 -0.36 1.80 -1.78 -0.14 0.01
Sig. (%) 77 80 83 100 100 80 70
Pos. (%) 0 100 0 100 0 4 57
Vola_abs60 Median -0.01 1.05 -0.36 1.79 -1.74 -0.13 0.01
Sig. (%) 83 83 83 100 100 77 70
Pos. (%) 0 100 0 100 0 4 57
Trend100 Median -0.03 0.43 -0.36 1.71 -1.67 -0.13 0.01
Sig. (%) 63 67 80 100 100 80 70
Pos. (%) 5 100 0 100 0 8 62
2nd stage LO
Benchmark Median 0.02 -0.42 0.66 0.58 0.02 -0.08 0.02
Sig. (%) 43 60 100 83 27 83 47
Pos. (%) 85 6 100 100 63 8 79
Logit Median 0.03 -0.68 1.02 0.94 0.04 -0.14 0.04
Sig. (%) 43 57 93 83 30 83 47
Pos. (%) 85 6 100 100 44 8 79
Vola_std60 Median 0.02 -0.40 0.67 0.58 0.01 -0.08 0.02
Sig. (%) 33 60 97 83 33 83 47
Pos. (%) 90 6 100 100 50 8 79
Vola_abs60 Median 0.00 -0.41 0.66 0.56 0.00 -0.09 0.02
Sig. (%) 37 60 97 83 30 83 47
Pos. (%) 64 6 100 100 44 8 79
Trend100 Median 0.02 -0.14 0.67 0.63 0.02 -0.08 0.02
Sig. (%) 43 47 100 90 27 80 47





Table 3.9: Robustness: Second Stage–Market Order Trader
This table reports the results for the robustness analysis for the sell side for the second stage–market order (MO) trader. The first three rows repeat the results
for the benchmark model, whereas the following three rows present the results for the logistic regression (Logit). The robustness analyses on the definition of
volatility (Vola_100, Vola_std60, Vola_std100, Vola_abs60, Vola_abs100) and on the previous trend (Trend100) are provided. Vola_100 is the exponential
moving average of the previous 100 squared returns with optimal decay parameter. Vola_std60 (Vola_std100) is the standard deviation of the last 60 (100)
mid-quote returns. Vola_abs60 (Vola_abs100) is the absolute change in the last 60 (100) mid-quote prices and Trend100 is the previous price change of the
last 100 observations. All of the regressions include 5 lags of the dependent variable and the time-of-the day dummies. For the sake of brevity, those are not
reported. The median of the estimated coefficients, the percentage of statistically significant coefficients at 5% level, and the percentage of positive coefficients
given that they are significant are provided.
2nd stage MO Vola Trend SPR Vcomp Vsign Vsignopp Dsame1_2 Dsame2_max Dopp1_2 Dopp2_max
Benchmark Median 0.19 1.20 -0.01 -0.51 -0.08 -0.09 0.01 0.01 -0.07 -0.01
Sig. (%) 100 67 7 63 53 50 13 10 37 13
Pos. (%) 100 100 50 0 0 7 0 33 18 25
Logit Median 0.37 2.06 -0.05 -1.00 -0.17 -0.17 0.05 0.01 -0.15 -0.01
Sig. (%) 100 67 7 57 50 50 13 20 43 10
Pos. (%) 100 100 50 0 0 7 0 50 23 33
Vola_100 Median 0.23 1.20 0.00 -0.32 -0.09 -0.10 0.02 0.01 -0.08 -0.01
Sig. (%) 100 67 3 47 50 50 10 20 30 13
Pos. (%) 100 100 0 0 0 7 0 50 22 25
Vola_std60 Median 0.22 1.09 -0.02 -0.41 -0.08 -0.09 0.01 0.01 -0.07 -0.01
Sig. (%) 100 67 7 43 50 50 13 23 37 13
Pos. (%) 100 100 50 0 0 7 0 43 18 25
Vola_std100 Median 0.22 1.21 0.00 -0.40 -0.09 -0.09 0.02 0.01 -0.07 -0.01
Sig. (%) 100 67 7 47 47 43 7 20 30 10
Pos. (%) 100 100 50 0 0 0 0 50 22 33
Vola_abs60 Median 0.02 1.18 0.00 -0.55 -0.12 -0.13 0.07 0.01 -0.03 -0.01
Sig. (%) 77 67 7 70 63 50 10 13 30 17
Pos. (%) 100 100 50 0 0 7 0 25 22 20
Vola_abs100 Median 0.01 1.37 0.01 -0.54 -0.12 -0.15 0.10 0.01 -0.04 -0.01
Sig. (%) 70 67 7 70 57 53 7 13 23 30
Pos. (%) 100 100 50 0 0 13 0 25 29 11
Trend100 Median 0.20 0.62 -0.01 -0.36 -0.12 -0.11 0.03 0.01 -0.08 -0.01
Sig. (%) 100 57 7 57 53 50 10 17 30 17
Pos. (%) 100 94 50 0 0 13 0 20 22 2099
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3.6 Conclusion
This paper investigates how the information content of a limit order book affects
the order choice of an investor. By employing a two-stage sequential ordered probit
model, we first answer whether the competition or signaling effects dominate each
other. Second, we examine the order decision of a trader under the non-walking
through the book mechanism. Finally, we study the trading behavior of institutional
and individual investors separately.
By reconstructing the limit order book for the Istanbul Stock Exchange, we show
that the competition effect is present only at the best quotes while determining the
arrival rate of a market or a limit order. On the other hand, a patient trader perceives
an increase in the depth up to the second best quotes as an increased competition and
submits a more aggressive limit order. An increase in the same-side-depth behind the
top of the book is perceived as a signal of a possible mispricing of the current quotes
and encourages agents to submit less aggressive orders. This is consistent with the
predictions of Goettler et al. (2005) and Goettler et al. (2009). We show that, at
every stage, the competition effect is stronger than the signaling effect.
In our market, in her decision to submit a “large” or “small” market order, only
volatility, previous price trend and volume accumulated on the opposite side of the
book matter for an impatient trader. In other words, none of the price information
affects the order choice of an impatient trader. This result might be explained by the
non-walking through the book property of our market. Because under this mechanism,
the spread and the price distance variables do not capture the execution price of an
aggressive market order.
Finally, the results show that institutional investors trading strategies are affected
by fewer pieces of the limit order book information compared to individual investors.
An institutional investor considers other traders’ actions only for competition and
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signaling does not influence her order choice. Moreover, since they have informational
advantages over individual investors, they do not face the picking off risk that makes
the market order trading more costly in high volatility states.
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Implied Correlation and Expected Returns
4.1 Introduction
Correlation is one of the most important concepts in an extensive variety of the-
ories and applications in finance. Over the last two decades, empirical research has
documented evidence that correlation among assets changes over time and rises dur-
ing periods of market downturn, diminishing the portfolio diversification benefits in
times they are most needed.1 Hence, it is natural to examine whether correlation is
an important indicator of market-wide risk. The volatility of the market is a key de-
terminant of aggregate risk; an increase in market volatility leads to an increase in the
market expected return, since risk averse investors demand a higher risk premium to
hold the market portfolio when systematic risk rises. As changes in correlation induce
changes in market volatility, it is expected that they also affect the time variation of
the market equity premium.
In this paper, I investigate whether changes in implied correlation induces changes
in the market equity premium. Using option data of the S&P100 index and its individ-
ual constituents, I extract information of second moments following Martin (2011)’s
approach to construct the aggregate implied correlation. The motivation of employing
1Relevant studies are Roll (1988), Bollerslev, Engle and Wooldridge (1988), Ho, Stapleton and
Subrahmanyam (1995), Longin and Solnik (2001), Ang and Chen (2002), Moskowitz (2003), Brandt
and Diebold (2006), and Hong et al. (2007), among others.
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a forward-looking measure relies on the advantages of extracting information about
equilibrium stock prices from option data. Bates (1991) suggests that option prices
reflect the market participants’ expectations by giving a direct indication of the ag-
gregate subjective distributions of investors. Moreover, they provide information that
is not fully captured by historical prices. As Buss and Vilkov (2011) point out, option
prices update faster to new market conditions, since historical data have some iner-
tia incorporated. Furthermore, when estimating risk-neutral expectations of higher
moments using options, we do not face the trade-off between using long time-series
of data to obtain precise estimates and short windows to produce conditional instead
of unconditional estimates.2
I show that aggregate implied correlation is highly and positively related to both
monthly and cumulative subsequent market returns. The relationship is stronger
for intermediate prediction horizons, particularly at bimonthly, quarterly and semi-
annually return horizons, and robust to the inclusion of standard predictors such as
valuation ratios, business cycle variables, and second moments of the return distribu-
tions. The economic importance of implied correlation3 is the highest compared to
the other variables: a one standard deviation increase in implied correlation translates
into a 1.31 percent increase in three-months-ahead monthly market returns. Further-
more, I find that these results are not driven by the recent financial crisis. My findings
may indicate that periods of high market-wide correlation produce a deterioration of
the investment opportunity set and, as a consequence, an increase in the equilibrium
expected return.
This paper is part of a vast literature on the predictability of the market risk
premium. Considerable effort has been dedicated to provide evidence that valuation
ratios such as price-to-dividend and price-to-earnings ratios, and different business
2For further discussion see for instance Chang, Christoffersen and Jacobs (2013) and Conrad,
Dittmar and Ghysels (2013)
3Implied correlation is used interchangeable with aggregate implied correlation.
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cycle variables such as consumption over wealth, default spread, and term spread,
among others, have predictive power for market returns (e.g. Keim and Stambaugh
(1986), Campbell (1987), Campbell and Shiller (1988), Campbell and Shiller (1989),
Fama and French (1988), Fama and French (1989), Lettau and Ludvigson (2001),
Lamont (1998), Lewellen (2004)). The forecasting power of second moments has also
received attention in the academic literature. In a recent paper, Bollerslev, Tauchen
and Zhou (2009) show that a high variance risk premium predicts high future stock
market returns, especially at a quarterly return horizon. Their results depend de-
cisively on the method employed: the “model-free” rather than the “Black-Scholes”
options implied volatility, and the use of intraday data instead of daily frequency data
to estimate realized volatilities. Following Bollerslev et al. (2009), and motivated by
Driessen et al. (2009) who show that the pricing of index variance risk depends on
the pricing of individual variance risk and correlation risk, Cosemans (2011) presents
evidence that the predictive power of the market variance risk premium is mainly
driven by the correlation risk premium and the systematic component of the average
variance risk premium in individual constituents. The question of how changes in ag-
gregate realized correlation affect expected returns on the market has been addressed
by Pollet and Wilson (2010). They show that the variance of market returns is ap-
proximately equal to the product of average variance of individual stock returns and
the average realized correlation. Their findings reveal that the physical correlation
strongly predicts future market excess returns, whereas the average variance does not.
This paper contributes to this literature in different ways. First, I provide a
new variable, the aggregate implied correlation, which contains information on future
market returns that cannot be explained by the aforementioned predictors. Second, I
document further evidence for Pollet and Wilson (2010)’s findings by using a forward-
looking measure of correlation: I show that the relationship between the market
variance and the product of individual variances and pairwise correlations also holds
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when using forward-looking estimates, indicating that changes in implied correlation
induce changes in the market implied variance. Third, I document that the forecasting
power of realized correlation is only present when the recent financial crisis is not
included in the analysis, whereas that of implied correlation does not depend on the
sample period. I show that the predictive power of realized correlation is no longer
significant under the presence of aggregate implied correlation, suggesting that a
forward-looking measure reveals more information on the expected market equity
premium than its physical counterpart. Fourth, I extend Cosemans (2011)’s study by
showing that the forecasting power of the correlation risk premium is driven by the
information content of implied correlation.
This study also builds on the research on correlation of asset returns. Existing
theoretical studies have considered the time-varying nature of correlation and its re-
lationship with asset returns. Ang and Bekaert (2002) solve a dynamic portfolio
choice problem under the presence of two i.i.d. regime switches. They identify a
“bear” regime with lower conditional means, higher correlations, and higher volatil-
ities and thus reproducing the asymmetric exceedence on correlations. Buraschi,
Porchia and Trojani (2010) also examine the effect of stochastic volatility and corre-
lations on optimal portfolio choice. By assuming that the covariance matrix follows
a Wishart process, their estimations reveal that the hedging demands are consider-
ably larger compared to models that consider constant correlations. Recent papers
have addressed the dynamics of correlation in an endowment economy. In a two-trees
Lucas (1978) economy Cochrane, Longstaff and Santa-Clara (2008) examine a sim-
ple equilibrium model with homogenous agents. They obtain closed-form solutions
that allows to examine the implications of correlation among stocks. In a similar
economy, Buraschi, Trojani and Vedolin (2011) analyze a model with heterogenous
agents. They document that the larger the belief disagreement, the larger the cor-
relation risk premium. Martin (2013), on the other hand, considers multiple assets
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(Lucas Orchard) to analyze the behavior of asset prices allowing for rare disasters. His
model solution leads to correlations that arise endogenously and increase in times of
disasters. In this study I provide empirical evidence that changes in correlation affect
stock returns in an aggregate perspective. I find a positive and significant relation-
ship between implied correlation and future market excess returns in the time-series,
which is consistent with risk averse investors demanding a higher risk premium to
hold aggregate wealth in periods of high correlation.
Finally, this paper is also related to studies focusing on the risk-return trade-
off of risk-neutral measures of second moments. Ang, Hodrick, Xing and Zhang
(2006) examine the pricing of volatility risk by using the implied volatility index VIX
and find a negative price of risk. Conrad et al. (2013) find that the risk-neutral
volatility, skewness and kurtosis of individual assets are highly connected to future
returns. Chang et al. (2013), on the other hand, document that the market skewness
is negatively priced in the cross-section of stock returns, whereas the positive pricing
of market kurtosis highly depends on the test methodology. My paper extends this
literature by also examining how risk-neutral expectations of second moments affect
the time-series of market returns.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 presents the construction
of implied correlation, the predictive methodology, and data description. The main
findings of the predictive regressions, analysis of the pre-crisis period, out-of-sample
experiments, and the predictive power of correlation risk premium are reported in
Section 4.3. Finally, Section 4.4 concludes.
4.2 Empirical Methodology and Data
One of the aims of this study is to examine the predictive power of implied corre-
lation on market returns. Pollet and Wilson (2010) show that the realized correlation




















Figure 4.1: The figure presents monthly time-series estimates of the implied variance
of the S&P100 index (IV) and the product between the implied correlation (IC) and
the average implied variance of the S&P100 individual components (avgIVi), for the
period from January 1996 to December 2010. Implied variances for the index and
for all of the individual components are calculated as the risk-neutral expectations of
the 30-days-ahead variance from equation (4.5). The implied correlation is obtained
from equation (4.4) by using the implied variance estimates. Variances are reported
in percentages squared
variance. They find that the realized variance of the S&P500 index is almost equal to
the product between the average realized variance of the individual components and
the average of pairwise realized correlations. In Figure 4.1, I show that this relation
also holds almost perfectly when using risk-neutral measures. Changes in implied
correlation induce changes in the market implied variance, also indicating that the
option-implied correlation may reveal information on aggregate risk (the details of
the construction of implied variances and correlation are provided below). Moreover,
as forward-looking measures incorporate new market conditions quicker than histor-
ical estimates, I expect that implied correlation performs better in explaining future
market risk premia compared to its physical counterpart.
This section presents the construction of aggregate implied correlation, the predic-
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tive regression methodology to forecast stock market returns, and a detailed descrip-
tion of the data used in the analysis. Summary statistics of the explanatory variables
are also provided.
4.2.1 Construction of Implied Correlation
The instantaneous variance of the index at a given time t, σ2It, is a function of the
instantaneous variance of individual constituents, σ2it, and the correlation between












where wit denotes the market weight of ith component. From this equation, I can
obtain an expression for the expected integrated variance under the risk-neutral prob-


























By assuming equal pairwise implied correlations between all of the pair stock returns,
ρijτ = ρτ , and given that it is not possible to estimate the second term of the previous











































































ICt represents the market’s expectation of future market-wide correlation, implied
by option prices of the index and prices of options on its components. It summarizes
the pairwise correlations among all the individual components. An increase in ICt is
associated with a deterioration of the market’s expectations of the portfolio diversi-
fication benefits.
Estimation of ICt
To calculate the implied variance of the index and implied variance of the index
components, I use the risk-neutral variance of simple returns which can be estimated
from the strike of a simple variance swap. Martin (2011) introduces this financial
contract with different properties than a standard variance swap. For instance, simple
variance swaps can be hedged in the presence of jumps and they measure the risk-
neutral variance of simple returns. According to Martin (2011), it also provides a
natural way to calculate implied correlations, since the decomposition of the index
variance (equation (4.1)) refers to simple returns, not log returns.






, is approximated as the strike of a simple variance swap defined as,











where FT denotes the underlying asset’s forward price to time T at time 0, and
putT (K) and callT (K) are the put and call prices with maturity date T and strike
price K, respectively. The integral is defined over an infinite set of strike prices. By
assuming that the available strike prices of the put options belong to the interval
[KPmin, K
P
max] where 0 < KPmin < KPmax < +∞, I solve the integral numerically using
the trapezoidal method. Thus, the first term on the right hand side of equation (4.5)























In a similar manner, I numerically approximate the second term of the right hand
side of equation (4.5) to finally obtain the estimates of the implied variance for the
index and individual stocks.
I use daily option data provided by OptionMetrics for the S&P100 index and its
constituents from January 1996 to December 2010. I collect the following information:
expiration dates, strike prices, highest closing bid and lowest closing ask for both put
and call options. Daily closing stock prices are obtained from the CRSP database. I
filter the data based on the following criteria: First, I delete all double entries. Second,
I remove all the observations with empty implied volatility, since this case corresponds
to options with non-standard settlements, and third, I remove all entries with highest
closing bid equal to zero. Similar to Martin (2011), I approximate the forward price
to the spot price. The implied variance is estimated for different maturities and by
interpolating I construct daily estimates with 30 days of time-to-maturity. Monthly
time-series are given by the estimates at the end of each month. Once I approximate
the implied variance for the index and its constituents, I finally obtain the aggregate
implied correlation from equation (4.4).
4.2.2 Predictive regression methodology
The empirical methodology relies on a standard regression model of monthly mar-
ket risk premium on the lagged implied correlation, and standard control predictors
for different return horizons h,
rxmt+h = α1(h) + α2(h)ICt + controls+ εt, (4.7)
where rxmt+h is the monthly market return in excess of the monthly risk free rate at
t + h, and controls is a set of control predictors described below. The coefficient of
interest α2(h) is expected to be positive. This is consistent with risk averse investors
perceiving states of high market-wide correlation as an increase in aggregate risk,




In order to construct the market risk premium, I use (log) market returns based
on the CRSP NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ value-weighted portfolio in excess of the one-
month treasury bill (log) rate obtained from Kenneth French’s online data library.4
Following the extant literature on stock market returns predictability, I consider
three groups of control predictors: (i) second moments and variance risk premia, (ii)
valuation ratios, and (iii) business cycle variables.
Second moments and variance risk premia
Following Pollet and Wilson (2010), I include the average realized correlation as
a control variable. I calculate the sample correlation for each pair of constituents i





where σˆit is the realized volatility of stock i and σˆijt is the covariance between stocks













where Rid is the return of a trading day d, and Dt is the number of trading days in








Bollerslev et al. (2009) provide evidence of forecasting power of the market vari-
ance risk premium (VRPt) on market returns. Following their study, I compute VRPt

















where the time horizon T − t is 30 days. The implied variance is estimated by
numerically solving the risk-neutral expectation of the simple return variance defined
in equation (4.5) using the trapezoidal rule described in equation (4.6). The physical
expectation of the market variance is approximated as the realized variation of the
index from t− 1 to t described in equation (4.9).5
Furthermore, Cosemans (2011) documents that the cross-sectional average of the
variance risk premia (VRPit) of the S&P100 constituents is also highly related to the
future market risk premium. In accordance with his study, I also include VRPit as
the value-weighted average of the variance premia on all the index constituents.
Valuation ratios
The price-to-dividend (Pt/Dt) and price-to-earnings (Pt/Et) ratios have been widely
recognized as predictors of market returns (see for instance Campbell and Shiller
(1988), Campbell and Shiller (1989), Fama and French (1988), Lamont (1998), and
Lewellen (2004)). Following these studies, I consider the log of Pt/Dt and the log of
Pt/Et, obtained as the S&P500 price at the end of each month divided by its div-
idends per share and earnings per share accumulated over the last twelve months,
respectively.
Business cycle variables
Lettau and Ludvigson (2001) show that fluctuations in the consumption–wealth
ratio (CAYt) are strong predictors of market excess returns. I construct monthly time-
5I repeat the analysis using intraday frequency data to estimate the realized variance of the
market. The results are presented in Appendix C.
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series on CAYt using the most recently available observations. Quarterly estimates
of the consumption–wealth ratio are obtained from Lettau’s website.
The aggregate variation in stock market returns is also explained by variables
widely used in bond returns (see for instance Keim and Stambaugh (1986), Campbell
(1987), Fama and French (1989), among others). Following these studies, I include the
default spread (DSt), the term spread (TSt), and the relative risk-free rate (RRELt).
DSt is measured as the difference between BAA and AAA corporate bond spreads
from the Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis. TSt is calculated as the difference between
the ten-year Treasury bond and the three-month Treasury bill yields obtained from
the Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis. Finally, RRELt is constructed as the one-month
T-bill rate minus its trailing twelve month moving averages.
4.2.4 Descriptive analysis
Figure 4.2 presents implied and realized correlation estimates. Panels A and
B of Table 4.1 report summary statistics and the unconditional correlation matrix,
respectively. All of the variables are constructed in a monthly basis for the period
from January 1996 to December 2010.
Figure 4.2 shows that the implied correlation is higher than the realized correlation
for most of the sample period, which indicates a positive correlation risk premium.
Consistent with other studies (for instance Cosemans (2011) and Driessen, Maenhout
and Vilkov (2012)), the figure also reveals that correlation increases at stress times
or during periods of market uncertainty. I observe that some of the peaks for both
measures of correlation take place at events such as the LTCM default and Russian
crisis in 1998, the Iraq war in 2003, and the recent financial crisis, with sharp increases
around the collapse of Northern Rock in August 2007 and Lehmann Brothers in
September 2008. In these events, I also observe that the difference between these two

























Figure 4.2: The figure presents monthly time-series estimates of the implied corre-
lation (IC) and the realized correlation (RC) for S&P100 index, for the period from
January 1996 to December 2010. The implied correlation is obtained at the end of
each month using implied variances for the index and for all of the individual compo-
nents, calculated as the risk-neutral expectations of the 30-days-ahead variance from
equation (4.5). The realized correlation is obtained as the cross-sectional average of
the pairwise return correlations of the index components over a one-month window
as illustrated in equation (4.10).
Table 4.1 reports a monthly mean of 0.5, with value ranging from 0.19 to 0.81 and
standard deviation of 0.14 for ICt. The mean of the realized correlation is 0.33, which
indicates a positive average correlation risk premium of approximately 17% for the
sample period. All of the variables have positive autocorrelation coefficients, except
for the second coefficient of the market excess return. ICt, log(Pt/Dt ), log(Pt/Et),
CAYt, DSt, TSt, and RRELt display a first autocorrelation coefficient of more than
0.8. In unreported results, the augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron Unit
Root tests strongly reject the null of a unit root for ICt. However, this is not the case
for the valuation ratios, consumption over wealth, default spread and term spread.
This indicates that the implied correlation exhibits faster mean reversion than these
variables. Panel B shows that ICt is correlated with DSt, TSt, and RRELt, with cor-
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relation coefficients of 0.26, 0.47, and -0.31, respectively. This suggests that changes
in implied correlation partly vary over the business cycle. Moreover, Panel B reveals
that ICt and log(Pt/Dt) are negatively correlated, which may indicate that they have
common information about the variation of expected returns.
4.3 Predictive Regression Results
This section presents the results of the baseline predictive regression (4.7) for the
period from January 1996 to December 2010. In Section 4.3.1, I investigate the in-
sample forecasting power of implied correlation on market excess returns including
second moments of the return distributions, valuation ratios and business cycle vari-
ables as control set. In Section 4.3.2, I explore whether the in-sample findings are
driven by the recent financial crisis by focusing on a subsample period up to December
2006. Furthermore, recent literature has provided evidence for the predictive power
of the correlation risk premium. Thus, I examine in detail whether the information
content of implied correlation on future returns is captured by the correlation risk
premium. Section 4.3.3 reports the results.
All of the findings are based on regressions of the CRSP value-weighted portfolio
excess return on the lagged implied correlation (ICt) and control variables. I use
monthly observations in all the cases. The reported t-statistics are calculated using
Newey-West standard errors to account for possible serial correlations in the residuals.
The discussion of the results is based on the estimated coefficients, their statistical
significance and the adjusted R2’s. To help the interpretation of estimated coefficients,
all of the explanatory variables are standardized to have mean zero and unit variance,
and the market risk premium is in percentage terms.
Finally, in Section 4.3.4, I investigate whether implied correlation has a better
out-of-sample performance than historical average returns. The forecast experiments





Table 4.1: Summary Statistics
The table reports the summary statistics and the correlation matrix of the implied correlation (ICt), the realized correlation (RCt), the variance risk premium
(VRPt), the value-weighted average of variance premia on all the index constituents (VRPit), the log of price-dividend ratio (log(Pt/Dt)), the log of price-
earnings ratio (log(Pt/Et)), the consumption–wealth ratio (CAYt), the default spread (DSt), the term spread (TSt), the relative risk-free rate (RRELt),
and the market excess return (Rmt − Rft). All of the variables are monthly estimates from January 1996 to December 2010. The implied correlation is
obtained at the end of each month using implied variances for the index and for all of the individual components, calculated as risk-neutral expectations of
the 30-days-ahead variance from equation (4.5). VRPt is the difference between the market implied variance, calculated using equation (4.5) and the market
realized variance, calculated as the sum of squared daily index return deviations over a one-month window. log(Pt/Dt) is obtained as the ratio of the S&P500
index price and its dividends per share aggregated over the last twelve months. log(Pt/Et) is constructed as the price of the S&P500 index divided by its
accumulated earnings over the last twelve months. Monthly time-series on CAYt are obtained by using the most recently available quarterly observations.
DSt is calculated as the difference between BAA and AAA corporate bond spreads. TSt is constructed as the difference between the ten-year Treasury bond
and the three-month Treasury bill yields. RRELt is calculated as the one-month T-bill rate minus its most recent twelve month moving averages. Finally,
Rmt − Rft is the difference of the CRSP value-weighted portfolio (log) returns and the one-month treasury bill (log) rate. VRPt and VRPit are reported in
percentages squared, and RRELt and Rmt − Rft are reported in percentage terms.
ICt RCt VRPt VRPi log(Pt/Dt) log(Pt/Et) CAYt DSt TSt RRELt Rmt −Rft
Panel A: Summary Statistics
mean 0.50 0.33 2.39 -25.69 3.99 3.24 -0.59 1.01 1.68 -1.63 0.33
min 0.19 0.05 -325.93 -603.13 3.16 2.71 -3.73 0.55 -0.53 -23.17 -20.49
max 0.81 0.78 48.62 37.44 4.41 4.83 3.14 3.38 3.70 12.83 10.37
st. dev. 0.14 0.14 33.82 66.14 0.24 0.42 2.00 0.49 1.21 7.24 4.99
AC(1) 0.81 0.61 0.51 0.46 0.97 0.93 0.98 0.96 0.98 0.85 0.15
AC(2) 0.73 0.46 0.26 0.30 0.94 0.86 0.95 0.89 0.94 0.82 -0.05
Panel B: Unconditional Correlation Matrix
ICt 1.00
RCt 0.57 1.00
VRPt -0.01 -0.39 1.00
VRPi -0.05 -0.24 0.90 1.00
log(Pt/Dt) -0.49 -0.53 0.23 0.13 1.00
log(Pt/Et) 0.16 0.04 0.04 -0.12 -0.13 1.00
CAYt 0.18 -0.25 0.04 -0.14 0.19 0.12 1.00
DSt 0.26 0.54 -0.51 -0.51 -0.65 0.41 -0.20 1.00
TSt 0.47 0.39 -0.06 -0.02 -0.40 0.39 -0.08 0.42 1.00
RRELt -0.31 -0.27 0.08 0.14 0.22 -0.39 -0.21 -0.45 -0.47 1.00
Rmt − Rft -0.02 -0.29 0.32 0.28 0.10 0.12 0.00 -0.23 0.01 0.13 1.00
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the predictive ability is assessed by the out-of-sample R2.
4.3.1 In-sample predictive power
Table 4.2 presents the simple regression results of monthly market excess returns
on the lagged ICt at different forecast horizons. Panel A reveals that the implied cor-
relation is strongly related to subsequent monthly market excess returns, particularly
at return horizons from one to six months. The significance is at a 5% level and the
highest adjusted R2s are 6.81%, 6.23% and 4.77% when explaining monthly market
returns at two, three and six months ahead. For the same horizons, a one standard
deviation increase in ICt translates into 1.36%, 1.31% and 1.17% increase in market
excess returns, respectively.
The results indicate a positive and economically significant relationship between
ICt and the future market risk premium. When examining my findings after the
inclusion of traditional predictors, I find that this relationship is particularly strong
for market returns at two, three and six months in the future. Table 4.3 reports
the regression results when the forecast horizon is two months ahead. The first five
columns present the simple setting results on control variables.6 The figures reveal
that the variance risk premium (VRPt) and the value-weighted cross-sectional aver-
age of individual stocks’ variance risk premium (VRPit) have significant predictive
power for monthly market risk premium, two periods ahead. These results are consis-
tent with Bollerslev et al. (2009) and Cosemans (2011), who document a significant
relationship between the VRPt and VRPit on subsequent cumulative market excess
returns, respectively. Both of these studies show that a higher difference between the
model free implied variance (MFIV) and the realized variance obtained from intraday
frequency observations is positively connected to the future market risk premium.
My findings provide further evidence of a significant relationship when using the im-
6For the sake of brevity, I only report the coefficients that are found to be significant in at least





Table 4.2: Predictive Regressions of Monthly Market Risk Premium
Panel A presents the results of the following predictive regression: rxmt+h = α1(h)+α2(h)ICt+t, where the dependent variable is monthly market excess return
at t+ h, h the forecast horizon in months, and ICt the implied correlation defined in Table 4.1. The regression is based on monthly data from January 1996
to December 2010. The coefficients are estimated with ordinary least squares and t-statistics are calculated using Newey-West standard errors to account for
possible serial correlation in the residuals. The implied correlation is standardized to have mean zero and standard deviation equal to one, and the dependent
variable is in percentage terms.
h 1 2 3 4 5 6 9 12 15 18 24 36
Panel A
ICt 0.94 1.36 1.31 1.04 0.91 1.17 0.58 0.70 0.54 0.52 1.13 -0.42
(2.84) (4.64) (4.16) (3.20) (2.32) (3.63) (1.61) (2.03) (1.56) (1.46) (2.80) (-0.80)
constant 0.32 0.32 0.31 0.30 0.29 0.30 0.30 0.27 0.28 0.20 0.16 0.06
(0.79) (0.79) (0.81) (0.79) (0.76) (0.78) (0.71) (0.64) (0.64) (0.46) (0.36) (0.13)
adj. R2 (%) 3.01 6.81 6.23 3.67 2.65 4.77 0.73 1.30 0.49 0.41 4.19 0.01
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plied variance approximated as the strike of a simple variance swap and the realized
variance estimated with daily frequency data.
When I compare the simple regression results with the second column of Table
4.2, I observe that the economic importance of ICt dominates all of the explanatory
variables. The statistically most important control variable, VRPt, is expected to
produce an increase of 0.94% of monthly market risk premium, two months ahead.
The implied correlation, on the other hand, translates into 1.36% increase in market
excess returns. Moreover, ICt explains a higher proportion of the market risk premium
variation compared to the other variables. Once more, VRPt is the only control
variable that appears to explain a fair part of the variation in subsequent returns.
However its adjusted R2 is only 2.98%, which is less than half than that of the implied
correlation.
The last ten columns report the regression results when ICt is included along
with different control variables. To conserve space, I only report the results that
represent the general findings.7 Columns VI to XI present different combinations
including ICt and second moments/variance risk premia as regressors. The figures
reveal that the slope of the implied correlation remains statistically significant at a
5% level. Not surprisingly, combining ICt with VRPt produces an adjusted R2 of
10.02%. Moreover, the slope of the realized variance (RVt) becomes negative and
statistically significant along with ICt. However, column IX suggests that in the
presence of ICt, RVt contains information on subsequent returns that is given by
VRPt. Focusing on VRPit, columns X and XI indicate that the information content
of this variable is also captured by VRPt.
In the last set of columns (XII to XIV), I show the results when the log of price-to-
dividend ratio (log(Pt/Dt)) and business cycle variables are included in the multiple
7I also analyze many other different specifications (not reported) reaching qualitatively the same





Table 4.3: Predictive Regressions: Two Months Ahead
The table presents the regression results of monthly market excess returns Rmt −Rft on the lagged implied correlation ICt and different set of lagged control
predictors at a prediction horizon of two months ahead. The regressions are based on monthly data from January 1996 to December 2010. The coefficients
are estimated with ordinary least squares and t-statistics are calculated using Newey-West standard errors to account for possible serial correlation in the
residuals. IVt is the implied variance of the S&P100 index calculated as the risk-neutral expectations of the 30-days-ahead variance from equation (4.5) at
the end of each month. RVt is the realized variance of the S&P100 index estimated from equation (4.9). The rest of the variables are defined in Table 4.1.
All the explanatory variables are standardized to have mean zero and standard deviation equal to one, and the dependent variable is in percentage terms.
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI XII XIII XIV XV
ICt 1.49 1.55 1.37 1.16 1.40 1.34 1.39 1.66 1.79 1.65
(4.25) (4.57) (4.24) (3.54) (4.40) (4.17) (2.96) (5.76) (4.44) (5.00)
IVt 0.36 -0.30
(0.79) (-0.67)
RVt -0.38 -0.76 0.91
(-1.36) (-2.75) (1.21)
VRPt 0.94 0.96 1.77 1.66 0.90
(2.53) (3.21) (2.29) (2.34) (2.86)










RRELt 0.97 0.77 0.90
(2.36) (1.90) (2.49)
constant 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32
(0.72) (0.77) (0.84) (0.80) (0.74) (0.82) (0.88) (0.90) (0.88) (0.86) (0.90) (0.79) (0.90) (0.90) (1.01)
adj. R2 (%) -0.05 0.00 2.98 1.12 0.99 6.57 8.47 10.02 10.02 8.40 9.95 6.29 9.70 8.86 12.41
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regression. The descriptive analysis in Panel B of Table 4.1 reveals that ICt and
log(Pt/Dt) may possibly share information on future returns. The correlation matrix
also suggests that part of the variation of ICt relates to the business cycle. Hence, it is
extremely important to examine whether the forecasting power of implied correlation
on future market risk premium remains positive and significant after controling for
these variables.
Overall, ICt is highly significant in all of the specifications examined. The lowest
t-statistics is 2.96 when combining the implied correlation with the log of price-to-
dividend ratio. Having these two variables together actually reduces the adjusted
R2 of the model. Moreover, I find that the relative risk-free rate (RRELt) becomes
statistically significant in conjunction with the implied correlation. The adjusted R2
increases to almost 10%, which is higher than the fraction of the variation explained
when all of the business cycle variables are included in the multiple setting (columns
XIII and XIV). Finally, as expected, ICt along with VRPt and RRELt explain an
important proportion of the variation of monthly market excess returns two months
in the future.
I also provide evidence for the forecasting power of implied correlation when the
focus horizon is three months ahead (Table 4.4). Similar conclusions are obtained:
The economic importance of ICt (1.31%) is also the highest compared to the rest
of the variables in a simple regression setting and the explanatory power of ICt is
strongly robust to the inclusion of different predictors. I again observe that ICt and
RRELt perform well in a bivariate setting; the economic importance and t-statistics
of both variables increase substantially, and in conjunction they reach an adjusted R2
of 11.34%.
Once more, the story is similar for a prediction horizon of six months. The new
findings of Table 4.5 show that the coefficients of the implied variance (IVt) and real-





Table 4.4: Predictive Regressions: Three Months Ahead
The table presents the regression results of monthly market excess returns Rmt −Rft on the lagged implied correlation ICt and different set of lagged control
predictors at a prediction horizon of three months ahead. The regressions are based on monthly data from January 1996 to December 2010. The coefficients
are estimated with ordinary least squares and t-statistics are calculated using Newey-West standard errors to account for possible serial correlation in the
residuals. IVt is the implied variance of the S&P100 index calculated as the risk-neutral expectations of the 30-days-ahead variance from equation (4.5) at
the end of each month. RVt is the realized variance of the S&P100 index estimated from equation (4.9). The rest of the variables are defined in Table 4.1.
All the explanatory variables are standardized to have mean zero and standard deviation equal to one, and the dependent variable is in percentage terms.
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI XII XIII XIV XV
ICt 1.63 1.51 1.32 1.48 1.34 1.29 1.35 1.70 1.69 1.70
(4.00) (4.18) (4.07) (3.69) (4.11) (4.02) (2.78) (5.06) (4.43) (4.79)
IVt 0.00 -0.73
(0.00) (-1.56)
RVt -0.44 -0.82 -0.67
(-1.26) (-2.48) (-0.67)
VRPt 0.73 0.75 0.15 1.39 0.66
(2.47) (2.03) (0.15) (1.48) (1.98)










RRELt 1.25 1.30 1.20
(2.84) (3.01) (2.98)
constant 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31
(0.73) (0.75) (0.78) (0.76) (0.75) (0.84) (0.87) (0.87) (0.87) (0.85) (0.87) (0.81) (0.95) (0.95) (1.01)





Table 4.5: Predictive Regressions: Six Months Ahead
The table presents the regression results of monthly market excess returns Rmt −Rft on the lagged implied correlation ICt and different set of lagged control
predictors at a prediction horizon of six months ahead. The regressions are based on monthly data from January 1996 to December 2010. The coefficients
are estimated with ordinary least squares and t-statistics are calculated using Newey-West standard errors to account for possible serial correlation in the
residuals. IVt is the implied variance of the S&P100 index calculated as the risk-neutral expectations of the 30 days-ahead-variance from equation (4.5) at
the end of each month. RVt is the realized variance of the S&P100 index estimated from equation (4.9). The rest of the variables are defined in Table 4.1.
All the explanatory variables are standardized to have mean zero and standard deviation equal to one, and the dependent variable is in percentage terms.
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI XII XIII XIV XV
ICt 0.96 1.01 1.15 1.13 1.12 1.12 1.06 1.54 1.19 1.54
(3.15) (3.52) (4.06) (3.56) (3.83) (3.84) (2.63) (4.01) (3.31) (4.27)
IVt 0.89 0.45
(2.34) (0.96)
RVt 0.88 0.62 0.11
(3.02) (1.93) (0.14)
VRPt -0.67 -0.64 -0.54 -0.05 -0.72
(-1.84) (-2.48) (-0.79) (-0.07) (-2.50)










RRELt 1.13 1.74 1.19
(2.19) (2.84) (2.31)
constant 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30
(0.71) (0.70) (0.69) (0.69) (0.73) (0.77) (0.77) (0.78) (0.78) (0.77) (0.77) (0.78) (0.91) (1.01) (0.94)
adj. R2 (%) 2.52 2.47 1.17 1.78 1.54 4.86 5.63 5.81 5.26 6.12 5.57 4.36 8.74 10.29 10.25
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at a 5% level in a simple regression setting. However, looking at the bivariate regres-
sions, I observe that the explanatory power of these variables is reduced including
ICt. Furthermore, log(Pt/Dt) is found to be weakly significant per se, but it looses
its significance after the inclusion of ICt.
In summary, my findings reveal that the in-sample forecasting power of implied
correlation is robust to the inclusion of traditional predictors of market risk premium,
particularly at prediction horizons of two, three and six months ahead. First, implied
correlation contains information on future market returns that cannot be captured by
second moments and variance risk premia. Second, valuation ratios do not perform
well for the sample period of this study, and combining log(Pt/Dt) along with ICt
actually reduces the fit of the model. Third, when controling for all of the business
cycle variables, ICt is still highly significant, indicating that there is extra information
of implied correlation that is not captured by these variables. Fourth, RRELt does
not have a forecasting power alone, however it significantly explains future market
excess returns in the presence of ICt. Both variables together explain a high fraction
of the market returns variation.
Finally, I perform two extra empirical exercises as robustness checks: first, the
market realized variance is estimated from high-frequency–as opposed to daily–observations8
and second, I use the cumulative returns as dependent variable. In both cases I ob-
tain qualitatively the same findings previously discussed. Detailed explanations of
this analysis along with the main results are reported in Appendix C.
4.3.2 Pre-crisis period
In this section, I investigate whether the relationship between implied correlation
and future market returns is driven by the crisis period. To this end, I repeat the
analysis but only considering a subsample from January 1996 to December 2006.






Table 4.6: Predictive Regressions in the Pre-crisis Period
This table presents the regression results for the pre-crisis period. Panel A reports the results of the following predictive regression: Rmt − Rft = α1(h) +
α2(h)ICt + t, where the dependent variable is monthly market excess return at t + h, h the forecast horizon in months, and ICt the implied correlation
defined in Table 4.1. Panel B reports the multivariate predictive regression results with a forecast horizon of three months ahead. The regressions are based on
monthly data from January 1996 to December 2006. The coefficients are estimated with ordinary least squares and t-statistics are calculated using Newey-West
standard errors to account for possible serial correlation in the residuals. RVt is the realized variance of the S&P100 index estimated from equation (4.9).
The rest of the variables are defined in Table 4.1. All the explanatory variables are standardized to have mean zero and standard deviation equal to one, and
the dependent variable is in percentage terms.
h 1 2 3 4 5 6 9 12 15 18 24 36
Panel A
ICt 0.97 1.19 1.28 0.88 0.63 0.99 0.83 0.79 0.79 0.81 0.55 -1.01
(2.90) (3.72) (4.06) (2.52) (1.41) (3.30) (1.85) (1.93) (2.02) (1.97) (1.34) (-2.55)
constant 0.47 0.46 0.46 0.45 0.43 0.45 0.45 0.41 0.43 0.32 0.26 0.13
(1.30) (1.33) (1.35) (1.31) (1.22) (1.27) (1.21) (1.09) (1.08) (0.82) (0.61) (0.32)





Table 4.6: Predictive Regressions in the Pre-crisis Period (cont.)
Panel B I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI
ICt 1.28 0.97 1.48 1.06 1.34 1.24 1.69 1.72
(4.06) (2.36) (4.68) (3.16) (4.36) (2.59) (3.92) (5.10)







log(Pt/Dt) -0.97 -0.50 0.56
(-2.87) (-1.43) (1.06)
log(Pt/Et) -0.68 -0.79 -1.16 -0.31









constant 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46
(1.35) (1.26) (1.30) (1.23) (1.35) (1.31) (1.40) (1.50) (1.55) (1.51) (1.48)
adj. R2 (%) 7.09 5.07 3.76 1.43 7.56 9.32 7.30 9.33 9.73 9.03 12.03
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Table 4.6 presents the results.
The simple regression results reported in Panel A indicate that ICt also predicts
monthly market risk premium in the pre-crisis period, similarly at short and inter-
mediate forecast horizons. The highest adjusted R2 is around 7% when predicting
returns three months ahead. Moreover, the economic importance and t-statistics are
also the highest for this forecast horizon. To explore in more detail the explanatory
power of ICt in a multiple setting, I report the predictive regression results with a
forecast horizon of three months in Panel B. The first set of columns shows the simple
regression results of the control variables with a significant coefficient. New interest-
ing findings compared to the main results are reached in the pre-crisis analysis. First,
the realized correlation (RCt) presents the evidence of forecasting power reported
by Pollet and Wilson (2010). However, the slope of RCt is not longer significant
when ICt is also included in the specification (column V). This result may indicate
that a forward-looking measure contains more information than a physical measure
of correlation on market risk premium.
Second, valuation ratios are significantly related to the future equity premium
when the financial crisis is not included in the analysis. Unreported results reveal
that the log(Pt/Dt) is significant in a simple setting for return horizons from one
to almost two years. The price-to-earnings ratio, on the other hand, also presents
a higher predictive power compared to the full sample results, but not as strong as
log(Pt/Dt). However, when examining the multivariate setting, I observe that the
explanatory power of log(Pt/Dt) is highly reduced under the presence of ICt. In
summary, the multivariate specifications illustrate that the explanatory power of ICt
is remarkably robust to the inclusion of different control variables, which indicates
that the information content of ICt on future market returns is also not captured by
second moments, variance risk premia, valuation ratios, and business cycle variables
in the pre-crisis period.
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4.3.3 Analysis of the correlation risk premium
Cosemans (2011) shows that the correlation risk premium (CRPt) is significantly
related to the future market risk premium, particularly at short forecast horizons.
Moreover, he documents that the forecasting power of the variance risk premium is
partly driven by CRPt. In this line, I examine whether the predictive power of ICt is
also captured by the correlation risk premium.
To this end, I compute CRPt as the difference between the risk-neutral and phys-
ical expectations of correlation, ICt−RCt, and conduct two different analyses. First,
I run the baseline regression (4.7) considering both monthly and cumulative market
returns as dependent variables, and ICt and CRPt as predictors.9,10 Second, I ana-
lyze whether predicting market returns combining ICt and RCt gives a better fit than
considering only ICt − RCt. Note that the second specification is nested in the first
one, therefore I employ a likelihood ratio test (LR test) with the following restricted
and unrestricted models:
R model : rxt+h = β0 + β3(ICt − RCt) + εt, (4.12)
U model : rxt+h = β0 + β1ICt + β2RCt + t, (4.13)
where the null and alternative hypotheses are as follows:
H0 : β2 = −β1,
HA : β2 6= −β1,
I calculate the log likelihood under the null and alternative hypotheses, LLU and
LL0, respectively, to finally perform the LR test, where LR =2(LLU−LL0) distributes
χ2(1).
Table 4.7 reports the results with a focus return horizon from one up to six months
ahead. Each header row specifies the name of the indepedent variable considered in
9Cosemans (2011) performs his analysis by using cumulative market returns.





Table 4.7: Analysis of the Correlation Risk Premium
The first three set of rows of the table present the predictive regression results of monthly market returns at t+ h and cumulative market returns from t+ 1
up to t + h on the implied correlation (ICt), the realized correlation (RCt), and the difference ICt−RCt, i.e., the correlation risk premium (CRPt). When
predicting monthly market returns, t-statistics are calculated using Newey-West standard errors. When the dependent variable is cumulative market returns,
I employ Britten-Jones et al. (2011)’s standard errors to correct for the overlapping problem. The table also reports the likelihood ratio test for the following
unrestricted (U) and restricted (R) models: U model : rxt+h = β0 + β1IC + β2RCt + t and R model : rxt+h = β0 + β3CRPt + εt. The null and alternative
hypotheses are as follows: H0 : β2 = −β1 and HA : β2 6= −β1. The regressions are based on monthly data from January 1996 to December 2010. All the
explanatory variables are standardized to have mean zero and standard deviation equal to one, and the dependent variable is in percentage terms.
Dep. Variable Monthly Market Excess Returns Cumulative Market Excess Returns
h 1 2 3 4 5 6 2 3 4 5 6
I
ICt − RCt 0.71 1.08 1.04 0.72 0.37 0.85 0.90 0.93 0.88 0.78 0.80
(1.63) (2.30) (2.54) (1.70) (0.70) (2.10) (2.75) (3.04) (2.93) (2.65) (2.74)
adj. R2 (%) 1.46 4.09 3.72 1.45 -0.03 2.24 5.06 8.40 9.65 9.14 11.18
II
ICt − RCt 0.32 0.54 0.52 0.27 -0.10 0.35 0.44 0.46 0.42 0.33 0.35
(0.50) (0.88) (1.06) (0.54) (-0.17) (0.67) (1.21) (1.37) (1.30) (1.06) (1.13)
ICt 0.78 1.09 1.05 0.90 0.96 0.99 0.92 0.96 0.93 0.90 0.90
(1.47) (2.82) (3.00) (2.35) (2.36) (2.17) (2.34) (2.56) (2.55) (2.53) (2.58)
adj. R2 (%) 2.78 7.16 6.52 3.33 2.12 4.58 9.01 15.13 17.79 18.41 22.08
III
RCt -0.34 -0.57 -0.55 -0.29 0.11 -0.37 -0.47 -0.49 -0.44 -0.35 -0.36
(-0.50) (-0.88) (-1.06) (-0.54) (0.17) (-0.67) (-1.21) (-1.37) (-1.3) (-1.06) (-1.13)
ICt 1.14 1.68 1.62 1.20 0.85 1.37 1.40 1.46 1.39 1.26 1.27
(2.72) (3.23) (3.32) (2.51) (1.44) (3.33) (3.44) (3.73) (3.60) (3.32) (3.40)
adj. R2 (%) 2.78 7.16 6.52 3.33 2.12 4.58 9.01 15.13 17.79 18.41 22.08
χ2(1) 3.42 6.81 6.23 4.41 4.81 5.24 8.58 14.52 17.64 19.84 23.79
p_value 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
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the specifications. When the variable to forecast is cumulative market returns, the re-
gression involves overlapping observations inducing serial correlation in the residuals.
I correct for this problem by using Britten-Jones, Neuberger and Nolte (2011)’s stan-
dard errors which provide a simple way to correct for this problem; transformation
of the original regression into an equivalent representation with a non-overlapping
dependent variable. The results reveal that when running simple regressions (spec-
ification I), CRPt highly predicts market excess returns. The explanatory power is
strong when forecasting cumulative as opposed to monthly market returns. However,
when comparing these findings to the findings obtained considering only ICt (Table
4.2 and Panel A of Table C.2), I observe that for all of the forecast horizons examined,
the economic importance and adjusted R2s of the implied correlation are higher.
The bivariate regression results (Specification II) indicate that the predictive
power of ICt is not driven by CRPt. ICt is highly significant in predicting mar-
ket returns under the presence of CRPt at all of the return horizons, except at one
month ahead. The interesting result is that the slope of CRPt is no longer significant
and its economic importance is highly reduced. The likelihood ratio test–in the last
two rows of the table–supports this finding. Specification III presents the results for
the unrestricted model. I observe that for all of the return horizons, except for one
month ahead, I reject the null hypothesis with a p-value lower than 5%. This indi-
cates that forecasting market returns with ICt and RCt as predictive variables instead
of using the difference ICt − RCt, significantly improves the fit of the model.
4.3.4 Out-of-sample tests
The main findings indicate that implied correlation has a strong in-sample pre-
dictive power for the equity premium. However, one of Welch and Goyal (2008)’s
critique is that predictive models often have a poor out-of-sample performance. They
show that historical average returns have a better forecasting power for market ex-
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cess returns than models with “popular” predictor variables. Keeping this critique in
mind, I explore whether implied correlation also exhibits out-of-sample forecasting
power in the sense that it beats the historical average return. I particularly focus on
predictions of two, three and six months ahead, where the implied correlation was




t+h − ̂rxmt+h, (4.14)
ε2,t+h = rx
m
t+h − rxmt , (4.15)
where rxmt+h is the realized return at t + h, ̂rxmt+h is the fitted value obtained from
estimating the predictive model up to time t, and rxmt is the historical average return
calculated up to time t. I use six years of estimation window to obtain the parameters
of the predictive regressions and I recursively calculate the error terms over a testing
window (Ttest) of nine years. Then I evaluate the out-of-sample performance by
comparing the mean-squared errors (MSEs) and the statistical significance of their
difference by employing the test of Diebold and Mariano (1995) (DM). The implied
correlation has a superior forecasting ability if the MSE of the predictive regression











Table 4.8 presents the results. In the first set of three rows, I begin discussing h-
periods-ahead monthly market return forecasts. Consistent with the in-sample results,
I find that the implied correlation delivers positive out-of-sample R2s of more than
5%, 3% and 4% when the forecast horizons are two, three and six months ahead,
respectively. However, DM tests reveal that the difference in mean-squared errors
is not statistically different from zero. Taking into account the short sample period
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Table 4.8: Out-of-Sample Tests
The table reports the out-of-sample forecasting tests for prediction horizons of two, three and six
months for the period from January 1996 to December 2010. The market excess return is based on
the CRSP NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ value-weighted portfolio in excess of the one-month treasury
bill (log) rate. The forecast error at period t + h is obtained as the difference between the market
excess return at t + h and the fitted value from estimating the predictive model up to time t with
the implied correlation as predictor variable. The benchmark error is calculated by employing
the historical average return up to time t. Six years of estimation window are used to obtain the
parameters of the predictive regressions and the error terms are recursively calculated over nine years
of testing window. The out-of-sample R2 is defined in equation (4.16). ∆MSE is the difference
in mean-squared errors, reported in percentages squared, and their statistical difference is assessed
by employing the Diebold-Mariano test (DM t-stat). The first three rows report the statistics of
h-months-ahead forecasts of monthly market excess returns, whereas the last set of rows presents
the one-step-ahead forecasts of h-month-cumulative market excess returns.
h 2 3 6
dep. var: Monthly market excess returns
R2out (%) 5.12 3.20 4.25
∆MSE 1.25 0.79 1.03
DM t-stat (1.35) (0.83) (1.58)
dep. var: Cumulative market excess returns
R2out (%) 6.97 7.61 11.32
∆MSE 1.09 0.89 0.80
DM t-stat (1.64) (1.68) (2.83)
used to perform out-of-sample experiments, this finding provides weak evidence for
monthly market returns predictability at the aforementioned forecast horizons.
The last set of rows reports the out-of-sample predictive power of the implied
correlation on one-step-ahead cumulative returns. For this purpose, I use the fitted
values obtained from the previous monthly predictions to construct cumulative fitted
returns. If the aim is to predict the next-period h-month-cumulative excess returns,
I train the linear predictive model over the estimation window to forecast h-periods-
ahead monthly returns. Then I use the parameters estimated from the trained model
up to time t to obtain the following monthly fitted values: ̂rxmt+1,..., ̂rxmt+h, and by
summing them up, I construct the fitted cumulative excess return from t + 1 to
t + h. The forecast errors are calculated as the difference between the realized and
fitted cumulative returns and finally compared to the benchmark errors of equation
(4.15). In overall, the statistics indicate that the implied correlation has a good out-
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of-sample performance on predicting cumulative returns. On the one hand, when
the return horizon is two and three months, R2out’s are around 7% and the predictive
regression has a statistically significant lower mean-squared prediction error. On the
other hand, the statistics are stronger when the return horizon is 6 months, reaching
an out-of-sample R2 of approximately 11%.
In summary, these findings document consistent evidence with the in-sample
results. The implied correlation exhibits out-of-sample predictive power for both
monthly and cumulative excess returns for the period from January 1996 to Decem-
ber 2010.
4.4 Conclusion
This paper shows that aggregate implied correlation may be an important indi-
cator of market-wide risk. I estimate risk-neutral expectations of second moments
from option prices of the S&P100 index and of the S&P100 individual components
using a sample period from January 1996 to December 2010, and examine whether
correlation provides information on the time-series of expected market returns and/or
affects the risk-return trade-off of stock returns.
I document that implied correlation has strong forecasting power for market excess
returns. The degree of predictability is not only present for cumulative returns,
but also for monthly returns, and it is particularly strong at prediction horizons
of two, three and six months. The implied correlation displays the highest economic
importance, and it explains the largest proportion in the variation of future aggregate
returns, among alternative variables. The results are robust to different specifications,
to the inclusion of standard predictors, and are not driven by the recent financial crisis.
Moreover, this paper provides further evidence for Pollet and Wilson (2010)’s results.
The physical correlation is highly and positively related to three-months-ahead market
returns, in the pre-crisis period. However, its forecasting power is no longer significant
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under the presence of implied correlation, suggesting that a risk-neutral expectation
of correlation reveals more information on the future equity premium. Similarly, my
findings also support the results of Cosemans (2011); the correlation risk premium has
a strong in-sample forecasting power for cumulative market returns at intermediate





The results presented in chapters 2 and 3 indicate that the limit order book
contains information on trader’s order choice and on the short-term price movements.
The Chapter “Global depth and future volatility” proposes a summary measure
of the limit order book distribution (global depth) and provides empirical evidence
that global depth has a strong in-sample and out-of-sample predictive power over
market volatility. The information content of global depth cannot be captured by
other liquidity measures and trading related variables. Moreover, we document that
the predictive power is not only at the aggregate level. For most of the stocks in our
sample, individual stock global depth significantly forecasts individual stock volatility.
Chaper 2 provides market participants a summary measure of the limit order book
distribution with predictive power over volatility. One interesting extension of this
study is to use the volatility forecasts to design a trading strategy. In high volatility
states the risk of being picked off by an informed trader increases. Hence, If investors
are able to anticipate an increase in volatility, they can submit less aggressive orders
and reduce their execution costs. A different route to follow for further research is to
explore the predictive power of our summary measure over returns. As global depth
gives the relative price position of the quoted depth, it may also contain information
on the direction of the price. Unreported results reveal that neither global depth nor
other variables such as trading related variables and liquidity measures are able to
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predict intraday returns for the sample period considered in this study. However,
when we focus on the predictability regressions at a daily frequency, we find that
global depth significantly forecasts daily returns at a 10% level. Considering that
we use two months of data, this result motivates the extension of this analysis by
investigating the global depth–future returns relationship either in another exchange
or by increasing the sample size.
In “Competition, signaling and non-walking through the book: effects on order
choice”, we show that the competition effect is stronger than the signaling effect for
both sides of the market in every stage of the trader’s decision process. For a limit
order agent, the competition effect is the strongest for the volume at the second
best quotes for both, buyers and sellers. On the other hand, as walking through
the book is not allowed, for an impatient trader only volatility, price trend, and
signaling variables on the opposite side affect her order choice decision. Finally,
in comparison to individual traders, we document that institutional traders’ order
submission strategies are less affected by the state of the limit order book.
One novel feature of this chapter is that it analyzes the effect of the limit or-
der book information when walking through the book is not allowed. However, the
main focus of Chapter 3 is on its impact on order choice. One possible extension
could be to analyze the effects of this market mechanism on liquidity. When walking
through the book is allowed, large market orders walk up the book until they are fully
executed. Hence, the transitory price impact of such an order is higher under this
market mechanism. It would be interesting to examine if this is also the case on the
permanent price impact. This would give important information to stock exchanges
for designing their market mechanism rules.
Chapter 4, on the other hand, addresses a question in the area of asset pricing,
and provides empirical evidence on the informativeness of the implied correlation on
both monthly and cumulative market excess returns. I particularly find that the
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predictive power of implied correlation is stronger at intermediate forecast horizons.
It is robust to the inclusion of standard predictors of market returns and robust to
different specifications. The economic importance and the proportion of the time-
series variation in market risk premium explained by the implied correlation are the
strongest among the rest of the variables.
The analysis presented in Chapter 4 points out different directions for further re-
search. As Fama and French (1989) documented, expected bond and stock returns
move together, and the variation in both of them is related to the business conditions.
Hence, an extension of this analysis is to investigate whether implied correlation has
any forecasting power over bond returns. Furthermore, the findings presented could
be reconciled to the literature on cross-sectional asset pricing. Some studies have ex-
amined whether correlation affects the risk-return trade-off of asset returns. Mueller
et al. (2012) use the implied correlation to analyze the cross-section of currency re-
turns. Krishnan et al. (2009), on the other hand, focus on the equity market and
a physical measure of correlation as risk factor. The results of this chapter reveal
that implied correlation is more informative about future market returns than the
realized correlation. Hence, an open question is whether this is also the case in the





Tables A.1, A.2 and A.3 present samples of the order data, trade data and limit
order book data for one of the stocks in our sample for July 1, 2008, respectively.
Table A.1 provides the identity number of an order (OrderID), the number of shares
submitted (Volume), the corresponding limit price in Turkish Lira (Price), and time
(Time). In addition, order data includes identifiers showing whether an order is
valid for one session or for the whole day (TIF), whether the order is submitted
by an individual or an institutional client (TraderType), whether the order is an
immediate or cancel order (KTR) order, and finally the identity number of the split
order (SplitID).
Table A.2 reports the transaction time (Time), the traded price in Turkish Lira
(Price), and the number of shares traded (Volume). The identity numbers of buy and
sell orders for a given trade are also presented (BuyerID and SellerID, respectively).
Finally, Table A.3 presents the best bid and ask prices (B1 and A1, respectively),
the inside spread A1−B1 (SPR), and the number of shares waiting at the best bid
and ask prices (VB1 and VA1). Prices and number of shares beyond the best quotes





Table A.1: Order Data
Table reports a sample of the order data for Akbank (AKBNK) for July 1, 2008. OrderID is the identity number of the submitted order assigned by the
Exchange, Volume is the number of shares to be bought or sold, Price is the limit price (in Turkish Lira), TIF is Time-in-force (0 if the order is valid for one
session, 1 if it is valid for the whole day), Time is the order submission time, TraderType takes value IND or INS if the order is submitted by an individual
client or an institutional client, respectively. KTR takes value E if an order is an immediate or cancel order. Finally SplitID is the ID number of the order
which is split into several orders.
OrderID Ticker OrderType Volume Price TIF Time TraderType KTR SplitID
107200800181205 AKBNK Buy 50000 4.02 0 15:30:35 IND
107200800181222 AKBNK Buy 25000 4.02 1 15:30:37 IND
107200800181254 AKBNK Buy 527 4.02 0 15:30:39 IND
107200800181275 AKBNK Sell Modification 24425 4.04 0 15:30:40 INS E
107200800181304 AKBNK Sell 10000 4.04 0 15:30:41 IND
107200800181309 AKBNK Sell 1000 4.04 0 15:30:42 IND
107200800181363 AKBNK Buy 50 4.04 0 15:30:47 IND
107200800165524 AKBNK Buy Modification 5 4.02 0 15:30:50 IND E
107200800181427 AKBNK Buy 1 4.08 0 15:30:53 IND
107200800181431 AKBNK Sell Modification 5000 4.04 0 15:30:53 IND
107200800181452 AKBNK Buy 1000 4.04 0 15:30:55 IND
107200800181479 AKBNK Buy 100 4.02 0 15:30:57 IND
107200800173629 AKBNK Short Sell 5000 4.04 0 15:31:00 IND
107200800181717 AKBNK Sell 100 4.04 0 15:31:27 IND
107200800181844 AKBNK Buy 100 3.94 1 15:31:40 IND
107200800181888 AKBNK Buy 5000 4 0 15:31:44 INS
107200800182186 AKBNK Sell 15000 4.02 0 15:32:23 IND
107200800182191 AKBNK Buy 1 4.08 0 15:32:24 IND
107200800182195 AKBNK Sell 25000 4.02 1 15:32:25 IND
107200800181304 AKBNK Short Sell 10000 4.02 0 15:32:26 IND
107200800173629 AKBNK Short Sell 5000 4.02 0 15:32:28 IND
107200800182223 AKBNK Buy 500 4 0 15:32:28 IND
107200800182230 AKBNK Sell 700 4.02 0 15:32:40 IND
107200800182346 AKBNK Buy 100 4.02 1 15:32:40 IND
107200800178541 AKBNK Buy Modification 2000 4.02 0 15:32:47 IND




Table A.2: Trade Data
The table reports a sample of the trade data for Akbank (AKBNK) for July 1, 2008. Time is the transaction time, Price is the traded price (in Turkish Lira)
and Volume gives the number of orders traded. BuyerID and SellerID are the identity numbers of the matching buy and sell orders for a given trade.
Ticker Time Price Volume BuyerID SellerID
AKBNK 15:30:35 4.02 11501 107200800181205 107200800181191
AKBNK 15:30:47 4.04 50 107200800181363 107200800173428
AKBNK 15:30:53 4.04 1 107200800181427 107200800173428
AKBNK 15:30:55 4.04 1000 107200800181452 107200800173428
AKBNK 15:32:23 4.02 15000 107200800181205 107200800182186
AKBNK 15:32:24 4.04 1 107200800182191 107200800173428
AKBNK 15:32:25 4.02 23499 107200800181205 107200800182195
AKBNK 15:32:25 4.02 1501 107200800181222 107200800182195
AKBNK 15:32:26 4.02 10000 107200800181222 107200800181304
AKBNK 15:32:28 4.02 5000 107200800181222 107200800173629
AKBNK 15:32:29 4.02 700 107200800181222 107200800182230
AKBNK 15:33:01 4.04 1 107200800182498 107200800173428
AKBNK 15:33:25 4.02 7799 107200800181222 107200800182673
AKBNK 15:33:25 4.02 527 107200800181254 107200800182673
AKBNK 15:33:25 4.02 5 107200800165524 107200800182673
AKBNK 15:33:25 4.02 100 107200800181479 107200800182673
AKBNK 15:33:25 4.02 100 107200800182346 107200800182673
AKBNK 15:33:25 4.02 2000 107200800178541 107200800182673
AKBNK 15:33:25 4.02 1000 107200800182428 107200800182673
AKBNK 15:33:25 4.02 5000 107200800181888 107200800182673
AKBNK 15:33:58 4 10 107200800163849 107200800182976
AKBNK 15:34:09 4.02 15469 107200800183084 107200800182678
AKBNK 15:34:09 4.02 965 107200800183084 107200800161924
AKBNK 15:34:09 4.02 50000 107200800183084 107200800182805
AKBNK 15:34:09 4.02 10000 107200800183084 107200800117710




Table A.3: Limit Order Book Data
The table reports a sample of the limit order book data for Akbank (AKBNK) for July 1, 2008. B1 and A1 are the best bid and ask prices respectively,
whereas SPR is the inside spread calculated as A1−B1. VB1 and VA1 give the number of shares waiting at the best bid and ask prices, respectively. Similarly,
B2 (B10) and A2 (A10) are the second (tenth) best prices and VB2 (VB10) and VA2 (VA10) are the corresponding number of shares.
Time B1 A1 SPR VB1 VA1 B2 A2 VB2 VA2 . B10 A10 VB10 VA10
15:30:35 4.00 4.02 0.02 112816 11501 3.98 4.04 215352 51426 . 3.82 4.2 25154 66670
15:30:37 4.02 4.04 0.02 38499 51426 4 4.06 112816 160316 . 3.84 4.22 25204 32000
15:30:39 4.02 4.04 0.02 63499 51426 4 4.06 112816 160316 . 3.84 4.22 25204 32000
15:30:40 4.02 4.04 0.02 64026 51426 4 4.06 112816 160316 . 3.84 4.22 25204 32000
15:30:41 4.02 4.04 0.02 64026 75851 4 4.06 112816 160316 . 3.84 4.22 25204 32000
15:30:42 4.02 4.04 0.02 64026 85851 4 4.06 112816 160316 . 3.84 4.22 25204 32000
15:30:47 4.02 4.04 0.02 64026 86851 4 4.06 112816 160316 . 3.84 4.22 25204 32000
15:30:50 4.02 4.04 0.02 64026 86801 4 4.06 112816 160316 . 3.84 4.22 25204 32000
15:30:53 4.02 4.04 0.02 64031 86801 4 4.06 112811 160316 . 3.84 4.22 25204 32000
15:30:53 4.02 4.04 0.02 64031 86801 4 4.06 112811 160316 . 3.84 4.22 25204 32000
15:30:55 4.02 4.04 0.02 64031 91800 4 4.06 112811 160316 . 3.84 4.22 25204 32000
15:30:57 4.02 4.04 0.02 64031 90800 4 4.06 112811 160316 . 3.84 4.22 25204 32000
15:31:00 4.02 4.04 0.02 64131 90800 4 4.06 112811 160316 . 3.84 4.22 25204 32000
15:31:27 4.02 4.04 0.02 64131 95800 4 4.06 112811 155316 . 3.84 4.22 25204 32000
15:31:40 4.02 4.04 0.02 64131 95900 4 4.06 112811 155316 . 3.84 4.22 25204 32000
15:31:44 4.02 4.04 0.02 64131 95900 4 4.06 112811 155316 . 3.84 4.22 25204 32000
15:32:23 4.02 4.04 0.02 64131 95900 4 4.06 117811 155316 . 3.84 4.22 25204 32000
15:32:24 4.02 4.04 0.02 49131 95900 4 4.06 117811 155316 . 3.84 4.22 25204 32000
15:32:25 4.02 4.04 0.02 49131 95899 4 4.06 117811 155316 . 3.84 4.22 25204 32000
15:32:26 4.02 4.04 0.02 24131 95899 4 4.06 117811 155316 . 3.84 4.22 25204 32000
15:32:28 4.02 4.04 0.02 14131 85899 4 4.06 117811 155316 . 3.84 4.22 25204 32000
15:32:28 4.02 4.04 0.02 14131 85899 4 4.06 117811 155316 . 3.84 4.22 25204 32000
15:32:40 4.02 4.04 0.02 9131 80899 4 4.06 118311 155316 . 3.84 4.22 25204 32000
15:32:40 4.02 4.04 0.02 8431 80899 4 4.06 118311 155316 . 3.84 4.22 25204 32000
15:32:47 4.02 4.04 0.02 8531 80899 4 4.06 118311 155316 . 3.84 4.22 25204 32000
15:32:52 4.02 4.04 0.02 10531 80899 4 4.06 116311 155316 . 3.84 4.22 25204 32000
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A.2 Calculation of Global Depth
Suppose that the limit order book for stock X at 11:00am is as follows:
Order type Volume Limit price Time Best Bid Best Ask
Sell 50000 8.3 09:30:00 - 8.2
Buy 10000 7.9 09:30:01 7.9 8.2




Sell 3334 8.05 10:58:17 8 8.05
Buy 25000 8 10:58:20 8 8.05
Buy 50000 8 10:58:38 8 8.05
Sell 1 8.1 10:58:50 8 8.05
The first step in the calculation of global depth involves the calculation of the
tick-adjusted price distance ∆ of each limit order in the given book relative to the
best extant limit price:
∆buyi,τ = (p
B
τ − pbuyi )/tick,
∆selli,τ = (p
sell
i − pAτ )/tick,
where pBτ (pAτ ) is the best bid (ask) price in interval τ and p
buy
i (pselli ) is the limit price
of the ith order.
Say the tick size is 0.05. Then we have the following price distances for the orders:
Order type Volume Limit Price Time Best Bid Best Ask ∆
Sell 50000 8.3 09:30:00 - 8.2 5
Buy 10000 7.9 09:30:01 7.9 8.2 2




Sell 3334 8.05 10:58:17 8 8.05 0
Buy 25000 8 10:58:20 8 8.05 0
Buy 50000 8 10:58:38 8 8.05 0
Sell 1 8.1 10:58:50 8 8.05 1
Next, we obtain of the percentage of total volume supplied/demanded at a given
∆ for ∆ = 0, 1, 2, .., 30. This way, we reach the limit order book probability density
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function (LOB–PDF). By integrating the LOB–PDF of the each side of the market
over the ranges of ∆, i.e., by calculating the cumulative frequencies, we obtain the
limit order book cumulative distribution function (LOB–CDF). That is:
Buy side Sell side
∆ Total Volume Frequency Cum. Frequency Total Volume Frequency Cum. Frequency
0 78500 0.270 0.270 68400 0.186 0.186
1 52575 0.181 0.450 71602 0.194 0.380
2 58440 0.201 0.651 54588 0.148 0.528




29 0 0.000 1.000 0 0.000 1.000
30 0 0.000 1.000 0 0.000 1.000
Global depth for each stock is the weighted average of the LOB–CDF, where
the weight function is given in Equation (2.2). For the estimated decay parameter
λ̂ = 0.366, we have the following weights and the resulting global depth (GD):
Buy side Sell side
∆ weights (λ = λ̂) Cum. Freq. weight*cum.freq GD Cum. Freq. weight*cum.freq GD
0 0.307 0.270 0.083 0.186 0.057
1 0.213 0.450 0.096 0.380 0.081
2 0.147 0.651 0.096 0.528 0.078




29 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000
30 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.576 1.000 0.485
Finally, the aggregated global depth for a given interval τ is calculated as the
cross-sectional average of the individual stock global depth measures.
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A.3 Global Depth vs. “Local” Depth
By definition, global depth is related to the standard “local” depth measures,
i.e., the quoted depth up to a given threshold. To investigate their relationship, we
estimate the following regressions for buy and sell sides of the market separately:
GD(∆, λ)s,τ = b0,s + b1,sDEPTHs,τ + s,τ .
For a given limit order book at time τ and for each stock s, DEPTH denotes the
“local” depth measure calculated at different thresholds. First, we calculate the vol-
ume available at the best quotes, DEPTH0. Second, to capture the volume available
beyond the best quotes, we calculate the cumulative volume of orders up to the three
best quotes, DEPTH03, and five best quotes, DEPTH05.1 We evaluate global depth
given in (2.1) and (2.2) at three exogenously given decaying factors, λ = 0, 0.5 and
1. Hence, we first assign equal weights for each of the quotes, then we allow for
exponential decaying weights with a lower and higher decay factors.
The table below presents the results. To conserve space, only the analysis for the
buy side of the market is reported. Results for the sell side are qualitatively similar.
The main conclusion from this analysis is that, irrespective of the chosen decay factor,
the local depth at the best quotes is strongly and positively related to our summary
measure, global depth. As expected, the explanatory power of DEPTH0 over global
depth is increasing with the decay factor; a higher λ makes global depth more closely
related to the depth at the best quotes. However, as the results suggest, even when
λ = 1, DEPTH0 can explain only 42% (33%) of the variation in global depth for
the buy (sell) side. The explanatory power of the depth variables over global depth
increases up to 59% when we include all of the depth variables.
From this analysis, we conclude that although they are positively and significantly
correlated, there is a non-trivial proportion of the variation of global depth that cannot
1As an additional robustness, we employ different depth variables measured not only at the first
three or five quotes, but also at different thresholds. The results are qualitatively similar.
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be explained by the standard depth measures. This analysis suggests that our variable
provides different information than that of the standard depth measures.
Table A.4: Global Depth and “Local” Depth Variables
PANEL A GD(λ = 0)buyτ






constant 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88
[100/100] [100/100] [100/100] [100/100] [100/100]
adj. R2 26.28 28.86 22.99 31.99 29.37
PANEL B GD(λ = 0.5)buyτ






constant 0.34 0.39 0.42 0.38 0.41
[100/100] [100/100] [100/100] [100/100] [100/100]
adj. R2 39.74 14.16 6.23 41.01 45.61
PANEL C GD(λ = 1)buyτ






constant 0.21 0.26 0.30 0.27 0.28
[100/100] [100/100] [100/100] [100/100] [100/100]




This appendix consists of two tables related to Chapter 3, Competition, Signaling
and Non-Walking Through the Book: Effects on Order Choice. Table B.1 presents
the definitions of the key variables used throughout the analysis in the chapter. Table
B.2 on the other hand, summarizes our main findings, expressed qualitatively. For
each finding, we as well include a pointer to the supporting empirical evidence (the
corresponding table), a pointer to similar results in the empirical/theoretical literature





Table B.1: Definitions of Explanatory Variables
The table presents the description of the independent variables used in the two-stage sequential ordered probit model.
Regressors Definition
Covariates for the depth at and beyond the best quotes
Vcomp The total volume of orders at the best quote in the first stage and second stage–MO and
the accumulated volume of orders up to the second best quotes in the second stage–LO for the same side of the book.
Vcompopp The total volume of orders at the best quote in the first stage and
the accumulated volume of orders up to the second best quotes in the second stage–LO for the opposite side of the book.
Vsignal The accumulated volume of orders from the second up to the tenth best quotes in the first stage and second stage–MO and
the accumulated volume of orders from the third up to the tenth best quotes in the second stage–LO for the same side of the book.
Vsignalopp The accumulated volume of orders from the second up to the tenth best quotes in the first stage and second stage–MO and
the accumulated volume of orders from the third up to the tenth best quotes in the second stage–LO for the opposite side of the book.
Covariates for walking through the book
SPR The (tick size adjusted) difference between the best ask and bid quotes.
Dsame1_2 The price distance between the best and the second best quotes for the same side of the book.
Dsame2_max The price distance between the second best ask (bid) and the highest available ask (lowest available bid) quote
for the same side of the book.
Dopp1_2 The price distance between the best and the second best quotes for the opposite side of the book.
Dopp2_max The price distance between the second best ask (bid) and the highest available ask (lowest available bid) quote
for the opposite side of the book.
Additional variables
Vola The exponential moving average of the last 60 mid-quote squared returns.




Table B.2: Summary of the Main Findings
This table presents the summary of our main findings along with the corresponding table. All the variables are defined in Table B.1.
Regressors Main Findings Table Consistent with Inconsistent with
Covariates for the depth at and beyond the best quotes
Vcomp Encourages market orders. 3.4 Parlour (1998), Ranaldo (2004),
Beber and Caglio (2005),
Pascual and Veredas (2009)
It persists beyond the best quotes and 3.3
it is the strongest up to the 2nd best quote.
Vcompopp Discourages market orders. 3.4 Parlour (1998), Ranaldo (2004),
Pascual and Veredas (2009)
Vsign (weakly) discourages market orders. 3.4 Goettler et al. (2005), Pascual and Veredas (2009)
and Goettler et al. (2009)
Discourages the limit order aggressiveness. 3.5 Goettler et al. (2005),
Goettler et al. (2009),
and Pascual and Veredas (2009)
Vcomp/ The competition effect is stronger 3.4, 3.5, 3.6





Table B.2: Summary of the Main Findings (cont.)
Regressors Main Findings Table Consistent with Inconsistent with
Covariates for walking through the book
SPR Discourages MOs. 3.4 Ranaldo (2004),
Beber and Caglio (2005),
Ellul, Holden, Jain,
and Jennings (2007)
Cao et al. (2008),
and Pascual and Veredas (2009)
Encourages aggressive LOs. 3.5 Ellul, Holden, Jain,
and Jennings (2007)
and Pascual and Veredas (2009)
No significant effect on the market order 3.6 Pascual and Veredas (2009)
aggressiveness.
Dopp1_2/ No significant effect on MOs. 3.4 Cao et al. (2008) Pascual and Veredas (2009)
Dopp2_max No significant effect on the market 3.6 Pascual and Veredas (2009)
order aggressiveness.
Additional variables
Vola Discourages MOs. 3.4 Foucault (1999),
Ahn et al. (2001),
Ranaldo (2004),
Beber and Caglio (2005),
Encourages aggressive MOs. 3.6 Hall and Hautsch (2006) Ranaldo (2004)
Trend Discourages (encourages) buy (sell) MOs. 3.4 Beber and Caglio (2005),
Cao et al. (2008)
Encourages (discourages) aggressive buy (sell) LOs. 3.5




C.1 High-Frequency Realized Variance
The appendix examines the predictive power of implied correlation when control-
ing for the market realized variance estimated from intraday data. Bollerslev et al.
(2009) estimate the realized variation from high-frequency observations to analyze
the predictive power of the variance risk premium on market returns. According
with this study, I use the market realized variance estimated from high-frequency
observations obtained from Hao Zhou’s webpage. I compute the implied variance of
the market (IVt) following the methodology described in equations (4.5) and (4.6)
in Section 4.2.1. Then I obtain the market variance risk premium, VRPht, as the
difference between IVt and RVht. Table C.1 presents the results of the predictive
regressions when the dependent variable is three-months-ahead market excess returns
for the period from January 1996 to December 2010. Results for predictions at two
and six months ahead are qualitatively similar.
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Table C.1: Robustness: High-Frequency Market Realized Variance
This table reports the regression results of the three-months-ahead monthly market excess returns
on the implied correlation (ICt), the high-frequency market realized variance (RVht), the high-
frequency variance risk premium (VRPht), and other control predictors defined in Section 4.2.3. The
regression is based on monthly data for the period from January 1996 to December 2010. t-statistics
are calculated using Newey-West standard errors. The explanatory variables are standardized to
have mean zero and standard deviation equal to one, and the dependent variable is in percentage
terms.
I II III IV V VI VII VII
ICt 1.54 1.25 1.47 1.47 1.57
(4.27) (3.88) (3.77) (2.94) (3.91)
RVht -0.50 0.39 -0.90 -0.70
(-1.57) (0.76) (-3.34) (-1.19)
VRPht 0.88 1.18 0.79 0.24 0.84 0.91











constant 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31
(0.75) (0.78) (0.78) (0.86) (0.85) (0.87) (1.02) (1.02)
adj. R2 (%) 0.42 2.52 2.22 8.72 8.15 8.27 12.85 12.32
C.2 Predicting Cumulative Market Excess Returns
This section shows that implied correlation is strongly related to future cumulative





rt+i = β1(h) + β2(h)ICt + controls+ t (C.1)




i=1 rt+i, is the (scaled by the horizon h) cumulative market
excess return from t + 1 up to t + h. The explanatory variables include monthly
estimates for the implied correlation ICt and a set of control predictors, all previously
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defined in Section 4.2.3, for the period from January 1996 to December 2010.
The regressors are standardized to have mean zero and standard deviation equal
to one, and the dependent variable is in percentage terms. As the regression involves
overlapping observations inducing serial correlation in the residuals, I employ Britten-
Jones et al. (2011)’s standard errors. Panel A presents the results at different forecast
horizons when only ICt is included as a regressor. The figures indicates that the
relationship between ICt and future market risk premium is statistically significant
at a 5% level for all of the forecast horizons examined. Particularly, I find that a
one standard deviation increase in the ICt produces 1.19% increase in the subsequent
quarterly market risk premium. The highest adjusted R2 is 40.87% for a bi-annually
horizon. However, this result must be interpreted carefully as Boudoukh, Richardson
and Whitelaw (2008) and Cochrane (2005) argue. They point out that the adjusted
R2 with overlapping observations increases with the return horizon.
When examining my findings in a multivariate context, I observe that the results
are qualitatively the same as the one obtained when the dependent variable is monthly
market returns. For the sake of brevity, Panel B only reports the prediction results
for quarterly returns. In summary, the forecasting power of implied correlation is
remarkably robust to the inclusion of different control variables; it is not captured by
second moments, variance risk premia, valuation ratios and business cycle variables.






Table C.2: Predictive Regressions of Cumulative Market Excess Returns
The table presents the results of the following predictability regression: 1h
∑h
i=1 rt+i = α1(h) + α2(h)ICt + controls+ t, where the dependent variable is the
(scaled by the horizon) cumulative market excess return from t+1 up to t+h, and h is the forecast horizon in months. ICt is the implied correlation described
in Section 4.2.1. controls is a set of control predictors defined in Section 4.2.3. The regression is based on monthly data from January 1996 to December
2010. The coefficients are estimated with ordinary least squares. Britten-Jones et al. (2011) t-statistics to correct for overlapping observations are reported in
parenthesis. All of the variables are standardized to have mean zero and standard deviation equal to one.
h 1 2 3 4 5 6 9 12 15 18 24 36
Panel A
ICt 0.94 1.14 1.19 1.14 1.07 1.08 0.95 0.86 0.81 0.77 0.76 0.57
(2.84) (3.27) (3.52) (3.43) (3.27) (3.34) (3.01) (2.80) (2.70) (2.65) (2.82) (2.50)
constant 0.32 0.30 0.29 0.28 0.26 0.26 0.25 0.24 0.22 0.20 0.12 0.10
(0.79) (0.84) (0.84) (0.83) (0.79) (0.80) (0.82) (0.79) (0.76) (0.72) (0.60) (0.48)





Table C.2: Predictive Regressions of Cumulative Market Excess Returns (cont.)
Panel C I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI
ICt 1.44 1.41 1.20 1.17 1.24 1.20 1.20 1.51 1.59 1.07 1.50





VRPt 0.96 1.10 1.12 1.03 0.89











RRELt 1.01 0.84 0.94
(2.89) (2.02) (2.74)
constant 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29
(0.86) (0.87) (0.88) (0.88) (0.87) (0.88) (0.84) (0.88) (0.86) (0.88) (0.91)
adj. R2 (%) 16.15 21.07 23.09 22.69 20.73 22.70 13.46 23.00 23.33 23.22 30.82154
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